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ABSTRACT 
A long journey - more than a half century - of our constitutional set 
up in terms of governing the country discloses the fact that a coalition 
governing process in the system is as a reality in itself. During June 96 - April 
97, the Government headed by H.D. Deve Gowda, was a kind of curiousity in 
the World of political History. The Prime Minister's party has got only 44 
MPs and all the parties having formed the government put together do not 
account for more than 150 MPs in the Lok Sabha having a total strength of 
545 members. So the major political challenge that India faces today is how 
to make coalitions a viable proposition of government while in states like 
Orissa, West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura, the coalition formula has worked 
reasonably well, the experience of the centre has proved to be a total fiasco. 
The experience of coalition and Minority governments has widened the 
horizone of political leaders and have enlarged the participating space for a 
large assortment of parties and regions in the process of governance. Though 
on an average coalition governments are less stable than on party system 
governments, yet under certain conditions, they have shown more stability. 
However, it is considerable situation in which the pre-condition to extend the 
support by the party - national or regional^ happens to be not only 
unideological but unethical, not with the tone of constitutional morality, who 
will know the fate of such government?, this is not a hypothetical situation but 
a live example of our coalition era. The creditability of such alliances as 
could be seen from the attitude of AIADMK which came up with certain 
conditions including the arbitrary dismissal of the then government by 
opposition for according support to the B.J.P. 
The small parties which have come together to form the minority 
government have only their smallness in common. They have fought elections 
against each other. Any strife between two reasonal parties forming part of 
the combine or a controversy over an action or ommission of the Prime 
Minister or another Minister, or an internal calamity or disturbance, or an 
external event affecting deeply the country may bring down the government. 
What is disturbing is that in case the Government falls, the prospect 
of a strong majority emerging is dim, if elections are held, without some 
reforms for that purpose. We may again get a hung Parliament! However, a 
stability is very much required for the efficiency of the Government and also 
to inspire confidence to the external financial world. For the present 
Parliamentary system to work properly two parties almost equally strong 
sharing the power alternatively, are required. But such a pattern is the result 
of historical factors in a few countries. We can not expect such a situation to 
spring up to its own in India. 
After Independence, we had the rehearsal of democracy with one 
giant party along the miniscule parties was growing to be a challenge to the 
old depository of power, the old party weakened by way of successive splits. 
The new big party developed cracks even before it could achieve majority in 
the country as a whole. Simultaneously we have been witnessing the growth of 
strong regional parties which stand in the way of the development of being 
national parties. So the historical trend in independent India is not towards the 
emergence of big and disciplined national parties, essential for stability. 
Some steps have to be taken towards that end. Of course we can not create 
artificially a two party regime, but we can certainly create conditions 
favourably for its emergence or at least for reaching a stable majority in 
Parliament. 
The first thing to be done to make the present system work is to 
regulate the political parties. The present system is a government by parties; 
parties offer a choice for the representation of the people in parliament; the 
party is the meeting point of the majority and the government. However, the 
constitution which is quite elaborate and consists of not less than 395 articles 
does not contain any provision in respect of political parties. The 
Representation of the People Acts, 1950 and 1951 also did not embody any 
substantive provision in respect of parties, which appear only in schedules and 
nomination forms. It fell on the Election Commission to prescribe the 
particulars to be given by political parties for getting themselves registered 
which it did in the Elections Symbols (Reservation and allotment) order 1968. 
For some check on split, we had to wait for 52nd Amendment of the 
Constitution in 1985, known as the Anti-Defection Law and till 1989, for 
insertion in the Representation of the People Act 1951, of section 29A 
containing elaborate provisions for the registration of the parties. But the 
internal functioning of parties was not adverted to. 
So it is high time that the lacuna is filled up by adequate statutory 
provisions regarding the constitution and mode of functioning of parties in 
order to ensure their commitment to democracy throughout in order to create 
democracy within the parties. 
Since on the other side the present system may lead soon to a 
Parliament with the majority belonging to one part of the country and the 
opposition to another part. Such a geographical divide, if it takes place, would 
be a real danger to our nation marked by diversity. Majority and opposition 
should be prevalent all over the country. The electoral law should be 
conducive to it. 
Though it is not much purposeful to compare the number of 
occasions on which the President's rule were imposed during the period of 
coalition government with that of non-coalition counterpart. Yet it is analysed 
that the demand within the government by coalition formation found inherent 
based condition of supposition. However, the rate of success remained lesser 
due to the coalition factor in opposition. In fact it was the period of single 
dominant party enjoying majority the Parliament, that laid a treck for running 
its successor in dismissing the government in the State. During whole period, 
either the government was dismissed due to the factor of opposite party ruled 
in state or settle the internal differences within the party. The same political 
motivation is more or less reflected in the whole dismissal episode but it is a 
new phenomenon reflected during coalition age as a demand of allies. 
The controversy in relation to the Article, shivers the very roots of 
constitutional institutions in the system. The conferment of the power to 
exercise the provision is coupled with the constitutional duty to protect the 
constitution. The institutions which are under bounden-duty to defend the 
constitution are the President, the Parliament, the Governor and the judiciary. 
Among them a long history of misuse of the provision implicate not only 
President, Governor but Parliament also. Till the judgement was delivered in 
state of Rajasthan Vs. Union of India, holding that if the facts, forming the 
basis of declaration of emergency, were known and malafides are alleged the 
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court could entertain the petition but before this case was decided the states 
High Court had held that it was none of its concern to sit in judgement on 
action taken by the President. Interpreting the Constitution these courts had 
held that the Parliament was the only authority intended to have a decisive say 
in the matter, either by approving or rejecting the resolution and the exercise 
of judicial review was not permitted by the Constitution. The Parliament is 
though an exalted and dignified institution yet, by its nature, character and 
complexion is highly partisan and hence the Parliament, strictly controlled by 
the centre government, is thoroughly incompetent to perform judicial function 
because the overtones are highly political and the consequences to the State 
government are very serious. 
Now it is not difficult to discern an outrageous praradox, made to 
project from the powers and position, stipulated to be conferred both on the 
President and the Governor. The President being the head of the Federal State, 
has to do much of the balancing between the centre and the States to fulfil his 
sacred trust of defending and protecting the Constitution and the Govenror, on 
the other hand, had none of such function to perform yet the former was 
stripped of his powers conferred by the law of the Constitution while the later 
was made vested with unlimited discretionary powers. It did not accord with 
the system envisaged by the Constitution yet every thing came to be 
manipulated with a view to make the system subservient to the petty and paltry 
expediency of the Central Government. 
However, on the point the presidential act done by K.R. Narayanan 
consequently halted an errant government in its tracks by using his 
Constitutional authority and influencing it with his own high moral stature in 
context with the dismissal of the Rabri Devi government in Bihar. In this case 
the Union government bypassed the Supreme Court's guidelines in S.R. 
Bommai's case and ignored its own commitment not to misuse Article 356. 
Mr. Narayanan's second return of a government recommendation for dismissal 
of an elected state government should persuade political parties - all 
inveterate sinners while in office and convenient crusaders while in opposition 
to get together and agree on a minimum set of rules for the imposition of 
President's rule in any state. Hence, precedant set by the President ought to 
be respected by the subsequent one. 
To extricate the system from other factors of subversion it is called 
forth that the procedure and method of Governor's appointment should be 
changed and brought in line with the requirements of the federal parliamentary 
system. He should be appointed by the President on the joint recommendation 
of the Prime Minister, the leader of the opposition and the Chief Minister of 
the state where he is being appointed. In addition to it his discretionary 
powers, which are unlimited and paradoxical to the Parliamentary system 
should be spelled out and catalogued in articulate terms lest he should have 
the freedom to act in a lackadaisical way. ' T T " - > » 
Now in relation to the Provision, since the time of its framing, 
Article 356 has generated serious controversy because the founding fathers 
apprehended that there was possibility of this Article "being abused or 
employed for political purposes" or being resorted to for "unneccessary or 
intolerant action through political prejudice." Also they apprehended that the 
Centre might "intervene in petty provincial matters" on the "slightest pretext" 
"on the pretext of resolving ministerial crisis or on the pretext of purifying or 
reforming maladministration obtaining in a particular State" or on the ground 
of "mismanagement or inefficiency or corruption in a province," or for 
resolving "a mere crisis or a vote of no-confidence in the Ministry by the 
Legislature," or for ensuring "good government" thus "reducing the autonomy 
of the States to a farce. In fact Dr. Ambedkar echoed the sentiments of the 
framers when he said : "The proper thing we ought to expect is that such 
articles will never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead 
latter." 
The main reason for the incorporation of this Article was that the 
founding father recognised the fact that in a country of sub-continental 
dimensions, immense dimensions, immense diversities, socio-economic 
disparities and multitudinous people, with possible divided loyalties, security 
of nation and stability of its polity could not be taken for granted. External 
aggression in Jammu and Kashmir, the emergence of disruptive forces and 
widespread violent disturbances in the wake of partition made them feel the 
imperative need for bestowing the Union with overriding powers to control 
and direct all aspects of administration and legislation throughout the country 
during an emergency arising out of external aggression, internal disturbance 
or the dreakdown of the constitutional machinery in a State. The Constitution 
gives plenary authority to the States to make laws and administer them in the 
field assigned to them. That being so, pointed out Dr. Ambedkar in the 
Constituent Assembly, the Centre's interference in the administration of 
provincial affairs must be 'by and under' some constitutional obligations, so 
that the 'invasion' by the Centre in the provincial field "must not be an invasion 
which is wanton, arbitrary and unauthorised by law". This constitutional 
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obligation and authority, as stated by Article 356, was considered essential in 
order to contain the activities of desintegrating and divisive forces. 
The provisions relating to the imposition of President's Rule 
constitute an important exception and limitation to the principle of 
constitution and limitation to the principle of constitutional Governments in 
the States. President's Rule brings to an end, for the time being, a duly elected 
Government, a responsible Government in the State, during the period of 
proclamation, is replaced by a responsible government at the Centre in respect 
to matters falling normally in the State's sphere. It may be argued that a larger 
democracy temporarily takes control of a smaller democracy. This because 
the Constitution does not suspend the constitutional machinery in the State 
concerned. 
There is however, a shift in the power structure. And this shift in the 
power structure does constitute federal coercion. This is a very tricky power. 
Exercised correctly, it may operate as a safety mechanism for the system. 
Abused or misused, it can destroy the Union and the States. A wide literal 
constitutional distribution of powers between the Union and the Stales. A 
wide literal construction of Article 356 (1) will reduce the constitutional 
distribution of powers between the Union and the States to a licence 
dependent on the pleasure of the 'Union Executive. Further, it will enable the 
Union Excutive to cut at the root of the parliamentary form of government in 
the State and will act against the idea of federation. 
Different Committtees and Commissions, such as the Administrative 
Reforms Commission, the Governors' Committee, the Sarkaria Commission 
did not suggest deletion of this Article. The Sarkaria Commission felt that the 
Article should remain as an ultimate constitutional weapon to cope with 
situations having a bearing on the preservation of unity and integrity of the 
country and upholding the Constitution. Article 356, has, indeed, solved many 
seemingly intractable problems. Given the right political conditions, it might 
be possible for any Governor to avoid turning to this Article. Actually, the 
problem lies not in the constitutional provision but in its application. What is 
required is delineating proper safeguards against its arbitrary, partisan and 
malafide use. 
As such this research study comprises of, in all, six chapters. 
The first chapter introduces the concept of coalition govt, by way of 
anatomical approach. It goes on to define the term coalition, therefore, there 
is an effort to structurise the coalition govt within the parameter of 
parliamentary democratic structure within this study, there has been a need to 
look at the Indian perception towards this new emerging formation of the 
fabrication in the system. The next in this chapter, the study undergoes a 
change towards coalition - making by dividing the study in different, phases 
and kind of coalition. 
The study in second chapter is confined to Presidential process and 
power during the process of formation of coalition at stake due to the 
constitutional necessity. So the study goes to understand the constitutional 
role of the President in relation to hung parliament and coalition as to how to 
provide a viable proposition of Govt, in India. Also the chapter touches the 
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aspect of "care taker Government" ~ a viable armagment ~ to fill the gap and 
the doctrine that the President can not act sue moto. Hence, the chapter is 
solely devoted in investigating the emerging solutions similar to coalition or 
inviting to coalition. The study goes on into the constitutional sphere by 
observing the impact on the preventive aim of the tenth schedule of the 
constitution and suggestive calculations. 
After a deep-study and investigations, through the different angles 
of coalition situation or coalition in the form of Government, it is pertinent 
to make a structural study of Article 356 without which the project can not be 
concluded, since the use or misuse of the provision under the coalition 
environment can be unfolded. Thus chapter third is meant for the study of 
Article 356, not only as constitutional provision but, its background, 
historical set-up behind the text of the provision, objectives incorporated in, 
hope and expectations of constitutional framers and also the existing 
amendments to the provision. Thereafter, the chapter studies the reconcilling 
and influencing place of the provision under federal polity. The object of 
study in this chapter is to trace out the hitch or the potential which provides 
an opportunity to violate the sanctity of the wisdom of the constitution. 
The fourth chapter deals with relative synthesis which may germinate 
the possible potential to misuse the power. This tries to detect by way of the 
position of President, cabinet and the Governors, first taking a note of the 
cabinet, a study of Article 74 in the context for elaborating the binding 
position of the constitutional head, the functional aspect of the cabinet has 
been considered which seems to be able to play gimmick. The cabinet system 
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of government in India has also been touched in brief comparatively. What 
does the coalition in cabinet mean is the subject of the study of this chapter. 
The doctrine of "aid and advice" has been discussed in relation or linkage with 
the ultimate object of this research study. Since the institution of governor 
remains very vital on the subject, the power, place and position is subject to 
minute study and scrutiny. The doctrine of presidential pleasure is discussed 
in relation to this constitutional office. A requisite study of Sarkaria 
Commission on Centre State relations is done under this chapter. 
The fifth chapter deals with the role of judiciary in protecting the 
constitutional sanctity. The judicial and juristic opinion in the sphere of this 
controvery has been studied on the basis of various cases which came before 
the courts. The study further goes on the doctrine of "political questions" in 
relation to presidential proclaimation. The trend emerged in coalition which 
provides the place of play of political ingenuity, is also the subject of study in 
this chapter. Thus, this chapter deals with a long judicial journey in relation to 
presidential proclaimation from single party domination to coalition 
armagements at the centre. As such this judicial journey has been seen in 
terms of judicial remedy or relief in the discussion. The whole chapter is 
intended to observe into two phases by drawing a sharp line of the year 1977, 
by taking into discussion various dicisions of Supreme court as well as High 
courts. 
The chapter sixth invites the argumental study on sustainability or 
non sustainability of the Art. 356, receiving a grievous and repeated outraging 
of the consatitutional modesty, keeping in view the debated interaction 
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preceded by and followed by constitution. Finally, the last chapter is devoted 
to the conclusions and suggestions. Though each chapter is lasted with 
conclusion and suggestion in itself precisely and specifically, yet this last 
chapter deals with those submissions without which, the research project 
could not be deemed to be completed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
PROBLEM : 
The question begins with-who will ensure that the country is being 
governed by the constitution and the laws. To fulfill this object, the President 
of India has been recognised as ensurer for constitutional machinery. This is 
a common phenomena found in majority of the Constitutions of the countries 
and in achieving this object, the President has been vested with certain 
important measures, Article 356 being one of them, corresponding to 
provisions in other Cosntitutions like U.S. and Australian, especially Article 
4, section 6 and section 119 respectively. 
The Article has ever been shrouded in controveries, not because of 
its insertion but with the mode and manner in which the provision has been 
repeatedly used, misused and abused. Article 356 is the only Article in the 
Constitution which the union has unfailingly chosen as its sword to strike at 
state governments run by the opposition or regional parties. Frequent use of 
this Article without justifiable cause has seriously threatened the very 
existence of democratic governments in the federating units of the Indian 
Republic. In other words, the centripetal forces at work have virtually 
nullified the Federal feature of Indian Constitution.' 
The Constitution makers vested themselves with constitutional 
power not as a run-way upon which a political game can be played. Except the 
constitutional provisions, they also expressed their hope with succeeeding 
generation not to invoke Article 356 frequently but to treat it "as dead letters.^ 
This rises up the moral values and the standard of character of the man through 
whom, the power is going to be exercised. To this purpose, the personality of 
Governor comes into light, who is understood as an agent of the Central 
Government. Though the Supreme Court in Hargovind Pant Vs. Dr. Raghukul 
Tilak ,^ did not accept the relationship between Centre and the Governor as the 
relationship between employer and an employee - "The Governor's office is 
not subordinate or subservient to the Government of India". 
But the practical position of this constitutional office is different 
from what were the hopes and expectations of founding father of Indian 
Constitution. To implicate the Governor, study is required, from where they 
are invited, their career and personal characters etc.? In this context, the 
relevancy of words of Dr. Rajendra Prasad, President of the Constituent 
Assembly, is still relevant, who had forseen this weakness in our Constitution. 
".... It is not possible to devise any yard-stick for measuring the moral qualities 
of a man and so long as that is not possible, our Constitution will remain 
defective". Again the controversy is reflected in the thought of former chief 
minister Ram Krishna Hagde of Kamataka and Sarkaria Commission Report. 
The point is also vital since, the role of Governor has to be detected with the 
point of view of his relationship with the Centre. 
Though, we have had some very distinguished Governors of 
unimpeachable moral integrity like, Sarojini Naidu, Padmaja Naidu, H.C. 
Mukherji and G.S. Pathak, to mention only a few. Another example is of 
Raghukul Tilak Governor of Rajasthan who was dismissed on August 8, 1981 
when he refused to be bullied by centre's blandishment and threats.'* 
On the other side, in 1977 when, Janata Government came into 
power with allies and in 1980, even without the request and report of the 
Governors concerned, it dismissed more than eighteen state governments at a 
stretch. These controversial aspects of the historical events requires a 
thorough study to be done. 
As earlier mentioned, the President is a constitutional head of the 
system who has been used as a rubber stamp. For instance, in 1975 the then 
Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi had ignored Giri's advice to bring Gujrat 
Government under President's rule and directed the Governor to dissolve the 
assembly without President's knowledge. But, whats about today? Is there hope 
with us? when the Union Cabinet had recommended the dismissal of Rabari 
Devi government in Bihar, the Rashtriya Janata Dal ministry had not only 
decisively proved its majority, but defeated a Central Bill on the formation of 
Vananchal also i.e. a double vote. Was it constitutionally valid to dismiss a 
government that enjoys the confidence of legislature? Interestingly many of 
coalition partners like AIADMK and Akali Dal are opposed on principle to the 
Article 356. But contrastingly, AIADMK as a coalition partner at the Centre 
saw the Bihar scene (as above) as precedent to be used in Tamil Nadu. Did the 
then President K.R. Narayanan by sending back the recommendation to the 
Union Cabinet rely upon to test the case of State of Bihar on the touch-stone 
of constitutional correctness and political fairness?^ If it happens time and 
again precedent can be establishingly repeated. Is there any scope for 
consideration of recommendations of Union Cabinet ? Or is the government 
to get relief on ruling of S.R. Bommai's case or are the dismissals of 
Governments only solutions of the future etc.?^ 
A famous case of Karnataka Assembly dissolution is on the point 
where as many as 22 opposition leaders from ten political parties had urged 
President Venkatraman on April 21, 1989 "to strictly adhere to the 
constitutional Provisions in regard to the Karnataka ministry and ensure that a 
trial of strength takes place in the state assembly on April 27, 1989". In a 
memorandum submitted to the President, the opposition leaders had described 
the report of the Karnataka Governor to the centre as" highly irregular and 
arbitrary". Venkataraman conveniently turned a deaf ear to the appeal made by 
opposition leaders and instead chose to act as the rubber stamp of the Rajeev 
Government by issuing a proclaimation under Article 356. By doing so, the 
President inflicted yet another injury to the already fragile fabric of 
democracy in India. 
Was it not the duty of the President, as head of the state to adhere to 
his oath under Art. 60? When democracy in the federating unit is in peril or 
is seriously threatened by the ruling party at the centre. Should the President 
act as an active collaborator to the ruling party at the centre? Ought the 
President to act in his own discretion rather than on the aid and advice of the 
cabinet under Article 74? 
In case of U.P. where Kalyan Singh Government which was restored 
by the Allahabad High Court by its interim order on 23 Feb. 1998 is another 
misdeed of Governor Romesh Bhandari. In that case when the Supreme Court 
ordered "composite Floor test", a piquant situation arose in the chief 
minister's secretariat annexe with both Mr, Jagdambika Pal and Mr. Kalyan 
Singh occupying adjacent chambers and claiming to be Chief Minister. It is 
clear that the entire plot to destabilise the U.P.Government was hatched 
primarily to ensure the victory of a certain politician struggling to win a seat 
of the Lok Sabha from Western U.P.This only underlines the depths to which 
politicians can sink in pursuit of their overvening ambitions and how little 
they care for institution and processes essential to the survival of democracy.^ 
What is at stake, in reality, is not the survival or dismissal of the 
governments in the states,but the very existence and survival of democracy in 
the federating units of Indian Republic. With every passing year, the 
constitutional fabric of checks and balances is being torn by high 
constitutional functionaries like the President, the Prime Minister, the 
Governors. How long are the people - the sole repository of political power -
going to tolerate the flagrant misdeeds of these constitutional functionaries? 
How long is this infant democracy going to bear the stresses brought about by 
its leaders? Thus the study requires a lot. 
The present evolved scenario has constituted a prompt urge to 
conduct a detailed investigations and the probe in regard is the coalition 
government at the centre where some of the partners have been demanding 
dissolution of certain states even before the formation of the government. 
The fact is peculiar in comparison with the past misuses of Article 356. Miss 
Jai Lalitaa and Samata Party leader Famades demanded dismissal of Tamil 
Nadu and Bihar states Government, even before coalition came into fore. 
Threat after threat from backing away from the coalition has made the central 
Government shaking, having effects on political and economic infra-structure 
of the country. Not only this, the image of the present government has been 
lowered down in the outside world as well, inflation, roaring prices of 
esssential commodities, productions and mal-administration at government 
functioning are all results of these threats. It is not sure when the central 
government will collapse. In some political circles, a demand is being made 
that the present democratic and federal set-up is not suiting the country. The 
constitution needs reform. 
Recent recommendations to the President of India of the Bihar 
governor to dismiss the Bihar Government for constitutional break down of 
Government machinery has severaly been criticised. In consequence of the 
recommendation, there was a call for Bihar Bandh which has resulted in large 
scale violence. Rail track have been blown up, dissrupting the train services, 
there has been rowdism prevailing in the state, even some persons were killed 
and house seeks recall of Governors from the President. It is serious situation 
which may endanger federal structure of our country. 
It shows that the problem is very serious and requires a thorough 
research. Hence, I have selected this topic for conducting a detailed research 
and suggestive ways and means to save the present democratic republic of 
India. 
Objective and Scope of the Study : 
In view of the uncertainty and controversy in relation to Presidential 
proclaimation-provision travelling from single party domination to coalitional 
track. The study has carried out in-depth analysis of the structure and the 
place of the provision surrounded by the constitutional defenders on the 
subject and made an effort to bring out the broad parameters and boundaries 
within which the application of the proclamation can be constitutionalised. 
The Indian perception, rather apprehension, with regard to coalition govt has 
been investigated from different formative process of coalition making, 
resulting in stability and unstability and also from democratic principles. 
Further, it has been inquired as to whether the single party structured 
government or coalitional structured government provides a check in misusing 
the presidential rule on political pitch. 
The role of the defenders of the constitution like the President, the 
Parliament, the Governor and the judiciary has been tried to see them not in 
isolation but the reflection of the relations among them except one organ i.e. 
judiciary. The judiciary as the ultimate ensurer of constitutionally governing 
state is detected in evolving the judicial defence machanism stricking at a 
political question so as to ensure the sanctitity of the constitution by studying 
the case laws. 
From the cabinet's call to the President ringing the bell of the 
Governor to the defectional outcome among the parties necessarily involving 
the controversy have been the aspects to be observed. So the roles and the 
relationship of those which diminish the efficacy of the constitution with an 
object to serve their personal advantage are the constant objectives to be 
inquired under this research study. 
Plan of Study : 
The research study comprises of, in all, six chapters. 
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The first chapter introduces the concept of coalition govt, by way of 
anatomical approach. It goes on to define the term coalition, therefore, there 
is an effort to structurise the coalition govt within the parameter of 
parliamentary democratic structure within this study, there has been a need to 
look at the Indian perception towards this new emerging formation of the 
fabrication in the system. The next in this chapter, the study undergoes a 
change towards coalition - making by dividing the study in different, phases 
and kind of coalition. 
The study in second chapter is confined to Presidential process and 
power during the process of formation of coalition at stake due to the 
constitutional necessity. So the study goes to understand the constitutional 
role of the President in relation to hung parliament and coalition as to how to 
provide a viable proposition of Govt, in India. Also the chapter touches the 
aspect of "care taker Government" — a viable armagment ~ to fill the gap and 
the doctrine that the President can not act sue moto. Hence, the chapter is 
solely devoted in investigating the emerging solutions similar to coalition or 
inviting to coalition. The study goes on into the constitutional sphere by 
observing the impact on the preventive aim of the tenth schedule of the 
constitution and suggestive calculations. 
After a deep-study and investigations, through the different angles 
of coalition situation or coalition in the form of Government, it is pertinent 
to make a structural study of Article 356 without which the project can not be 
concluded, since the use or misuse of the provision under the coalition 
environment can be unfolded. Thus chapter third is meant for the study of 
Article 356, not only as constitutional provision but, its background, 
historical set-up behind the text of the provision, objectives incorporated in, 
hope and expectations of constitutional framers and also the existing 
amendments to the provision. Thereafter, the chapter studies the reconcilling 
and influencing place of the provision under federal polity. The object of 
study in this chapter is to trace out the hitch or the potential which provides 
an opportunity to violate the sanctity of the wisdom of the constitution. 
The fourth chapter deals with relative synthesis which may germinate 
the possible potential to misuse the power. This tries to detect by way of the 
position of President, cabinet and the Governors, first taking a note of the 
cabinet, a study of Article 74 in the context for elaborating the binding 
position of the constitutional head, the functional aspect of the cabinet has 
been considered which seems to be able to play gimmick. The cabinet system 
of government in India has also been touched in brief comparatively. What 
does the coalition in cabinet mean is the subject of the study of this chapter. 
The doctrine of "aid and advice" has been discussed in relation or linkage with 
the ultimate object of this research study. Since the institution of governor 
remains very vital on the subject, the power, place and position is subject to 
minute study and scrutiny. The doctrine of presidential pleasure is discussed 
in relation to this constitutional office. A requisite study of Sarkaria 
Commission on Centre State relations is done under this chapter. 
The fifth chapter deals with the role of judiciary in protecting the 
constitutional sanctity. The judicial and juristic opinion in the sphere of this 
controvery has been studied on the basis of various cases which came before 
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the courts. The study further goes on the doctrine of "political questions" in 
relation to presidential proclaimation. The trend emerged in coalition which 
provides the place of play of political ingenuity, is also the subject of study in 
this chapter. Thus, this chapter deals with a long judicial journey in relation to 
presidential proclaimation from single party domination to coalition 
arrnagements at the centre. As such this judicial journey has been seen in 
terms of judicial remedy or relief in the discussion. The whole chapter is 
intended to observe into two phases by drawing a sharp line of the year 1977, 
by taking into discussion various dicisions of Supreme court as well as High 
courts. 
The chapter sixth invites the argumental study on sustainability or 
non sustainability of the Art. 356, receiving a grievous and repeated outraging 
of the consatitutional modesty, keeping in view the debated interaction 
preceded by and followed by constitution. Finally, the last chapter is devoted 
to the conclusions and suggestions. Though each chapter is lasted with 
conclusion and suggestion in itself precisely and specifically, yet this last 
chapter deals with those submissions without which, the research project 
could not be deemed to be completed. 
Methodology 
Doctrines and derivatives inclusive of possible data, by deducting 
them into premises and the possible conclusions and suggestions have been 
drawn. Furthermore, by applying them on further investigated materials where 
they are applicable, or, to the extent possible, the statements could be met 
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with the historical evolutions, wherever required, evaluations of judicial 
decisions, the comparative study of other federal constitutions of the world 
pertaining to the area of the study is the part of the methods. The views and 
debates of the framers of the constitution have been inquired into the working 
tones of the constitutiuonal provisions by inductive methods. The opinions of 
politician, jurist, legislators and Parliamentarians, have been taken into 
account deductively. Furthermore reports, recommendations of the law 
commissions or other committees, if any, have also been gone into. Besides, 
text books on constitutional law, books on political Science and also research 
articles on the subject are the part of the study. 
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Chapter - 1 
COALITION GOVERNMENT : 
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Nature and Concept of Coalition : 
Coalition government is not new or unusual phenomena; either 
government is formed by one party or two or more parties. The term 'coalition 
is derived from latin Word' COALITIO' which is verbal substance of 
coalescere, to go together and desire - to grow up, which means to go or to 
grow together. Oxford dictionary defines coalition as an act of coalescing, or 
uniting into one body; a union of persons, states alliance. In the strict political 
sense the word coalition, is used for an alliance or temporary union into a 
single government of distinct parties or members of distinct parties. 
A coalition can take place in two phases; pre-election alliances or 
adjustments between the parties or post-election union to share political 
power and run the government. The former type of coalition has additional 
advantages than the latter. A pre-poll understanding provides a common 
platform to the parties in order to attract the electrorate on the basis of joint 
manifesto. 
As already has been made a context that coalition government are 
running well in European countries, for example in France, Itly and Portugal 
because the coalition of the parties is based on ideology. As about coalition 
government, they are rarely found in Britain and America. As history of the 
House of Commons shows that when a general election does not produce a 
clear majority for either of the parties, single party minority government 
rather than coalition has been the rule. Twenty five general elections were 
held in Britain in this century. As many as five failed to give a clear majority 
to either of the main parties. In all these cases the outcome was a minority 
14 
govemmenl and never coalition. Reason being bi-party system. These parties 
are based on the ideology, the coalition government in other countries could 
not succeed because social structure of these countries was different, in 
comparision to western countries. In developing countries the coalition 
government has no common programme, cohesion of class composition, 
uniformity of social composition etc, the parties of coalition government 
form hands with another to form a united front without any ideological basis 
sometime coalitions are formed to build up a formidable united front against 
some other political movement or other political party. 
The hegemony of a single political party after independence was not 
natural democratic development. The harmony of the congress party was due 1 
to the emotional support of the people of India to a party that won 
independence for them. 
The Charismatic personality of Nehru only impeded the natural 
development of Indian democracy, the Indian democracy remained captive of 
a leader but the decline of Nehru's leadership and increased political 
consciousness among the people has changed the whole scenario. After the 
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decline of Nehru's leadership. So many parties at the National, state or 
regional level emerged. So the coalition of parties is not unbelievable 
phenomena. 
The coalition government is the natural outcome of our social 
structure. Political developments do not take place in vaccum. They are the 
natural out come of social organisation and structure coalition have become a 
political necessity in India today, because no single party is getting absolute 
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majority. Hence we should be ready for coalition government, because it is 
natural phenomena in plural society. Society needs political socialisation. 
Political culture is the outcome of social culture and our social culture is of 
conflict, rivalaries, waring fractions in the society in few states. In this 
situation, the negative voting prevails. 
As far as the kinds of coalitions is concerned most coalitions 
government in India have seen two types of coalitions. 
a) Executive coalitions - where the parties are joining the cabinet. 
(b) Legislative coalitions - where the parties are supporting the government 
from the Parliamentary floor without joining the cabinet. 
It is depending upon the perceptions and objectives of parties 
joining the coalition. An executive coalition demands a greater degree of 
ideological and programmatic cohesion than a legislative coalition which 
invites parties to become a part of the coalition despite their glaring 
incompatible ideologies.^ 
Support from outside : 
A political trick occasionally invoked to let a minority government 
continue in power by the device of legislative support extended to it from 
outside has in the recent past been unequivocally condemned as the Villain^ of 
the pierce responsible for bringing down as many as five of a total of six 
governments since 1989. Political observers have seen in the party system 
transformation from one party dominance to a multi-party configuration, at 
least one desirable consequence. The regionalisation of the party system non 
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articulated the federal features of the Indian political system that had 
remained rather suppressed during congress dominance. The experience of 
coalition and minority governments has widened the horizon of political 
leaders and have enlarged the participating space for a large assortment of 
parties and regions in the process of governance. 
Thus, it is obvious that 'support from the outside' is a common 
enough feature of minority politics in India even though this has proved to be 
the proverbial Trojan horse. But the lust for pov^er does not deter the party in 
minority from rushing in. 
It is morally imperative that the party supporting the Government 
from outside should formally share the ruling responsibility : back seat 
driving distorts political processes and policy making. Even otherv^'ise, no 
party, much less the Congress, can expect to be quiet and be a passive 
spectator while supporting the minority government. And, why should it be ? 
The supporting party has to share the responsibility, however vicarious and 
indirect, for acts of omission and commission of the coalition government.. 
Equally important the opposition role non-ruling party must perform in a 
parliamentary democracy gets compromised. Support from outside means that 
the normal opposition space is in practice conceded to an unduly shrunk 
opposition - now-ruling party minus the supporting party. So it is our 
arrangement that is more political than constitutional morals. 
History of Coalition-Making : 
India's view on coalition government is deeply coloured by what 
Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81)'*, the famous British Prime Minister observed 
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about it, namely Britain does not love coalition. To an average Indian, the term 
'coalition government', therefore, evokes an image of instability, 
indecisiveness and other attributes of such a negative colour. In India, the 
single party dominance system has prevailed for such a long time that any 
departure from the neatness and symmetry of such a governing arrangement 
looks an aberration, conjuring up an image of instability. 
The Congress, which ruled India for the large part of the last half a 
century was more a 'system' than a party in the strict sense of the term. The 
Congress was a phenomenon. A time came when its capacity to accommodate 
local and regional aspirations dwindled, and other parties began to emerge to 
articulate more efficiently the local urges. The Congress was truly a leviathan 
and the space vacated by its defeat in elections could not be filled by any 
other single party. India has now entered a transitional phase in its political 
history. As no other political party is in a position single-handedly to replace 
the Congress, a coalition arrangement of governance becomes a functional 
necessity; though others may hold a diverse view like : 
"If I go by my personal experience I led a coalition government of 
eight political parties in my state and I don't think it is good for the country. It 
is not healthy for the country but we can still wait and see".^ 
"Coalition government is not necessarily bad. We can not say that it 
can not work. It has been working for many many years even in a very 
developed country like Italy. In our own country, Kerala had more than 25 
years of experience about coalition government. Bengal has similar 
experience. But there are two types of coalition governments, one coalition 
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government of political parties where they enter into coalition before the 
election and second, this is what is happening in Bengal. Pre-election 
combination, i.e. post-election coalition. It works, it can work. It is a different 
coalition if it is said post-election. I had run a post-election coalition, it was 
difficult, not impossible. If somebody asks me to head a coalition government, 
I will never accept it. Today, in India we are having post-election coalition and 
therefore we have to see, we have to watch. 
So for next few years, it is going to be a very interesting scenario in 
India. We have embarked upon a new experience in the country not by choice 
but we have been forced into the situation".^ 
The history and evolution of coalition making in post independent 
India can be studied in different phases : 
1. 1947-1967 : Single dominant party 
2. 1967-1977 : First phase of coalition politics and congress crises. 
3. 1977-1989 : Ilnd split in congress coalition Model. 
4. 1989-onwards : The Coalition government and the problem of stability. 
1947-1967 : Single Dominant Party : 
When the Congress came to power after independence, it inherited a 
historical consensus, a considerable organizationl base and a wide spread 
feeling of trust and confidence.' The Congress was orginally classified as a 
pragmatic and pluralist conglomeration. It enjoyed an aura of legitimacy, 
stemming from its heritage as the notional movement bringing the Swaraj. 
From this enotional commitment is generated its authority and legitimized 
through electoral victories. 
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Political stability in India in the first two decades, after 
independence was largely attributed to broad national consensus evolved under 
the stewardship of Nehru. During this period, the Indian National Congress 
provided political leadership both at the conter and in majority of states. The 
Congress evolved a national consensus on the principles of Socialism, 
Secularism and Parliamentary Demoracy. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru strived to keep 
above the politics of consensus from 1947 to 1964 and laid down a firm 
edifice for democracy in India. 
Being a Pundit and main stalwart of the National movement coupled 
with a liberal bent of mind Nehru enjoyed popular acceptance. Under his 
leadership the first two decades after independence, saw a consolidation of 
Democratic Insitutions and the Consitutional Government both at the center 
and in the federal segments. The economic and social changes thus ensued, 
showed social ;mobility as well as participation of the people in the life of 
the nation. In this period the system achieved a state of perceptible stability. 
It was a period of significant socio-cultural readjustment and changes, but it 
was also a period in which the deep-rooted disparities in the Indian society 
came more clearly into view.^ 
The national consensus evolved in India helped it hold itself despite 
the traumas of partition. The initial pessimism about its fate as an independent 
new state was overcome by the mass surge of popular hope under the 
leadership of Nehru. People in India had tremendous faith in Nehru's 
leadership and they genuinely believed that India would become a strong and 
prosperous country soon. The existence of a consensus in India in the early 
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years was similar to the one in many independent countries and there 
prevailed a spontaneous self-restraint on the part of both leaders and the 
people they led.' 
However, despite mass popularity and leading qualities Pundit Nehru 
had to face political differences with other political leaders of the Congress 
Party. His conflicts with Sardar Patel and Dr. Rajender Prasad are well known. 
The internecine struggle for power started from the begining. Within three 
months of independence Acharya J.B. Kriplani resigned from the Presidency 
of the Congress on the ground that he was neither being consulted nor 
informed by Prime Minister Nehru about important government policy 
decisions. After a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee (A.I.C.C), 
Gandhi said; "I am convined that no patch-work treatment can save the 
Congress. It will only prolong the agony. The best thing for the Congress 
would be to dissolve itself before the lots sets in further. Its voluntary 
liquidation will brace up and purify the political climate of the country".'° 
The first power struggle came to light over the question of selecting 
a person for the presidentship of the Indian Republic. Jawahar Lai Nehure 
proposed the name of C. Rajagopalachari, primarily on the ground that he was 
unpopular within the party circles and could not be provided an important 
place either within the Organization or the Government. Many others led by 
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel brought forth the name of Dr. Rajinder Prased. 
Jawahar Lai Nehru was overruled, and Prasad got the Presidency." 
Purshotam Das Tandon was openly opposed by Pt. Nehru, yet he 
became President of the Congress Party. A few cabinet ministers resigned 
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because they had policy differences with Nehru. CD. Deshmukh resigned 
because he differed with Nehru on the status of Bombay City as a joint Capital 
of Maharashtra and Gujarat. V.K. Krishna Menon was forced to resign because 
many leaders of teh Congress asked Nehru to drop Menon, who was held 
responsible for the debacle of the Indian Army in 1962. Nehru faced many 
challenges for his colleagues in Parliament, Cabinet and the Congress Party. 
The greatest asset of Nehru was that on his challengers were comrades-in-arm 
during freedom struggle and his leadership was never theatened. Yet he started 
The parctice of combining the office of the Prime Minister and the Congress 
party President.'^ 
Another manifestation of power struggle and infighting within the 
Congress was the formation of separate political parties and groups by those 
Congressmen who failed to secure important positions either in the 
government or in the party organization. As a result new parties came up from 
the Congress i.e. 'Democratic Group' of 'Congress Democratic Party' led by 
Kripalini. In U.P. under the leadership of Triloki Sing and Rahey Shyam, a new 
party known as 'Peoples Congress Party' formed on ll'"^ June 1950, the 
'Congress Democratic Party' and on November 1950 in West-Bengal headed 
by Dr. P.C. Ghosh formed the 'Krishak Praja Mazdoor Party'.'^ 
As a result in 1952 Congress failed to get an absolute majority in 
four states: Madras, PEPSU (Patiala and East Punjab States Union), Orissa 
and Travancore-Cochin, and managed a bare majority in Rajasthan. Its 
opposition in Madras was saved by the separation of the new states of Andhra 
where, however, the communist Party of India (CPI) brought down the 
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Congress Government in November, 1954 and President's rule had to be 
imposed. '^  Hence, a coalition government could be seen in PEPSU between 
1957 and 1957 and the polities of United Front was shown in, on the 
formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1958, T. Prakashan a PSP MLA resigned form 
the party and formed a coalition ministry. After 1954 election in Travancore 
Cochin the Congress supported the ministry fromed by the PSP leader Pattom 
Thanu Pillai. In 1957, Orissa and a coalition between Congress and Gantantra 
Parished, Which lasted till 1961, from 1960-1964, Kerala had a coalition 
government with Congress, PSP, and Muslim league as its constituent units.^ ^ 
As a matter of fact, it would not be wrong to conclued that the congress has 
not held a "Monopoly of Power" in India, even before 1967. 
By and large, Nehru's politics of Consensus succeeded and remained 
dominant as other political forces till then had not become well organized and 
assertive. The elections of 1952, 1957 and 1962 witnessed only 50 percent 
of the voter's turnout. There was neither a high level of assertion from the 
voter nor extreme competition among the parties. The traditional social order 
was controlled by the high castes whose leadership supported the Congress 
Party. Even the land reform policies of the Congress Party during 1950's and 
1960's did not disturb traditional social order and the politics of the abolition 
of absentee land-lordism in India.'^ 
To put in the words of Rajni Kothari: "In giving to the country and its 
institutions such strength and character, a critical role was played by 
Jawaharlal Nehru the first Prime-Minister of India. Although it is easy to 
exaggerate his role and although its doubtful what he could have accomplished 
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had he not had the great inheritance of the national movements and its 
organization to stand upon. Nehru's role had been two-fold. By the sheer 
force of his personality, he managed to hold the Country together to arrest 
disruptive forces, and to take to the road for reaching social change and 
modernization. And he deeply worked to this end.'^ Thus the contribution of 
Nehru was not to formalize a revolution in India but to give his state of 
consensus.^* He provided the new institutions with sufficient time to strike 
roots and himself worked to that end by being chief operator and made 
acceptable to his countrymen certain critical- values: the value of equality, 
the value of freedom, the value of vote. Meanwhile the concentrated- power in 
himself and in his party and maintained some sort of balance, pinning his faith 
on the institutions of democracy but not allowing political conflict to take 
too sharp a form, in a sense drifting on and hoping things to sort themselves 
out ultimately.'^ Nehru was perhaps not too confident of the way things were 
shaping but his sense of power on the one hand and a sincere conviction about 
the efficiency of democratic institutions on the other were enough to allow 
India time to build a foundation.^ ^ 
Therefore, it could be truly said, that under Nehru, Congress gained 
in its strenght but in a subtle way. Unfortunately Nehru weakened the Party by 
concentrating power in his own hands, without making way for other leaders 
to emerge. Consequently towards the end of Nehru's life, with his own grip 
weakening, a powerful assertion of new forces from the regional state levels 
was infused. The Kamraj Plan adopted by AICC on 10 Aug, 1963 was to be 
evolved as a regulatory measure to meet the challenge let loose by regional 
bosses to the congress leaders.^' 
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K. Kamraj, persuaded Prime Minister Nehru to remove a number of 
important Chief Ministers and Cabinet members from their posts. One 
Cabinet Minister, S.K. Patil, returned to Bombay City Party unit and began to 
devote his energies to organization work. Kamraj himself resigned as Chief 
Minister of Madras and was subsequently elected National Presedent of 
Congress. In the state of West-Bengal the Congress Party boss Atulya Ghosh, 
had already emerged as the kingmaker when he exercised a decisive hand in 
selecting the new Chief Minister in 1962. These three men, all party leaders 
without offices in the state or national government, played key role in the 
selection of Lai Bahadur Shastri as Nehru's Successor.^^ By putting party 
managers into power the Kamraj plan not only recognised their importance in 
national affairs but also restored to the Central Organization the prestige and 
importance it had lost over the years due to Nehru's dominating presence.^^ 
Nehru's declining health and new assertions emerging from the state 
level, senior leaders of the party instead of relinquishing government 
positions and attending to party-building at the grassroots as stipulated in the 
Kamraj plan, after the death of Nehru, aggregated at the national level and a 
new kind of conflict developed right at the center of the system, in the form 
of Governmental versus Organizational groups, the later taking on the form of 
a coalition of general leaders. Consequently Kamraj proceeded to channel his 
energies to build a collective leadership with himself holding the dominant 
position to fill up the void created by the passing away of Nehru. This emerged 
as counter to the norms and practices of Parliamentary System of Government 
thereby yielding place to two pyramids of power-one presided over by Kamraj 
and the other by Lai Bahadur Shastri. The 'King-Maker' Lost much of his 
25 
power. Shastri despite being a man of great humility and mild disposition, 
made skilful use of the power and patronage associated with the office of 
prime minister and left no one in doubt as to his claim to the leader-ship of 
the party and the government.-'' 
The two successions within a span of three years between 1964-66 
unfolded certain dramatic twist, in the Congress. In the context of Nehru's 
death in May 1964, Kamraj outwitted Morarji Desai by evolving the game 
plan through the process of consencus in favour of Lai Bahadur Shastri. In 
1966 when Prime Minister Shastri died at Tashkent after signing the Indo-Pak 
treaty. Desai raised the democratic principle of election of the leader of 
Parliamentary Party, which the Congress leadership had to concede. In the 
contest for leadership of Parliamentry Party between Desai and Indira Gandhi, 
Congress chief ministers of six major states played important part and helped 
party President Kamraj to tilt the balance in favour of India Gandhi, then a 
junior leader in the Party and Govemment.^^ --.ir-nc i S 
1967-1977 : First Phase of Coalition Politics and Congress Crises 
Before the general election in 1967, no political pundit could 
visualize a coalition government in India because at the center and in almost 
all the states the Congress was the ruling party. It was rightly said that the 
dominance of the Congress Party was based on absorbing all-powerful 
elements in society and providing them a share in the structure of power it 
built. It was an open party capable of absorbing newer elements as they came 
into the political process, and it was all-inclusive. It did not become an 
instrument of any particular group. The weakness of the opposition gave it a 
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near monopoly of power in the country for over two decades although it 
received the support of only a minority of the electorate voting in the general 
elections. This favorable situation came to an end in 1967 when the Congress 
party suffered a gradual decline in its mass popularity yielding way for the use 
of regional groups thus suffering reverses in several states and its majority in 
the Lok Sanha was substantially reduced.^^ 
As a matter of fact, 1967 was a watershed in Indian electoral 
politics, for the first time it raised a dangerous signal for the ruling party that 
its support base had gradually eroded and if this continued, the Congress 
would be reduced to a minority party. The polarization of politics through 
radicalization of certain section of Indian voters had also begun with 1967 
elections.^^ 
The Fourth General Election in India began in the wake of the 
traumatic events following the Chinese aggression in 1962, the tragic death 
of Nehru in 1964, the border skirmishes with Pakistan in 1965, followed by 
the demise of yet another prime Minister, Lai Bahadur Shastri, in 1966. A 
Climate of cracking economic order, food storage, sluggish growth of 
agriculture, inflation, heavy taxations, soaring prices, challenges of 
unemployment and underdevelopment and brain-drain made by confusion 
worst confounded. The pragmatic consensus built by Nehru was considerably 
shaken and the diversed social groups hitherto agglomerated and consolidated 
by Nehru in the Congress organization started drifting from it in the form of 
factions. The adverse performance of leadership, the bottlenecks of 
implementation of the Governmental policies and programmes, the 
antagonistic attitude of the opposition parties and the increasing bureaucratic 
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mentality of the bureaucracy mounted frustrations and discontent in the 
country. Corruption, misuse and abuse of power, deideolization and 
devaluation of politics, had gone to such an extent that in 1963-64 the 
government of India had to set up a Committee on corruption under the 
chairmanship of Santhanam.^ ^ 
Many corrupt politicians, smugglers and their ilk had joined the 
bandwagon of money spinners and a new society of Shylocks emerged. While 
poverty and food crises was mounting these Shylocks stood like soar thumbs 
by their vulgar display of wealth. Curiously enough, nepotism and favouritism 
because rampant among the elected representatives. The N. Rajagopalan 
Ayyangar Commission in its report in June 1967 submitted that the financial 
assests of Bakhshi Gulam Mohammed family (Kashmir) had risen from ten 
thousand to 1.60 crores and found Bakhshi guilty of corruption and abouse of 
power. Same was true of Pratap Singh Kairon. In the same view, the Khanna 
Commission of 1967 exposed the corrupt and tardy practices of the then 
Chief Minister of Orissa, Patnaik and thirteen other Ministers. Similar were 
the reports of Aiyar Commission of March 1967, Madholkar Commission of 
March 1968. These scandals of corruption and mal-practices, however, 
remained intangible during the early sixties and came to fore as the Nehru ear 
drew to a close. 
In this climate of machiavellian evils, the Fourth general election 
came as a blessing in disguise for the electorate to display their anger and 
discontent through the instrument of ballot box and to exercise authority on 
the persons exercising authority. To put in the words of N.G.Goray, "The 
Indian people had behaved like a naughty child who rejects very thing in hand 
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but shows no precise liking and preferences for a new one."^^ To put in the 
words of Srivastava, "the image of indian elite has declined in terms of public 
respect. A decrease in the public respect of the political leadership results 
proportionately in the lowering down of the standard of elite action. 
Adventures and extra parliamentary forms of behaviour have become a 
common feature of the political elite behaviour in legislature."^^ 
"An objective survey of the extreme variation of results in different 
states with most often a sweep to the left, though divided but in some cases a 
main swing to relatively new parties of the right would suggest that the 
electors", in the absence of a national alternative, "were tending when they 
were voting for change, to back whichever party seemed most likely to be 
effective in defeating the Congress candidates."^' For instance 'the people of 
Kerala attributed their hardships on account of high prices and shortage of 
food to the failure of the Congress at the Centre and were prepared to vote 
any party to power which promised to better their conditions. The United 
Front's slogan of making basic changes had a direct appeal to the ordinary 
voter. "32 
D.N. Pathak's study of the Fourth General Election in Gujarat 
indicated that 81.8% of the voters attached highest importance to the issue of 
price level, next distribution of food (60.41%), and the third Governments 
inability to root out corruption (69.41%).^^ Similar were the conclusions of 
B.R. Prohit in Madhya Pradesh '^* and Raj Narain in Uttar Pradesh.^^ In the 
same view, B.N. Khanna and Satya Deva's study of Punjab and Haryana 
documented that "A substantial number of voters were dissatisfied with the 
existing thing... cumbersomeness, corruption, complacency and even 
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arrogance. While the Congress image became blurred to an extent, the Akali 
Dal image improved substantially among some Sikh voter. This was also true 
of the image of the Jan Sangh among Hindu voters".^^ 
These trands among the people moving away from the Congress gave 
severe set-back to the organization both at local and national level.^' To quote 
Rajni Kothari, "The great watershed in Congress history, for long in the 
making, has clearly arrived with the Fourth General Elections and had been 
stamped with nothing less than the verdict of the electorate itself, not fully 
relected in party and legislative realignments".^^ 
An analysis of the Fourth General Election results indicates a 
decline in the Congress representation in the Lok Sabha from 358 to 279 
seats and its failure to secure a majortiy in a states. Jan Sangh and Swatantra 
on the other hand increased their membership in the Lok Sabha - Jan Sangh 
from 14 to 35 and Swatantra from 18 to 44. 
The hitherto recessive opposition forces^' in the country had a 
opportunity to form Government in Kerala, Madras, Orissa, Punjab and West 
Bengal. In Bihar, Haryana, M.P., U.P. and Rajasthan the position of the 
opposition groups was a bet confusing. Fortunately or unfortunately, this 
sudden emergence of the opposition forces had created a sense of insecurity 
and suspicion of power in the Congress elite as a result they started defeating 
from the Congress party. In Haryana, for instance, within a week a good 
number of Congress legislators joined the opposition and a non-Congress 
ministry under the leadership of Rao Birender Singh was installed. Similarly, 
in U.P. Charan Singh had formed a non-Congress Government. So is the case 
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with Bihar where Jana Kranti Dal came to power. In Rajasthan, in the wake of 
disturbance, against the Congress, President's rule was imposed. Kerala was 
under the communist rule and Madras went under the heels of DMK. 
Swatantra, Jan Sangh and others installed a Government in Orissa. Punjab and 
West Bengal had almost followed the same lines. Even the union Territories 
of Goa, Pundicherry and interestingly enough Delhi could not rotard the anti-
Congress forces. 
Thus, for the first time in the political history of India, the electorate 
had changed the political map of the country - from monopoly of power to 
competition of power and established the fact that sovereignty really rests 
with the electorate. And "The country had entered a new phase of political 
realignment in which one party is being gradually replaced by another... and 
we are of transition from one system to another.'*^ 
In short, the 1967 Elections has considerably reduced the 
ascendancy of the dominant party in the central Parliament; showed the 
assumption of power by all major political Parties in one or the other states; 
paved a way for coalitional politics both at state and national levels cutting 
across ideological boundaries. 
A significant trend registered and reinforced by the election was the 
growth of Hindu nationalism in the northern part of India. Through the Jan 
Sangh, the standard of Hindu nationalism,'*' occupied a third place in the Lok 
Sabha, its strenght in few State Assemblies of Northern India was quite 
enough. For instance, it had 26 out of 318 seats in Bihar, 98 out of 425 seats 
in U.P., 22 out of 184 seats in Rajasthan, 9 out of 104 in Punjab and 7 out of 
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60 seats in Himachal Pradesh. Besides, this growth of Jan Sangh in North also 
indicated the movement of the electorate towards right as in many Northern 
states the Swatantra also emerged in strong position, like in Gujrat, 66 out of 
186 seats; Rajasthan, 48 out of 184 out seats and U.R, 12 out of 425 seats. 
Countary to this, a similar trend of movement towards the left was registered 
in a few States of North and a majority of Southern States. The CPI + CPM 
strength in West Bengal was 16 + 43 out of 280 seats, and the CPI strength in 
U.P. and Bihar was 13 out of 425 and 24 out of 318 respectively. In south, 
however, the CPM had 11 out of 234 seats in Madras, 52 out of 133 in Kerala 
and 9 out of 285 in Andhra Pradesh. While, the CPI had with it 11 out of 285 
seats in Andhra Pradesh and 19 out of 133 seats in Kerala.'*^ As a matter of 
fact a sort of left and right attraction was visible in the electorate in the 
Fourth General Election. But, However, the fact was, as pointed out by 
Kirpalani, "The term right and left whetever meaning and significance they 
might have in the Western context, whether in Democratic or Totalitarian 
states, have little meaning and relevance in the Indian context."^^ 
Moriss Jones assertion gives a clear understanding of the Fourth 
General Election. He argued, "Political Indian is to the understood not as 
heading necessarily for a crisis but rather as having achieved a breakthrough 
to normality. This normality is not likely to be a British Two-Party System or 
any one else's system. Perhaps, all one can say is that charisma, ready-made 
all India leadership and plebiscitary democracy have gone and that competitive 
pressures, peasant realism and the containment one hopes through bargaining 
and compromise of social and cultural variety well be the features of the 
future. In a word, the days of quasi-deferlism gave way to an era of full 
blooded federal politics in throughtly federal society "'*'* 
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The historic Bangalore AICC Session of July 1969, followed by a 
tussle between Mrs. Gandhi and Nijalingappa group on the issue of 
Presidential election, the ouster of Morarji Desai from the Government and 
the nationalization of fourteen major banks^^ made the crack of the Congress 
organization even wider and more conspicuous. This marked the beginning of 
an internecine war for supremacy within the Congress Party. In this 
background Mrs. Gandhi had two alernatives: first, to merge for progressive 
identity in what was enunciated by the non-agrarian sentimentalist, C. 
Rajagapolachari, a Congress - Swatantra - DMK - Jan Singh Grand Alliance; 
and the other was to part company with these rightist forces to give Congress 
a new and healthy outlook. Mrs. Gandhi opted for the second alternative and 
both the Syndicate and the Indicate (Mrs. Gandhi group) began to look for 
allies. The Syndicate moved to the right in an effort to pull down Mrs. Gandhi 
from the office and Mrs. Gandhi inclined towards the left to remain in power. 
Thus, this bout of infighting brought a split in the Congress Organization 
which was in fact a bitter wrangle for power between Mrs. Gandhi and the 
'Congress gang'. 
In the wake of the Congress debacle in 1967, coalitional 
governments were prevalent almost all over the country and now the Congress 
divide virtually brought about a coalition at the Centre as well: "The Union 
Government began to live to mouth existence seeking support from different 
political parties from issue to issue and surviving that basis.'*^ Though the Bill 
seeking to abolish privacy and privileges of the former rulers was passed by 
the Lok Sabha with 339 votes to 154, but in the Rajya Sabha the majority was 
short of two-third by only vote. As a result, the President had to issue an 
33 
Ordinance on September 7, 1970. derecognizing the former rulers. While, the 
Supreme Court, by a majority judgement on December 15, 1970, nullified the 
order.'*^ The absence of a clear majority to go ahead with the much proclaimed 
and publicised socialistic programme motivated Mrs. Gandhi to dissolve the 
Lok Sabha fourteen months before from its tenure on 2T^ December 1970 
and to seek a fresh mandate from the people. However, suspicions and fears 
of her coming back to power again clouded the thinking of her principal 
advisors D.P. Mishra and P.N. Haksar. But their doubts were cleared when they 
assessed her popularity in the Kerala election where her party secoured 30 
seats as against 6, the undivided party had in the dissolved House.^* In her 
address on IT^ December 1970, the Prime Minister asserted that "there 
comes a time in the life of a nation when the Government of the day has to 
take an unusual step to cut through difficulties in order to solve pressing 
problems with which the country is beset. The present is such a time. 
Therefore, on the advice of the Council of Ministers, the President has 
dissolved the Lok Sabha before its full term. In a Parliamentary system this is 
not unusual but in India this has happened for the first time."^' 
The election took place between March 1 and 10, 1971, and 
confounded the most optimistic expectations of many political Pundits and 
gave the Indian optimistic expectations of many political Pundits and gave the 
Indian political system a new stability. In fact, "The need of change towards a 
more egalitarian social order was the dominating note of the election 
symphony."^° "By elevating class issues to the national level, by appealing 
directly to the rural and urban poor and to discontented urban middle class, 
Mrs. Gandhi demonstrated that the Indian electorate could be re-aligned on 
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economic lines irrespective of caste, religions linguistic and tribal 
identities. "5' 
Indira Gandhi, projected herself as an issue oriented figure, quite 
different from opponents. In the words of Prayag Mehta, "The Congress (N) 
employed a hope-approach, arousing mass influence" which met "Greater voter 
acceptance uniformly in all sections of the electorate, and more 
conspicuously among the lower social class voters."^^ 
The beggest input of the Congress (R) was its capacity to enthuse 
the poor and the lower middle classes with the prospects of change under the 
banner of socialism secularism and democracy. The 'Garibi Hatao' slogan 
caught the popular imagination. The ideal of socialism attracted the unequal 
and backward segments, and the secular appeal brought the support of the 
minorities. 
Disgusted with the coalitional politicing and piqued by the 
unprincipled defectional corruption at both micro and macro levels, the 
conscious electorate of India voted in favour of the Congress (R) ideology of 
the socialist revolution, with a sense of vengeance, through peaceful and 
democratic methods. They snubbed those regional tendencies which were 
audacious enough to penetrate at macro levels, and bundled out of Parliament 
all the petty schemers and adventurers of ploitics and thus removed the 
obstacles of a cantankerous opposition. 
Thus, the fifth Lok Sabha election ushered a general desire for a 
strong and stable government in view of the instability of the coalitional 
governments all over the country. The socialist appeal of the Congress (R) 
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strongly moved the economically and socialy deprived strata, the scheduled 
Castes, and the younger voters who over-rode caste and regional prejudices. 
The inclusion in the grand alliance of the obscurantist forces like the Jag 
Sangh brought the support of the Muslims and the other ethnic and religious 
communities to the Congress (R) fold. The personal appeal of Mrs. Gandhi 
specially to the women, with her left leaning stance and secular synthesis 
short circuited the process of responding to her programmes. To quote Morris 
Jones, "with it the feared slide of central politics, towards unmanageable 
fragmentation and coalition is firmly halted. With it, the authority of the 
Central Government and Central politics, towards unmanageable 
fragmentation and coalition is firmly halted. With it, the authority of the 
Central Government and Central leadership in relation to state Governments 
and State parties is substantially restored; With it too the opposition 
parties go back to a position of greater dependence, forced to operate less by 
confrontation then by interaction with segments for the centre mass."^^ 
As a result, the fifth Lok Sabha election results, restored the 
Congress dominance after a brief interlude of four years. At first this 
appeared to be a return to the old familiar model; but on closer look one 
could discern significant differences. A major difference in the new model 
was the collapse of the competitive mechanism within the dorminant party. 
The Congress split and the emergence of Indira leadership destroyed the 
balance of internal factional competition. There was growing intolerance 
towards factions and factional fights. Factions were considered as a challenge 
to the supreme leader rather than as a pert of the "Congress System". Factional 
bosses were suppressed and crushed. The second major difference of the new 
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model was the decline of institutionalized politics and the growth of populist 
style. Institutions were devalued and short-circuited, the party was considered 
to be no more than a "Switch on-Switch off affair, and the task of party-
building was given a very low priority. ^ ^ 
According to Joshi and Desai, "In the earlier dominance model, 
consencus-making by accommodating various interests was itself a critical 
value; conflict-avoidance and group-accommodation were preferred even at 
the cost of ideological coherence and effectiveness of performance. But in 
the new model clear-cut and forceful with "Garibi Hatao" (Abolish Poverty) 
becoming a great mobilizing force. Economic conflicts between the haves and 
the have-nots was never as salient in any earlier election as in the 1971 
election. There was more stress on ideological coherence, more intolerance 
toward dissenters, and more determination to push ahead even at the risk of 
jeopardizing the party consensus"^^ 
Thus, the second dominance model was model of one- party 
dominance without the balance of internal competition. Its style put a 
premium on confrontation rather than consensus. It thrived upon sharply 
polarized divisions rather than upon the widest possible national consensus. 
The collapse of the internal competition mechanism, the sharpening of 
ideological battle, growing intolerance and increasing confrontation in a 
rapidly polarizing polity culminated into the emergency syndrome.^^ 
Mrs, Gandhi's fortune soon recorded a downward trend following 
inflation failure, of monsoons, decline in food production, increased 
vandalism, indiscipline among local party units and several states ruled by 
37 
Congress. There was a large scale strike in railways in 1974 which was 
crushed with an iron hand. IP'S movement of Total Revolution spear heading 
from Bihar added fuel to the fire. 
Moreover the assembly elections of the early 1973 Congress 
performance recorded a decline. Soon followed the Nav Nirman Youth 
Movement in Gujrat in January 1974. It succeeded first in forcing the 
resignation of the powerful Congress Chief Minister Chiman Bhai Patel 
enjoying a massive majority in the State Assembly and then in its second 
phase prompting Morarji Desai going on his fast unto death in support of the 
demand of the youth for dissolution of the State Assembly. The resignation of 
Congress CM giving into the dissolution demand by the powerful and reticent 
PM marked an important turn point not only in the fortunes of Congress and 
Indira Gandhi but also, in a way, the course of political development in Indian. 
"Jayaprakash Narayan, earlier pessimistic about stemming the rot that had set 
in the Indian democracy, soon grasped the political ethical implication of 
there developments.^^ 
On March 6' 1975, JP led a huge demonstration of more than a 
million people to parliament presenting to speaker of Lak Sabha a charter of 
demands. Meanwhile, Desai undertook another fast unto death demanding 
early elections of the Gujarat state Assemble which was supported by the 
Praja Pal Andolan backed by liberal elements in the state.^* The same day the 
Allahabad high court gave its famous judgment establishing irregularities 
against Indira Gandhi in 1971 elections from Rai Bareilly. Both these events 
dramatically ecliped her image, meanwhile, the massive protest rallies led by 
Jaya Prakash Narayan and pressure from within the Congress by Chandra 
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Shekhar on the PM to resign prompted Indira Gandhi to visualise a serious 
threat to her authority. Consequently an internal emergency followed on June, 
1975. The suspending Foundamental Rights and imposing pre-censorship and 
arrest of several political workers including all national leaders the 
Emergency phase heralded the era of a second republic in the mould of the 
authoritarian leader who sought to legitimie her rule in the form of a 20-point 
programme. 
Here it could be said that, conflict, turmoil and violence 
characterized the politics of the Indian republic in its twenty-fifth year. All 
external signs indicated that 1975 would be a year of trouble. Government and 
opposition indulged in mutual recrimination and suspected each other. Faith 
in representative Government was seriously shattered. Indira Gandhi's fading 
charisma was seen in the public criticism of her Government, which was 
becoming sharper day by day.^' And at last the election of the Lok Sabha was 
held in March 1977, brought reverses the Congress, giving victory to the 
Janata Party of various opposition groups supporting JP's movement under 
Babubhai J.Patel. 
1977-1989 : Second Split in Congress Coalition Model 
It is truly said that, in March 1977 India emerged from one of those 
political experiences which, in the perspective of history, account for the 
great tides of change in human affairs. Since the attainment of independence 
thirty years earlier the country had gone to the polls five times but the Sixth 
General Election brought about a total transformation into the structure of 
political power in India's federal union of 22 States and end the thirty-year 
old monopoly of the Congress Party which had come to believe in its own 
invincibility and its historic destiny to rule India from the Centre. 
39 
In retrospect, what the election achieved was without parallel in the 
history of democracy for it marked a peaceful transfer of power from a 
dictatorial hegemony of one party to a democracy. Under the spell of 
emergency the country was being ruled through a mechanism of terror and the 
total suspension of the rule of law however senses prevailed upon her when on 
the 18'*^  of January 1977 Mrs. Gandhi unexpectedly advised the President to 
dissolve the Lok Sabha and order a fresh election. 
Mrs. Gandhi referring to the temporary character of the emergency 
declared. "Our system, rests on the belief that governments derive their power 
from the people and that people will give expression to their will every five 
years, freely and without hindrance, by choosing the government they want 
and by indicating their preferences for policies." Every election, she 
concluded, was an "act of faith, an opportunity to cleanse public life of 
confusion. "^ ^ 
On February 2, 1977, the country was taken by total surprise when 
Jagjivan Ram resigned from the government and from the Congress. This step 
shook the ruling party and Mrs. Gandhi. Along with him went H.N. Bahuguna, 
a former Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh; Mrs. Nandini Salpathy, who had 
been compelled to relinquish her position as Chief Minister of Orissa, K.R. 
Ganesh, who had earlier been Minister of State at the Centre; Ram Mangal 
Pandey, a former minister in the Uttar Pradesh Cabinet; and D.N. Tiwari, who 
was a Member of the Lok Sabha. Jagjivan Ram's reason for resignation - as he 
stated - was to protest against the authoritarian and totalitarian trends in the 
country and the undemocratic functioning of the Congress. He immediately 
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set out to form his new organization - the Congress for Democracy - which he 
said stood for practical socialism in contrast to theoretical socialism. 
It seemed incredible and unreal but the impossible happened on 
January 20 - just two days after the announcement of the election - when a 
new party made its appearance on the scene as the main rival to the Congress. 
The Janta Party was composed of four entities - the old Congress, which had 
been beating its wings in vain after the great split in the parent body 
successfully engineered by Mrs. Gandhi in 1969; the Jan Sangh, whose 
organizational strength had been acknowledged by even its severest critics; 
the Bhartiya Lok Dal, which had been formed in 1974 when the Bhartiya 
Kranti Dal led by Chaudhury Charan Singh along with some leaders of the 
Swatantra Party and five other smaller parties constituted a party committed 
to conservatism; and lastly the Socialist Party. Heading the Party, as chairman, 
was Morarji Desai(81), a man of extra-ordinary vitality despite has advanced 
age. An administrator and seasoned politician, Desai commanded respect from 
all sections, from the older folks as well as from the youth. A man with 
granite determination, age and experience had mellowed him.^ ^ 
The formation of the Janata Party rattled Mrs. Gandhi and shook the 
Congress. She denounced it as an unprincipled alliance of diverse and 
irreconcilable elements constituted with the sole object of ousting her from 
power. She ridiculed it as a Khichdi warning the people that the power that the 
Congress alone was capable of holding the country together and giving it a 
stable government. The Congress president D.N. Barooah, had in a moment of 
exuberant rhetoric declared, "India is Indira, Indira is India. "^ ^ 
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But, the yeat 1977 represents a distinct watershed in the evolution 
fo Indian polity. The anti-emergency feeling became an anti-Indira Gandhi 
wave leading to the defeat of the Congress Party in 1977 elections by the 
Janata Party.^ ^ The Parliamentary elections held in March of that year gave a 
decisive blow to the authoritarian experiment of "Emergency Rule" brought 
about a major shift in voting trends and altered drastically the basic structure 
of the party system as in sixth Lok Sabha Election results.^^ The electoral 
change of 1977 has affected both the pattern of voter's choice as well as the 
institutional framework of party politics. It brought about an end of the 
"Congress System" and in its place ushered in a rather nebulous two - party 
system.^ ^ 
In one stroke the Indian electorate brought to an end thirty years of 
Congress Party Rule, eleven years of government under the Prime 
Ministership of Indira Gandhi, and twenty months of an emergency that had 
set India on a course of authoritarian govemment.^^ Thus in 1977, the first 
coalition at the central level was established under the leadership of Morarji 
Desai as the leader of the Janta Party.^ ^ As Robert G. Wesson writes: "The 
Desai government was more Indian in background, few spoke English easily 
and none were educated abroad. It policies were also more Indian, it favoured 
the Hindi language. The Janata approach to economic development was 
Gandhian, decentralisation to states and villages, agriculture rather than 
industry." Amaury de reincourt Lauds, "The new Janata Leaders immediately 
proclaimed it their aim to restore Mahatma Gandhi's principles of austerity, 
honesty and harmony in public life".^ * 
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But the Janata leaders were not disciplined. They quarreled among 
themselves over trifles. The post of Prime Minister was one, but two old men 
Charan Singh and jagjivanRam were aspirants for this central position. A 
compromise was found with Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram as two deputy 
Prime Minister.^^ Inspite of Janata Party emerging as a alternative to 
Congress, riding on the anti-Congress feeling, it did not provide a lasting 
formation of an alternative party because very soon the Janata party began to 
disintegrate. "No-confidence motion was brought against Desai ministry by 
Y.B. Chavan as an opposition leader. Defections started from the Janata Party 
to join the Janata (Secular) faction formed by Raj Narain. Morarji Desai, a 
man of lofty ideals, tendered his resignation to the President in July 1979. 
His successor, Charan Singh, who became Prime Minister with the support of 
two congressess - one led by Swaran Singh known as congress (S) and the 
other led by Indira Gandhi called Congress (I), could not secure confidence 
of Lok Sabha when he faced it in the last week of August 1979 as the Prime 
Minister. He therefore, advised dissolution of Lok Sabha.^ ^ 
In an overall assessment, the 1977 election led to usher in an 
optimism for a two-party model however this phase was short lived. As the 
elections held in January 1980 brought back Indira Gandhi to power with great 
honour and fanfare. Her Congress won two third majority in Lok Sabha with 
350 seats. Her opponents laged far behind with Lok Dal 41, CPM 35 and 
Janata 31.''^ 
After this election the re-emergence of the Congress as a dominant 
party continued for nine years (1980-84-89), during which Congress led by 
Indira Gandhi remained most powerful until her assassination in October 1984 
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and her son Rajiv Gandhi remained undisputed leader of the party till 1989. 
The fact that the break in the dominance of the Congress could last only about 
two and a half years clearly indicated that the congress had not lost anything 
by the period of break in its dominance. It came back more strongly and its 
dominance continued.'^ 
The assassination of Indira Gandhi on 30*^  October 1984 again 
raised the issue of political succession. However the party selected her son 
Rajiv Gandhi as the Prime Minister. It was the third peaceful management of 
succession in a consensual contest achieved by the Congress party^ .^ This 
succession was again a smooth transition and Rajiv Gandhi became firmly 
established as the party leader and Prime Minister. The eighth general election 
was held in December 1984 in which the Congress party secured 401 seats 
out of 507 for which ;election were held, (election in Kashmir and Punjab and 
been postponed) Rajiv Gandhi remained in power form 1984-1989.'^ 
Rajiv's call to heal India "Towards 21^ *^  Century" appealed to the 
youth and middle class. In the centenary session of the Congress in 1985 at 
Bombay in his Presidential address Rajiv had a dig at what he called the 
"Power brokers" and asked Congress to break new grounds to retain the 
popularity of this grand old party among Indian masses. However, he could not 
restructure the ruling pary nor could re-orient it in the image of his own. In 
one of the resolutions on economic policy, his advisors eliminated the word 
'socialism' to which Congeress since Nehru was committed. But he had to 
give in to the pressure form the middle level workers of his party and some 
senior leaders of the Congress Working Committee (C WC) and restored the 
work "Socialism' even though he proceeded further to adopt liberal economic 
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policy, Rajiv Gandhi could not put it in a more concerted form.'^ 
The year 1986 brought into focus a debate on Secularism, when a 
Muslim woman Shan Bano won her alimony case againest her husband in the 
Supreme Court, the Congress goverrunent could seize this opportunity to give 
protection to the divorced Muslim women. However, orthodoxy, Muslims led 
by Syed Shahbuddin and the Maulvis vehemently protested against such 
thinking in the government. Rajiv Gandhi gave in to the pressures of orthodox, 
and in May 1986, the controversial Muslim Women (Protection) Bill was 
passed by the Lok Sabha. Meanwhile on the issue of corruption Rajiv Gandhi's 
Defence Minister V.P.Singh resigned from the cabinet and later on from the 
Congress. A new process of opposition building started in October. Jana 
Morcha, the new national left-of-the-center party started by V.P.Singh's, Lok 
Dal under Devi Lai and socialist Chandra Shekhar made it a formidable 
coalition opposition. It had a social base in the farmers along with large 
OBC's which became famous as AJGAR. V.P.Singh's clean image against 
corruption of the Congress made him hijack the middle class support of Rajiv 
Gandhi which he had enjoyed in the early phase of his regime during 1984-86. 
In July 1989 a majority of opposition members in Lok Sabha resigned on the 
issue of GAC report on Bofors gun deal. In August Lok Sabha passed 
panchayati Raj and Nagar Palika Bill to give "power to the people at the 
initiative of Rajiv Gandhi. However two months later it was defeated in Rajya 
Sabha.''<^  
Rajiv Gandhi failed to perform these basic tasks of the Indian state: 
to maintain law and order in a sharply divided society, to play a positive role 
in facilitating economic growth in an economy with a high saving rate,skilled 
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managerial and technical personal, and promising entrepreneurial talent, and 
to cope with an uncertain international security environments.^'' And at last, 
the election of 1989 was held in an environment charged with emotions 
caused by a new genocide of Sikhs of Delhi. Inspite of the disturbed 
atmosphere, the government could never have thought of proclaiming 
emergency or suppressing civil liberties because of bitter lessons learnt by 
Indira Gandhi's emergency which led to the overthrow of her government. 
Other factors contributed to anti-government centres sentiments, such as. 
poor leadership, sycophancy, personality cult and abuse of the media for 
highlighting the sacrifices of one family to the negligence of many other 
freedom fighters. Every election takes place under a specific context and 
communalism was the context of, the Ninth Lok Sabha elections. First,all 
major political parties in the north and northwestern India either played the 
communal card or made compromises with it.Second, every important national 
leader like Rajiv, V.P.Singh, Devi Lai adjusted with communalism. Third, the 
beneficiaries of communal politics and communal vote were not only the BJP 
and Janata Dal but also the Congress. Fourth, the congress policy during 1984 
and 1989 proved that the practice of communalism to please a section of 
Hindus or Muslims or Sikhs was not a substitute for secular politics.^^ 
1989-onwards : Coalition Government and Problem of Stability 
The elections to ninth Lok Sabha in Novcrmber, 1989 marked a 
watershed in national politics as for the first time since independence, a'Hung 
Parliament' was thrown in with no party or a group getting a clear majority.^' 
The old system which was called the "Congress system" by Rajni Kothari, a 
"one-party dominated system" by W.H. Morris Jones, a "predominant party 
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system" by Giovanni Sartori, the "ruling party system" by Maurice Duverger, is 
no longer in existence. 
The 1989 general elections depicted two powerful waves, viz the 
Hindu wave and the anti Congress wave. While the Janata Dal and its Congress 
got the benefit of the latter wave, the exclusive and big beneficiary of both the 
waves. The 80 seats victory of the BJP in 1989 was the outcome of both 
Hindu wave and the opposition unity.*^ The voters in the Lok Sabha elections, 
1989 rejected the Congress but at the same time did not give much strength to 
the National Front to form the government on its own at the centre^' resulting 
in hung Parliament leading to the formation of minority government led by 
V.P. Singh, with the critical outside support of the BJP. This was a novel as 
well as unique experiment and first of its kind in Post-Independence Indian 
politics. This was a unique experiment because the two diametrically and 
ideologically opposed political camps right wing BJP and the leftist parties 
simultaneously extended outside support to the V.P. Singh led National Front 
government. The BJP support to V.P. Singh was a tactical strategy to help the 
formation of a national alternative to the Congress (I) at the centre. 
Considering the factionalized character and also plurality of ambitious leaders 
of the National Front, the BJP leaders were confident that the Front is 
unlikely to maintain its internal cohesion and complete the fiill five years 
term.*^ However this confidence was the worst confidence as fresh election 
to the Lok Sabha had to be called in May June 1991. In 1989 election, no 
party could acquire absolute majority. Congress could emerge as the largest 
party in the Parliament but it could not get absolute majority to form 
government. After this election the non-Congress parties have joined hands 
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and formed a coalition government. The Janata Dal which was in pwoer had 
only 141 members. The others parties supported this coalition. But this 
grouping was not based on ideology and have apparently irreconcilable 
election manifestos.*^ 
The government of V.P. Singh was a minority govenmient with 
majority backing- that of the partners of the National front, the B.J.P. and the 
C.P.M. The latter two are basically hostile to each other and, either would 
support the government if the other became a co-sharer of power with the 
Janata Dal.*'* Their main objective was to get rid of the Congress rule 
established by Rajiv Gandhi. This coalition of different parties was against the 
monopoly of single party with different ideologies, with the want of sharing 
the benefits of power. It could be said, the 1989 Parliamentary elections have 
often been regarded as one of the most firercely fought elections in the post-
independence history of India*^ (as shown in Table I). 
Prof. C.P. Bhambhri writes, "The Janata Party (The National Front) 
was formed by political groups who were involved in a struggle against 
domination of one party in the country politics, such a dominance had resulted 
in serious distortion in governance of the country, and ultimately, it led to the 
virtual derailment of Indian democracy. The creators of the Janata Party were 
publicly motivated by the great desire to save Indian democracy, which needed 
alternation among parties to rule over the country. The 'mergerists' perceived 
their attempt at party building in India as historic because it was done in the 
name of saving democracy in the country.*^ 
However within a year by August 1990 a clear rift emerged between 
the Janata Dal and the B.J.P. The BJP sought the alliance with Janata Dal in 
48 
1990 assembly election to eliminate Congress from the crucial Hindi 
speaking states of north-India. The very outside support to the National Front 
Government exposed BJP's hunt for the pragmatic pursuit of power i.e. 
enjoying power without responsibility. But, the V.P. Singh government did not 
pay any attention to BJP's electoral promises which led to its major 
differences with the National Front government. The delicate triangular 
balance upon which the viability of the National Front government rested was 
finally upset by the BJP when it pressed its view points on Ram Janambhoomi-
Babri-Masjid Controversy beyond the limits of the National Front and the left 
front.*^ On the other side the internal power struggle when V.P. Singh and 
Devi Lai felt apart and Devi Lai planned to organize a massive kisan rally in 
New Delhi in August 1990. V.P. Singh took a sudden decision to accept 
Mandal Commission recommendation to reserve twenty seven percent of jobs 
in the central government for backward classes. However an all-party meeting 
endorsed the PM's decision.** Here it could be said that if in the name of 
social Justice, Mandalization fragmented the Indian society on caste lines 
Ayodhya was the culmination of the Hindulava ideology that shattered the 
image and content of India's secular democracy. 
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TABLE-I 
PARTY CONSOLIDATION 
1989-JANATA DAL MINORITY GOVERNMENT WITH THE SUPPORT 
IT RECEIVED FROM PARTIES OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT 
A. Janata Dal Alliance Parties in 1989 (National Front) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
B . 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Janata Dal 
Telegu Desam 
D.M.K. 
Congress (S) 
Assam Gantantra Parishad 
The Communist 
from Outsides 
C.P.L (M) 
C.P.I. 
R.S.R 
Forward Bloc 
Left Front, 
142 seats 
2 
Nil 
1 
Nil 
(Support to 
32 
12 
4 
3 
C. B.J.P. and its Allied (support to Janata Dal/National Front 
from outside) 
B.J.R 86 
= 90 
Shiva Sena 4 
In November the Janata Dal, the core component of the NF 
Government split. Chandra Shekhar as leader of the breakaway group of 58 
MPs withdrew support to the Singh government. The N.F, Government headed 
by Singh lost confidence motion in the Lok Sabha. V.P. Singh resigned his 
post. At the same time Congress (I) extended support to Chandra Shekhar to 
form the government. Even as the BJP and the left parties declined the request 
of R. Venkataraman to form government. It was characteristic of Indian 
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politics that Chandra Shekhar was sworn in as PM with Devi Lai's his Deputy 
PM who had left him in the cold at the time of selection of V.P. Singh as the 
first PM of NF.89 
And, finally the novel experiment of alliance failed before 
completion of one year. But it helped the B JP to emerge as a sole alternative 
to the Congress (I) to constitute responsible opposition as well as to form 
government at the centre.'" 
On the other side Congress dilemma on the issue of Mandal 
Commission was the adoption of the Mandal Commission report and the 
concomitant divide between forward and backward castes brought into sharp 
focus the dilemma that the congress like other all parties faced. The Congress 
party historically had garnered a majority of the forward and backward caste 
votes. The adoption of the recommendations of the Mandal Commission 
report placed the Congress Party in a difficult position. It could not take a 
stand against adopting the measures, as that would cause it to lose what 
support it had among the backward castes in Uttar Pradesh and perhaps across 
the rest of the nation. Nor could it came out openly in favour of the report, 
for it would then lose the support of the forward castes, who were key party 
supporters and also constituted a significant portion of its office holders.^' 
In March 1991 the Congress threatened to withdraw its support to 
the minority government headed by Chandra Shekhar on a minor issue of 
police surveillance of Rajiv Gandhi's residence and Chandra Shekhar resigned 
as P.M.'^  In 1991 elections, the Congress Party returned with a slender 
majority produced mainly by a sympathy wave created due to the assassination 
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of Rajiv Gandhi during the process of election.'-' 
Analysing the lessons on 1991 Election M.V. Kanmath writes : "The 
elections that have just ended are vastly different from the elections held only 
two years ago. Then Bofors and the issue of corruption in high places was 
supreme in the voters minds. In 1991 no one spoke of Bofors. This time 
attention was focused around the Mandir-Mandal issues. Corruption was 
hardly header of. Then, again, in between the election, Rajiv Gandhi was 
assassinated and that gave a new turn to the elections.''* 
TABLE-II 
TENTH LOK SABHA ELECTIONS 1991 : PARTY POSITION 
Parties No. o 
Congress 
B.J.R 
Janata Dal 
C.RI. (M) 
C.RI. 
Telugu Desam 
J.M.M. 
S.J.R 
R.S.R 
Shiva Sena 
Forward Bloc 
Muslim League 
Congress (S) 
Others 
Congress government led by P.V. Narsimha Rao - 21.6.91 - May 1996. 
eats secured 
226 
117 
56 
35 
13 
13 
6 
5 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
11 
% of votes 
36.04 
20.03 
11.48 
6.28 
2.46 
3.02 
0.55 
3.24 
0.66 
0.43 
0.33 
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It is significant that Rajiv Gandhi had to sacrifice his life for the 
promotion of national integrity of its neighbour Sri Lanka. In the elections 
that followed his assassination, typical of the Congress culture Sonia Gandhi 
was unanimously elected as Congress President by the working committee. 
Sonia Gandhi however, declined the offer, but the obsession of the Congress 
leaders and workers with India's Nehru-Gandhi dynasty has never left them. It 
has remained by and large the continuing political institution of a family 
shadowing over the Congress indicating the failure of this great party of once 
multiple leaders to grow out of the dynasty syndrome. In the Lok Sabha 
elections the Congress emerged as the largest party falling short of an 
absolute majority, Narasimha Rao was chosen as leader of the party. In 
February Narasimha Rao was elected as President of the Congress in the 
organizational poll held after a gap of twenty years. Rao became the first 
Congress Leader outside the dynasty to centralize power by becoming both 
the Congress PM and the President.^^ Even with his minority Rao was 
destined to take a momentous decision of adopting the policy of economic 
reforms leading India on the path of liberalisation. 
But during the turn of this decade corruption was also acquiring 
sharp political relevance for example the CM of Goa surrendered to the police 
in Panaji; Madhav Singh Solanki resigned on the Bofors case; PCC(I) 
President J.B. Patnaik was arrested on corruption charges; stockbroker 
Harshad Mehta and his associations were arrested. Assets of three officers of 
State Bank of India in security scam were attached. On the other hand 
circumstances in which CBI Joint Director K. Madhavan looking into the 
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security scam resigned smacked of political intervention in his major case of 
corruption by the highest level power that be.^ ^ 
It was during this period that the famous Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 
(JMM) bribe case was concocted. The Government of India was saved for the 
first time with the help of corrupt practices. Soon thereafter, Rao showed his 
mastery of political alchemy of converting a minority into a majority.^' 
Rao introduced two Bills on 29th July 1994 in seeking to de-link 
religion from politics and to empower the election commission to debar 
parties with religious names but it was totally flopped under the protest of 
BJP and media criticism. But it helped him acquire some secular image even 
though the Muslims Community in the country under the Ayodhya Syndrome 
remained very much alienated from the Congress.^* And at last Congress did 
not secure her position in the Eleventh Lok Sabha elections (see Table III). 
TABLE III 
1996-ELEVENTH LOK SABHA ELECTIONS : PARTY POSITION 
Total No. of seats - 543 1.6.1996 
Name of parties Seats secured 
A. Congress 135 
B. Parties in the United from Coalition - 1.6.1996 
Janata Dal 43 Prime Minister 
Samajwadi Party 17 H.D. Deve Gowda 
D.M.K. 16 9 months 
Name of Parties Seats secured 
T.M.C. 20 
A.G.R 5 
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I.N.C. (T) 
C.P.I. (M) 
C.P.I. 
R.S.P. 
Forward Bloc 
M.P.V.C. 
K.C.P. 
C. Other supporting Parties 
I.V.M.L. 
J.M.M, 
M.G.R 
U.G.D.P. 
S.D.R 
K..E.C 
Independents 
D. Seats secured by B.J.P. and its Allies 
B.J.R 
Shiva Sena 
Samata Party 
Haryana Vikas Party 
Shiromani Akali Dal 
4 
33 
12 
5 
3 
2 
1 
2 
3 
161 
15 
8 
3 
8 
Total 195 
The eleventh Lok Sabha elections of 1996 was a unique election in 
many ways. It ushered into a new era of coalition politics. The five phase 
nation wide general election had thrown up a severely fractured verdict with 
none of the three major formations the Congress, the BJP and the National 
Front-Left Front combine were near the striking distance of an absolute 
majority.^' But for the first time in 1996, the BJP increased its share of 
^^ "' " ..^-''^"^^^ 
representatives in the Lok Sabha through a rnode?aJfe campaign and limited 
alliance with regional parties and got a position of the largest political party 
in India. As evident from the eleventh Lok Sabha election, it could be said, 
that Political developments of Indian politics were - dynamics of corruption, 
Criminalisation, Caste - Communal cleavages and a coalition process still 
struggling to fmd a new culture and capacity to effectively manage the task of 
governance.'°° During 1996-97 India has seen three PMs including a BJP's 
and another being the first authentic non-Hindi speaking one. 1996 has turned 
out to become of the most exciting years for the Indian polity as it attended 
to the twin tasks of taming the prince and keeping the kingdom intact 
efficaciously and by and large peacefully. The grand struggle among the 
conflicting groups over economic and social resources continued in all its 
glory; a new kind of politics of accommodation is being experiments with, 
accompanied by a robust attmept to reconstruct the collapsed structure of 
accountability, but without producing - so far - a crises of governability. A 
coalition govenrment of 13 parties, a communist home minister; and judicial 
custody for a number of former cabinet ministers were only some of the 
outward manifestations of a polity trying to change its internal order without 
producing any great disorder.'^^ 
Here, it is significant that both the National Fronts (1977 and 1989) 
were anti-Congress Fronts of parties. The Left Front is, however, a front 
separately established by the leftist parties which has also been consistently 
anti-Congress. But the third Front, which was the United Front was not anti-
Congress. It was formed after the 1996 elections as anti-B.J.R Front, on the 
ground that the Front was a combination of secular parties whereas the B.J.P. 
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was non-secular. The Congress party and the C.P.I. (M) had supported this 
Front which was a coalition of thirteen parties.'^^ 
The 10th and 11th general elections have witnessed the 
mushrooming of regional parties and the regionalisation of national parties. 
The trend of growing regional parties and their impact on the Indian political 
scene became evident in the formation of the United Front. The United Front 
in 1996 was not only a major attempt at the coalition experiment but also 
marked a paradigm shift in Indian politics. The rise of the regional parties has 
been mainly because of the substantial failure of the high command system in 
the Congress, the BJP or the Janata Dal. Many of the regional forces have 
been the offshoots of the Congress.'°^ This phenomena of creation of'Fronts' 
has on the whole affected the viability of individual parties and exposed their 
weaknesses. The fronts do not become 'parties' and they just represent 
temporary combination for a specific purpose. Consequently, the 'Fronts' have 
not been able to establish effective governments. They have also failed to 
produce any concrete ground for the polarization of different parties into a 
unified major political alternative. They have indicated the importance of 
regional parties, and regional parties have gained by becoming partners in 
such coalition governments at the center. This is, perhaps, the only visible 
contribution emerging out of the formation of the grouping of parties as 
'Fronts'.'O'* 
When the Congress party had lost its political hegemony, there has 
been in the nineties a determined effort on the part of the BJP to develop as a 
viable political alternative to the Congress Party. It made considerable 
advance in this direction, albeit under igenious and complex coalition 
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arrangements under its leadership.'°^ The outcome of the general election for 
12th Lok Sabha is not so much an electoral victory of BJP but the triumph of 
coalition politics in India. The rise and fall of coalition governments and mid-
term general elections at short intervals in the nineties had neither been 
fortuitous nor surprising. But those who have tended to view coalition politics 
with disdain or regard it as manifestation of political instability have failed to 
carry conviction and credibility with the mass of the people who have found in 
coalition politics novel opportunities for the assertion of their rights and 
demands in the democratic order. The BJP has taken advantage of this 
sentiment by forging multiparty alliances to exercise political power.'°^ And 
BJP emerged as a single largest party of Lok Sabha elections by capturing 
mostly Congress seats. The decline of the Congress became a net gain to the 
BJP. But this election is again continued to be split one causing re-emergence 
of a hung Parliament for the fourth successive time. The BJP with its old 
allies and some new partners emerged as the largest vote puller in the country, 
securing 31% of the votes and BJP captured 180 seats, more than 25% of the 
votes with the slogan of "stable government and able leadership".'^^ 
TABLE - IV 
TWELTH LOK SABHA ELECTION RESULTS 
(MARCH 1998) 
Partywise position as on 25th April 1998 
Total No. of Seats : 543 
A B.J.P. and Allies No. of Seats secured in 
the Lok Sabha 
1. B.J.P. 181 (including 3 results 
1 -Jammu, 
1-Bihar (Patna), 
l-J&K(Udhampur) 
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2. A.I.D.M.K. 18 
3. Samata Party 12 
4. Biju Janata Dal (Orissa) 09 
5. Shiromani Akali Dal Punjab 08 
6. Shiva Sena 06 
7. P.M.K. 04 
9. T.R.C. 03 
10. Arunachal Congress 02 
11. Trinamul Congress 07 
12. M.D.M.K. 03 
13. Haryana Vikas Party 01 
14. Janata Party 01 
15. H.L.D. (Haryana) 04 
16. Menaka Gandhi 04 
17. Satnam Singh 01 
18. Buta Singh 01 
19. T.D.P. (Telegudesam) 12 (Supporting from outside) 
Total 275 
B. Congress and Allies 
1. Congress 142 
2. R.J.D. (Bihar) 17 
3. R.P.I. 04 
4. I.U.M.L. 02 
5. U.M.F. (Assam) 01 
6. Kerala Congress (M) 01 
Total 167 
C United Front 
1. C.P.I. (M) 32 
2. CP.I. 09 
3. R.S.P. 05 
4. Forward Block 02 
5. Samajwadi Party (U.P.) 
(Mulayam Singh) 20 
6. Janata Dal 06 
7. Congress (S) 01 
8. National Conference (JK) 02 
9. A.G.R Nil 
10. M.G.R Nil 
11. D.M.K. 06 
12. T.M.C. 03 
Total 86 
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D. Others 
1. B.S.P. 05 
2. S.J.P. 01 
3. A.S.D.C. 01 
4. S.D.F. 01 (Sikkim) 
5. M.S.C. 01 
6. P.W.P. 01 
7. Independents 03 
Total 13 
Final Total 
A. B.J.P. and Allies 275 
B. Congress and Allies 167 
C. United Front 86 
D. Others 13 
Total 541 
As the election (Table IV) result shows that, each coalition was a 
heterogeneous aggregation. The pattern of heterogeneity, however, varied from 
case to case; some parties, in each case were closer, and hence more equal, 
than the others. It was a partnership in the negative virtue of keeping the 
Congress out of office. It was not a partnership in positive virtue of effecting 
any social change. Infact, it could not be so because the coalescing parties 
were of different colours and of different shades of the same colour; if some 
of them thought in terms of social justice, the others thought in terms of 
linguism, and yet others thought in terms of regional at religious chauvinisms. 
The parties had nothing in common among them; they had nothing negotiable 
with one another, this immobilized the coalitions. The net result was this: the 
coalitions replaced the Congress, but, like the Congress, they formed centrist 
governments, inclining towards the Left or the Right, depending on the 
preponderance of Leftist or Rightist parties in a coalition. The replacement of 
a government by a like government was brought about by the politics of 
coalition which, all the time, strove to heighten political negativism as the 
chief propellant of party competition.'°* 
The Congress Party on the other hand has failed to regain for itself 
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single party hegemony in politics. On the contrary, it has tended mindlessly to 
play the role of the destabilizer of the polity and eroded it mass support 
base.'^^ The vacuum created after the exit of Nehru-Indira leadership is not 
filled in by a firm, a long-term based leadership. Issues like Social Justice and 
Hindutva, which are essentially based on caste or religion have replaced what 
should be a well-knit ideology. Plebicitary leadership of Indira Gandhi and 
expectations created by the fresh image of Rajiv Gandhi substituted for the 
organization of the Congress. During the last decade almost every political 
party, except the CPM and the B JP, is in search of an organization. Politics of 
consensus over national goals guiding the system has given way, in the last 
decade, to politics of compulsion and convenience prompting leaders and 
parties to coalesce, break and again make a revised edition of alliance which 
cynically ignores values, public norms of consistency and propriety. All this 
has led to cynical devaluation of all the Gandhi-Nehru-Patel lived and died 
for. Time and again the Indian paradise was regained and lost. This time, 
almost finally."° 
It was the time for another round of elections, the third in three 
years. With the ignominious collapse of the country's fourth experiment with 
a coalition government at the center, once again the main electoral plank was 
going to be that of stability. And stability will yet again be equated with single 
party majority. The two main parties seem to be preparing to share power. The 
Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) had already seen-up the National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA) and the Congress was floundering for allies. But both were 
seeing these alliances as a safety net, just in case they don't get the majority 
on their own. In fact, both were waling towards absolute majority."* In 1998, 
even normally on the ball political pundits didn't foresee yet another hung 
Parliament till quite late into the electoral process. Everyone was positive 
that popular revulsion for the disgraceful manner in which three governments 
had come and gone between 1996 and 1997 would translate into an 
overwhelming vote for a single party. But the Indian voter loves throwing 
surprises and he did so this time too. It was a fractured mandate once again. 
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As thirteenth and fourteenth Lok Sabha elections result (Tables V & 
VI) clearly analysis that, people don't vote for or against coalitions. They vote 
for those who will articulate their demands. A fractured mandate is the 
manifestation, within the political system, of the churning that's going on in 
Indian society. Political mobilization of these newly resurgent classes was 
now taken up by a slew of newer political formations purely on the basis of 
various primordial identities - religious, caste, regional, linguistic. 
Established parties tried to tap these sentiments but the idioms they 
constructed be it Mandal or Mandir - couldn't contain the welter of new 
identities that had sprung up. The newer parties had shrewder leaders who 
knew how to fashion the right idioms to muster support. So the political 
system at the center began to reflect the multifarious schisms in Indian 
society. 
The spectacle of the congress remaining in power at the centre and 
in the states for two long a period has unwittingly given currency to the view 
that one party government alone can provide the much needed political 
stability in the country. In such a context, a hung parliament is generally 
perceived as a sinister development. This is an untenable view. Hung 
parliament is a common feature in European countries and a coalition 
government is taken as a normal feature and no eyebrows are raised. Also, one 
must remember that India is a country of continental dimension and diversity, 
which is not easy for any single party to successfully accommodate. The 
congress was another name for the national movement for independence. The 
momentum inherent in the national movement has now lost its force. Party 
building is a time consuming process requiring vision, tact and practice. Thus 
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seen, India will have to learn to line with coalition governments in the 
forseeable future. The situation is inevitable when the old order is ringing out 
and the new one is seeking to ring in. Fortunately, India can tap its coalitional 
experiences gathered from the past to guide its future course of action. 
One must at the outset admit that track record of coalitional 
arrangements in India is anything but assuring. But one should also not forget 
that coalitionism has its success stories also. Achuta Menon-led coalition in 
Kerala in the late seventies successfully computed its full term. Jyoti Basu-
led-leftist Front Government in West Bengal has provided stability to the 
state for two decades, bestowing on Jyoti Basu the honour of being the longest 
serving Chief Minister in India. Thus, the place of demcoratic values in 
relation to such political arrangement is the part and partial of the discussion. 
A Situational Democratic Arrangement : 
The democratic principles are the essence of the representation of 
will of the people which justifies the need for, and existence of, a 
representative government which symbolises the rule by many in 
constitutional democratic perspectives, or, in other words, the rule of the 
majority in the political community as a whole including its various sections, 
classes and groups. The term 'Democracy' postulates that form of government 
in which the governance is constitutionally conducted, must be broad based 
and it should not be concerned in any particular class, groups or obligancy. In 
the absence of unanimity, social consensus provides the basis of all 
democratic governments. Proverbially, it is the governments of the people, 
for the people and by the people. This government by the people is carried on 
by the representatives of the people chosen by the election. 
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It is this requirement that provides a method of an election which 
enables the people to elect their representatives belonging to organised and 
recognised political parties on the basis of their declared, manifested plans 
and programme of counted political actions. The governance is carried on by 
the majority or the majority party which is not bodily unchangeable. The rule 
of the majority for the time being is intended to approximate to the rule by 
consent"^ and government by popular opinion and support. 
Such representative govt, is a means to execute the will of the people 
with a view to ensure and provide :-
(i) restraints on uncontrolled junctioning of the government. 
(ii) responsibility and accountability of the government to popular 
representative bodies, and 
(iii) responsiveness to public opinion and popular will. 
Moreover, in a republic, the state sovereignty is vested in, and held 
by the people and the political power is exercised popularly as an expression 
of the people's sovereignty, command grace or pleasure. The constitution is 
adopted and given to themselves by the people. The constitution of India has 
been adopted, enacted and given "To ourselves" by "We, the people". The 
supreme political power is held by the whole polity, the political community -
the people's will. The Constitution was enacted by the chosen representation 
of the people assembled in Constituent Assembly or convention in the name 
of the people and for the people. Stressfully, it was thought by the Constituent 
Assembly that their intendment in this respect should be made manifest in the 
preambulary declarations of the Constitution. 
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In this way, this is a situation adjectified with the term "Sovereign 
Democratic Republic" in which something has to be placed, tested by the rule 
of many. It doesn't matter that the place is filled with by single party majority 
in number or minority in number but holding the confidence of the House or 
the combination of several parties, what really matters is the representation 
of the popular conscience of the people and not individual number. So this is 
only the anatomical analysis of the situation which provides the various 
methods. This is how such situational democratic arrangement is 
constitutionally recognised. 
At one place while such thing finds its place in the preamble of the 
Indian Constitution, at other place, it is recognised prominently by the apex 
court of the land by ensuring the validity with the "Doctrine of Basic 
Structure" propounded in Keshavananda Bharti's case''^, in the case of Kihota 
Mollohen vs. Zachilhu^''* laying down "sovereign, democratic, republican 
structure" as basic feature of the constitution and thus imposing the 
restrictions upon the amending power''^ of the Parliament. 
On the above premises, the governmental feature comes in lime light 
with a rule by the majority that are capable to hold the confidence of the 
people. Hence, the Indian Constitution nowhere adheres to the single party 
government. Even a government that has come in minority can hold the office 
if it has the confidence of the people as was observed by the SC in S.R. 
Bommai Vs. Union of India''^ (9 judge Bench) that wherever a doubt arises 
whether a ministry has lost the confidence of the House, the only way of 
testing is on the floor of the House."' The assessment of the strength of the 
Ministry is not a matter of private opinion of any individual, be he the 
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Governor or the President.''* In Jagdambika Pal vs. Union of India"', the SC 
directed a "composite floor test" to be held between the contending parties 
which resuhed in Shri Kalyan Singh securing the majority votes. 
In this context, more can be said that at the elections held in 1989 
and 1991 (for the 9th and 10th Lok Sabha, respectively) the largest single 
party failed to secure an absolute majority, yet in order to avoid another 
election, it was allowed to form a government with the tacit support of some 
other parties, who, however refused to enter into a coalition government and 
share the responsibility of the party in the power. 
It is, thus, a distinct form of government, a short lived government 
in coalition that is concerned here. In other words, the combination of parties 
supporting the government, has been done as coalition parties. This 
government is called coalition government, so hereto, it has been proved that 
it is not a constitutional fiction but a political reality in a democratic set-up. 
Structural Dilemma About Government: 
The framers of the Constitution realised that the new constitution 
should be able to wisely and efficiently harness and direct the energy of the 
nation and the leadership available towards the achievement of the needed 
social and eocnomic revolution within the democratic process, which form of 
government they asked themselves, would be able to perform this function 
smoothly'20? Because of the dearth of political inventions they turned their 
attention to the two available models - the Parliamentary and the Presidential 
Forms of government. 
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Jawaharlal Nehru'^' told the Constituent Assembly that it was after 
anxious consideration that they had decided in favour of Parliamentary form 
of government in which the power resided in the legislature and the ministers. 
Vallabhbahi Patel'^^ pointed out that the committees on Provincial and Union 
Constitution had decided that only Parliamentry form of government would 
suit India well. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Munsi and Alladi expounded to the 
Assembly the relative merits of these two models and the considerations 
governing the choice of the Parliamentry model. Ambedkar'^ ^ wanted for free 
India a form of government which could ensure in equal degree stability and 
responsibility. But he found that the Presidential form of government was 
more stable than responsible while the Parliamentry form of government was 
more responsible than stable, the former envisaged a periodic assessment of 
the executive by the electorate; the latter, a daily assessment of the executive 
by the legislature and a periodic assessment by the people. On the basis of 
this evaluation Ambedkar said : 
"The Daily assessment of responsibility which is not available under 
the American system is, it is felt, far more effective than the periodic 
assessment and far more necessary in a country like India. The draft 
constitution, in recommending the parliamentry system of executive, has 
preferred more responsibility to more stability.'^^ 
K.M. Munshi'^^ and Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar'^ ^ drew attention to 
India's long familiarity with this form of government and its capacity to 
function without a conflict between the executive and the legislature. 
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The Constitution makers knew that they could import from England 
the Parliamentary form of government, but not character and temperament 
that shaped it into a smooth and supple mechanism and that any discord 
between the native character and temperament and the borrowed constitution 
would be disastrous.'^' Even in England, the Earl of Balfour pointed out that 
the government would not work if there were multiple parties with near equal 
strength in the House of commons or with just two parties with such a 
profound chasm between them that a change of government would amount to a 
revolution.'^* So Ambedkar stressed the need for cultivation of constitutional 
morality in India. He noticed the threat to Parliamentary democracy posed by 
caste and creed and by political parties with diverse and opposing political 
creeds. Rajendra Prasad, too, knew that sale of votes by the electors or 
loyalties by their representatives would reduce responsible government to a 
force. So he said : "after all a constitution is a lifeless thing. It acquires life 
because of the man who control it and operate it, all that India needs today is 
nothing more than a set of honest men who will have the interest of the 
country before thcm".'^' He expressed a mystic hope that "when the country 
needs men of character they will be coming up and the masses will throw 
them up".'^° Ambedkar, however, warned : "if things go wrong under the new 
constitution the reason will not be that we had a bad constitution, what we will 
have to say is that Man is vile".'^' 
Parliamentary Democracy and Constitutional Democracy : 
Parliamentary democracy is a system of government by the whole 
people of a country especially through representatives who are elected under 
free and fair elections. 
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In a parliamentary democracy, the executive is acocuntable to 
parliament and ultimately to the people. It is also acknowledged that all 
authority in the state emanates from the sovereign people. It, therefore, 
focusses on government by the people rather than on any need to restrain 
government which, since it is government by the sovereign people, can not be 
limited. 
In a constitutional democracy, the written constitution enshrines the 
principles of democracy. It establishes, defines and confines the various 
organs or institutions of state. In other words, the constitution establishes a 
constitutional democracy of separate powers, checked and balanced. It 
establishes a framework of limited government. The very term 'constitutional' 
implies limitations. Constitutional democracy envisages a democratic system 
of government according to the terms of the constitution that is itself 
democratic in nature. It must be noted, however, that, a mere fact that a 
country has a written constitution in place does not in itself make that country 
constitutional democracy. There have been countries with written 
constitutions that did not place any restraint on government actions as was the 
case during the apartheid era in South Africa. 
A common feature between Parliamentary democracy and 
constitutional democracy is that both acknowledge that government rests upon 
the consent of the governed, given by means of elections based on universal 
and equal sufferage. However, parliamentary democracy may or may not be a 
constitutional democracy as well. As a general proposition, it may be said that 
parliamentary democracy is more likely to be practised by states with a 
parliamentary system of a government. On the other hand, a state with a 
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presidential or semi-presidential system of government would be an 'obvious' 
candidate for constitutional democracy. 
The best example of a country operating under parliamentary system 
of government is Britain with the doctrine of parliament's full power over 
elections and legislation. Britain, unlike many other democratic countries, 
has no single document or bundle of documents which embody its 
constitution. Thus, in Britain, the constitution is still viewed as nothing more 
than a law established by the government, and alterable by the government. In 
fact, in Britain, the constitution drives its authority from parliament. The idea 
being that the constitution is the creation of parliament which therefore, 
remains free to alter it, as it sees fit, by a simple act of parliament without 
any special procedure or majority vote. 
By contrast, America and other countries that have followed their 
constitutional model reject more changeable arrangement of laws, institutions 
and customs. These countries have instead developed the notion of a 
constitution as a positive set of principles and rules above laws, institutions 
and customs. They have developed the concept of a constitution as a superior, 
concrete law and not ambiguous one, against which all other laws are to be 
measured. In these countries. Parliament drives its authority and power from 
the constitution. The power of the state and every branch of it has its bounds 
assigned by the Constitution. 
Our democratic political system, modelled on the British system 
(Westminster system) in its operational aspects is developing its own way and 
giving birth to many a symptoms which are alien to the original model. This 
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can be illustrated by giving a smile : the soil in which an imported seeds is 
sown will definitely leave its mark on the growth, shape, colour and life 
processes of the plant. In a similar way the Indian political system differs 
from the original model because of the typical Indian soil milieu in which it 
had to operate. 
Political parties are concomitant to parliamentary system; this is 
what we have learnt from experience of older democracies. In British political 
system, there are two parties, the third no doubt has existed but its presence 
has always been nominal. The "shadow government" is always there. In India, 
on the other hand, parties exist, not two major parties, but a number of 
political parties, some national and many regional and local parties. 
A good deal of thought went into the framing of our Constitution; 
but our Constitution makers did not foresee fractured governments at the 
centre. Hence the omission of powers to the President to promulgate 
Presidential Rule at the centre when Coalition government do not work, and 
continuous mid-term elections becomes impractical. The mother of 
Parliaments did not visualise every politician, big or small, forming his own 
party ideology counting for little or nothing, expediency, being the order of 
the day, and public service only a cloak for personal aggrandisement. 
When the Constituent Assembly debated on the form of government 
for free India, two sets of arguments clinched the issue in favour of 
parliamentary system patterned on the Westminster model. First, was B.R. 
Ambedkar's stress on tradition and experience. But the sad fact is that the 
Westminster model has failed to take roots in this country.'^^ K.M. Munshi, a 
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strong supporter of the parliamentary system in the Constituent Assembly, 
regretted his decision 35 years later in 1985 when he said "If I had to make a 
choice again, I would vote for the Presidential form of government". 
The reforms in the parliamentary system or for a presidential system 
has always been spurred by fear of instability apparently inherent in the 
parliamentary system, the apprehension regarding stability has been 
heightened over the years due to the failure of several governments, for 
instance, Samyukta Vidhayak Das (SVD) between 1967-72; the Janata party 
(J) between 1977-79; Janata Dal (JD) between 1989-90. The weakening of 
the organisational structure of the Congress since seventies and failure of any 
other political party to emerge as a stable alternative have added to the fear of 
instability. The results of 1996, 1998 General and Assembly elections have 
further increased the fear of instability.'-'^ 
Presidential versus Parliamentary Democracy : 
It seems that a stage has been reached in the evolution of democratic 
system in India where a system analogous to Presidential system is seriously 
examined, there are too many parties in the fray. There is no limit to the 
formation of parties. The parties are not ideology or programme-based. The 
parties are mercurial. Horse trading by the intervention of money or by other 
lures, tangible and intangible, is rampant, such as the offer of a cabinet berth 
or chairmanship of a Corporation. All this and more call for to take proactive 
action before it is too late. 
The electorate has at present no real choice. If a person votes for a 
party of his choice, he lands up with a moribund and corrupt state level outfit. 
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And if the party at both levels are acceptable, he might have to vote for a 
thoroughly dishonest, corrupt or incompetent candidate. It is also often vice 
versa. He has the option of a better candidate and a new acceptable party. 
When such dilemmas are injected into a system of 20 plus party framework 
when parties are changing their positions as it suits 'the leader', democracy 
can not function in a meaningful way. 
One alternative, therefore, is voting by parties and not for the 
candidate. In so doing there is the problem of the conflict of the legislature 
and the executive, the like of which the US is facing now - as it has many 
times before. 
A truly democratic system could be a party-based executive and a 
now-partisan parliament. Both the president and the Executive (that is the 
Prime Minister and his team) are elected by a direct vote. In brief, the people 
elect a non-partisan Parliament, the same should be repeated at the state level. 
The suggested model may seem to be an innovation and may be 
rejected out-of-hand. If, however, true democracy and rule of law by the 
majority have to be ensured, a model similar to this has to be designed. 
It was earlier suggested that a Rastriya Panchayat on a non partisan 
basis could be elected with a much larger membership, each member 
representing a cohesive constituency.''* This Rashtriya Panchayat will be able 
to express the will of the people on issues of national importance and prevent 
a minority government to make historic decisions even when it does not have 
the people's mandate. The reference to 'minority' government is not merely to 
the government by a party which does not enjoy an absolute majority in the 
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legislature but it is to the relatively small positive vote a party commands 
even when it has the majority. 
What is even more significant. The subject issue might not have 
been raised at all and if raised it was one of the hundreds of other issues in 
the manifesto which tend basically to be a public relations (PR) exercise. 
The emerging Indian political framework is neither democratic nor 
in conformity with the spirit of the constitution. The constitution was 
envisaged with a different vision. In practice, it has developed strains and 
stresses. Before it collapses, a proactive programme is the need of the hour. 
The innate Indian commitment to higher values and standards and to principles 
of democracy demand introspection and counter-action. If democracy could 
survive in the last few decades inspite of adverse environment of a developing 
society and the diversities of Indian life, the Indian ingenuity must reinvent a 
new, really viable and sustainable democracy. In this context, the functional 
aspect of the Constitutional head - a protector of Constitutional sanctity - is 
the prime subject to be considered. 
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Chapter - 2 
ROLE OF PRESIDENT : COALITION 
AND HUNG PARLIAMENT 
We start with the view to examine how substantial a Presidential 
role may be in providing a viable proposition of government in India. The 
mandate is that there must be a council of Ministers at all times and there can 
not be a vacuum. The President can not act suo moto, pleading that there is no 
council of Ministers in existence. He has to create one and act according to 
the advice of the council. The view is apparently supported by the fact that in 
our system there is no such Constitutional arrangement as it is happened in 
the states i.e. a Presidential rule not withstanding his executive powers (Art. 
53) and legislative powers under Art. 123 of the Constitution. The exception 
for this only is for a very short interregnum between the death of the Prime 
Minister and the nomination of the successor to carry on the administration 
till a final choice is made. From this very notion the temporary arrangement, 
known as "care taker government" comes into existence. 
For our relevancy, let's examine the presidential position in India. 
Hence, it is, here, necessary to refer two views which have been expressed 
about his position under our constitution. The first view is that he is a 
constitutional head of the government and his position corresponds to that of 
the sovereign of the United Kingdom and like the sovereign, the president is 
under an obligation to act on the advice of his council of minsiters. The 
second view is that the President swears to defend, and has the duty to defend, 
the constitution and the law; that he represents the unity of the nation, and 
has, therefore, certain powers which enable him to override his council of 
ministers. 
"I have made this poignant and pertinent digression to dispell the 
misconceived notion that the position of the president of India is akin to that 
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of the Queen (or king) of England. This is fallacious for the simple reason 
that our President like the Parliament, Supreme Court and other institutions is 
a creature of the constitution while the English Queen owes her existence to 
history and convention. I also submit that the full contour of Presidential, 
power under our constitution has not yet been realised".' 
The second view is supported partly on legal, but mostly on political 
grounds. The legal ground is that the constitution provides for a council of 
Ministers to aid and advice the President in the discharge of his functions. 
In some respects the position of President can not be compared to 
that of the sovereign of the United kingdom, because the President holds an 
elective and the sovereign a hereditary office. Nor would it be correct to say 
that the President embodies the unity of India in the same sense in which the 
sovereign embodies the unity of the United Kingdom because holding a 
hereditary office, the sovereign is, by convention, above and outside political 
controversy; whereas, election to the office of the President may involve, and 
has in fact involved, intense and bitter party strife since the president stands 
as the candidate of a political party, or a combination of political parties.^*^ 
Secondly the important part played by the sovereign in the United 
Kingdom is due partly to historical causes, partly to the sentiment of loyality 
and respect which have grown with the years, and partly to the fact that 
Governments come and go but the sovereign remains a constant figure, so that 
the acculated experience of sovereign enables him to play a part which the 
President of India can not play because his office is elective and lacks the 
continuity and stability of a hereditary office. At this place it is enough to say 
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that Samsher Singh's case has finally established, that the President is the 
Constitutional head of government obliged to act on the advice of his Council 
of Ministers. Whether there are any circumstances under which he can act in 
his discretion is best considered after a discussion of Samsher Singh's case/ 
In this case a bench of seven judges of Supreme court decided very improtant 
questions about the constitutional position of the President and the Governor 
under our constitution. A bench of seven judges was constituted to consider 
whether the decision in Sardari Lai Vs. Union of India^ was correct. In 
Shamsher's case, although the appeals related to the termination of service, 
they raised questions of great importance about the position which the 
President and the Governors occupy under our constitution. Two judgments 
were delivered, one by Ray C.J. for himself, Palekar, Mathew, Chandrachud 
and Alagiriswami JJ and the other, a concurring judgment, by Krishna Iyer J. 
for himself and Bhagwati J. Several propositions emerged. One of them is 
quoted here -
Art. 163 provides for a council of Minister to aid and advise the 
Governor in the exercise of his functions and makes him the sole and final 
judge whether any fiinction is to be exercised in his discreation or on the 
advice of the council of ministers. Although Art. 74 also provides for a 
council of Ministers to aid and advise the President, that article does not 
refer to any discretionary power on the President and as a consequence, there 
is no provision in Art. 74 corresponding to Art. 163 which makes the 
Governor the sole judge in any matter in which he is required to act in his 
discretion.^ 
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In this proposition, the distinction between the provisions of Art. 74 
and 163(2) has been stated tersely by Ray C.J. and has also been referred to in 
the concurring judgment of Krishna Iyer J. But the conclusion to be drawn 
from the difference between the two Articles has not been explicitly 
formulated. Art. 74(1) provides that there shall be a council of Ministers to 
aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions, and Art. 163(1) 
makes the same provision, mutatis mutandis, for the Governors. If the correct 
conclusion to draw from Arts. 74(1) and Art. 163(1) is that the President and 
Governors are not obliged to accept and act according to that advice, it would 
follow that in the discharge of their functions the President and the Governors 
have a discretion to disregard the advice of the Council of Ministers. But such 
a conclusion is inconsistent with the express conferment of discretionary 
power on the Governor under Art. 163(2), for, if Governors have a discretion 
in all matters under Art. 163(1), it would be unnecessary to confer on 
Governors an express power to act in their discretion in a few specified 
discretionary powers on the Governor by Art. 163(2), but not on the President 
by Art. 74 negatives the view that the President and the Governors have a 
general discretionary power to act against the advice of the Council of 
Ministers.' 
Amendment of 1976 and 1978 : 
Art. 74 provides that the President/Governor "shall" in the exercise 
of his function act in accordance with the advice of the Council of Ministers. 
This is a statutory expression of the British convention. As Ivor-jennings puts 
it, "in nearly every case she (Queen) acts on the advice of Ministers" but in 
exceptional circumstances the crown would be justified in refusing to accept 
such advice. Ivor Jennings mentions that -
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"If Mr. Chamberlain had (as he would not have thought of doing) 
advised dissolution in May 1940 when Germans were invading Belgium, the 
king would have been justified in refusing". 
Thus the British Convention is flexible and provides for remote 
possibilities. The use of the word "shall" in Art. 74 causes confusion. If "shall" 
is interpreted by courts in the absolute sense without exception, situations 
such as the one cited by Ivor Jennings may cause havoc to the nation. One may 
argue that such stupid situations may not arise but the law must provide for 
remote and improbable contingencies. 
In the light of the above passage we have to comprise all possible 
cases or situations. Prior to 1976, there was no express provision in the 
Constitution that the President was bound to act in accordance with the advice 
tendered by the Council of Ministers, though it was judicially established* 
that the President of India was not a real executive, but a constitutional head, 
who was bound to act according to the advice of Ministers, so long as they 
commanded the confidence of the majority in the House of the People (Art. 
75(3).' The 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 amended Art. 74(1) to clarify this 
position.'° 
The word "shall" make it obligatory for the president to act in 
accordance with ministerial advice. 
The Janata Government retained the foregoing text of Art. 74(1), as 
amended by the 42nd amendment Act. But by the 44 the Amendment Act, a 
proviso was added to Art. 74(1)" the net result after the 44th Amendment, 
therefore, is that except in certain marginal cases referred to by the Supreme 
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Court'^, the President shall have no power to act in his discretion in any case. 
He must act according to the advice given to him by the Council of Ministers, 
headed by the Prime Minister, so that refusal to act according to such advice 
will render him liable to impeachment for violation of the Constitution. This 
is subject to the President's power to send the advice received from the 
Council of Minsiters, in a particular case, back to them for their 
reconsideration; and if the Council of Ministers adhere to their previous 
advice, the President shall have no option but to act in accordance with such 
advice. The power to return for reconsideration can be exercised only once, 
on the same matter. 
A vulnerable example in the Indian Constitutional history, that 
created a constitutional crisis was known as an appointment of Mr. Charan 
Singh as the Prime Minister, A very brief history is required here of Mr. 
Charan Singh. Mr. Charan Singh had been asked by the President to obtain a 
vote of confidence not later than the 20th of August 1979. Accordingly, he 
was to move a resolution in the house of the people expressing confidence in 
his Government on that day. However the support of Congress (I), led by his 
erstwhile arch enemy, Mrs. Indira Gandhi was withdrawn on the morning of 
20th August and Mr. Charan Singh tendered his and his Cabinet's resignation 
to the President of India. After a few days of consultations and discussions 
with various persons and parties concerned, the President dissolved the House 
of the people and Mr. Charan Singh and his cabinet remained as "caretaker" 
Government, without having enjoyed the confidence of the House even for a 
single day. 
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Apart from the infirmity in Mr. Charan Singh's appointment and his 
continuance in office, the question arises whether the amendment of Art. 
74(1) in 1976 has altered the law as laid down in Samsher Singh's case. The 
42nd Amendment amended Art. 74(1) and 44th Amendment further amended 
it by inserting a new proviso. 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court held that it was necessarily 
implied in the cabinet form of government adopted by our Constitution read 
with other provisions of our constitution, that the President was a 
constitutional head of Government and that he must act on the advice of his 
Council of Ministers. It is submitted that the amended Article 74(1), without 
the proviso, merely embodies in an Article of the Constitution what Samsher 
Singh's case had held by its judgment. This submission is further supported by 
the statement of objects and reasons for amending Art. 74(1) which states 
that "the President acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers. It has been 
made explicit that he shall be bound by such advice". In other words, it was 
implicit in Art. 74(1) as orginally enacted that the President must act on the 
advice of his Council of Ministers; the Amendment made explicit what was 
already implicit in Art. 74(1). As to the proviso to Art. 74(1), the statement 
of objects and reasons gives no reason for its insertion; but it is apparent 
from the terms of the proviso that it puts a fetter on the council of minsiters 
by requiring them to reconsider their advice at the instance of the President. 
The Art. 74 as can not be read in isolation but must be read harmoniously with 
other relevant provisions of the Constitution. Although Art. 356 provides a 
safeguard in case of a failure of constitutional machinery in the states, no 
such safeguard is possible for union. The very fact that the president is liable 
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to be impeached for violation of the Constitution shows that a duty is imposed 
upon him to see that the constitution is not violated. It must follow that there 
are some actions of the President for which he is personally responsible, and 
liable to be impeached, if his actions violate the constitution. The above 
discussion shows that Art. 74(1) can not be construed literally as laying down 
an absolute, and not a general rule. For if a President was always bound to 
follow the advice of his ministers and they were responsible for his actions 
there would be no scope for impeaching him for any of his official actions. In 
the result. Art. 74(1) lays down a general rule, subject to the exception that 
the advice given is not contrary to the Constitution or to the law and is not 
given malafide, that is, out of personal malice or illwilP^ or for achieving a 
purpose for which the powers was not conferred on the Executive. Nor must 
the advice of ministers defeat the underlying principle of the democratic 
government. For example, they can not advise the president that effect should 
not be given to the clearly expressed will of the people at a general elections. 
It is clear therefore that Art. 74(1) cannot be literally interpreted because it 
is subject to several exceptions. Furthermore, the elaboration can be brought 
to the point from other angle also. 
Doctrine of Necessary ImplicatioD : 
As far as the disregard by the President of the aid and advice 
tendered by the Council of ministers is concerned. The Constitution has 
remained unable to specify because of the difficulty of defining precisely and 
exhaustively the rare occasions in which the President may disregard the 
advice. But by applying the doctrine of necessary implications the closed 
situation can be unfolded. This is another angle from which we are trying our 
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best to tracing out the fact and circumstances that are required in furtherance 
of this paper of project in order to make clear picture of the situation so 
controversial. 
It is the President who is constitutionally mandated to act on the 
advice given by the cabinet and here the satisfaction of the President is in 
reality the satisfaction of the cabinet and particularly the Prime Minister. But 
this constitutional command of the President acting on the advice of the 
Council of Ministers is subject to certain exceptions. These exceptions can 
be placed in two categories : first, the exception is carved out expressly or by 
necessary implication in the text of the Constitution itself; and secondly, 
arises out of the convention involved to meet unforseen developments 
because the written text of the constitution is silent on the first category 
differs from the second also in the sense that in the former the satisfaction is 
in reality the satisfaction of other constitutional functionaries while in the 
latter the satisfaction of the President is his own satisfaction. 
There are two express exceptions to the established parliamentary 
norms that the figurehead executive will act on the advice of the elected and 
accountable executive. First Article 103 enjoins the President to act on the 
advice of the election commission in matters pertaining to disqualification of 
a Member of Parliament or State Assembly, a view recently enforced by the 
Supreme Court in a matter concerning the disqualification of Jayalalithaa, the 
Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. Second, Art. 217 mandates that the President 
will act in consultation with the Chief Justice of India in a matter concerning 
the determination of the age of High Court Judges. To these two expressly 
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engrafted exceptions, one may add by necessary implication the third 
exception resulting out of the pronouncement of the highest court of the land 
in the second judges case''* that the President shall appoint judges of High 
Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 217 and 124 respectively with 
obligatory consultation (read concurrence) of the Chief justice of India. After 
this historic judgement of our Supreme Court, the primacy in the appointment 
of Appellate Judges has shifted from the executive to the chief justice of 
India thereby reducing the advice of the Cabinet in the appointment of 
Appellate Judges under Art. 174 to a mere formality and of no significance 
whatsoever. 
Exceptions spelt out explicitly or implicitly in the written text of 
the constitution itself is not as problematic as exceptions springing from the 
existence of the grey area which in turn is the result of constitutional tacit 
unity. In this category also there exists two exceptions : First the choice of 
the Prime Minister; and second, dissolution of the Lok Sabha on the advice of 
a lameduck Prime Minister who ceases to enjoy the confidence of the House. 
So far as the dissolution of the House is concerned, it is submitted that the 
President is not bound at all to act on the advice of the Prime Minister who 
has lost his majority in the House and the President can act entirely in 
accordance with his discretion. Similarly Presidential discretion in the 
appointment of the Prime Minister in normal times is extremely 
circumscribed and almost negligible if any party secures a comfortable 
majority and its leader stakes his claim to form a government. But if no party 
is in a position to form a government on its own, then the Presidential 
discretion assumes tremendous significance. 
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Thus, though the Parliamentary system of government, and the 
constitutional conventions requires the existence of the Council of Ministers 
for advising the President, yet it is the Council of Ministers holding the 
command of the House that can bind the President by its advice. On the other 
hand, the care taker government that is for mere fulfilment of the vacuum 
limited by not to take major policy's decisions, can not bind the constitutional 
head by its arbitrary advice. Therefore it is submitted that Art. 75(1) which 
provides that the Prime Minsiter shall be appointed by the President necessary 
implies that the President has discretion in making the appointment. If after a 
general election, the party in power is returned with a clear majority, the 
discretion of the President in appointing the Prime Minister would ordinarily 
be a matter of form. But if in general election the party in power is defeated, 
and no party with a clear majority is returned to the House of the People, 
then, notwithstanding that the Ministry continues in office till a new Ministry 
is sworn in'^, the President has a real discretion to ascertain for himself, 
first, which party or combination of parties can form a stable government, and 
secondly, which of the persons contending for leadership is accepted by such 
party or parties as their leader. There are two other provisions of the 
constitution - Art. 60 and 61 - which necessarily imply discretionary power in 
the President in certain exceptional situations. Under Art. 60 the President 
swears that to the best of his ability, he will preserve, protect and defend the 
constitution and the law", and Art. 61 provides a sanction for the fulfilment of 
the oath, because under Art. 61 the President can be impeached "for violation 
of the Constitution". It is a necessary implication of Art. 60 and 61 that if the 
Council of Ministers advise the President to take action which is admittedly 
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contrary to the constitution and the law, or which the ministers are driven to 
admit is contrary to the constitution and the law, the President can reject such 
advice and if necessary dismiss the ministry if it persists in its advice. And if 
he is unable to form another Ministry, he can direct a dissolution of the 
House of the people and order the fresh general election.'^ 
So hitherto, it is very much clear that the President is constitutional 
head and not a rubber doll. Also it is very much clear that in case, where no 
party is having clear majority, the President can proceed on his own 
satisfaction, not on Cabinet's one, to protect the constitutional spirit and 
sanctity. Let us now move towards the situation which invites allied governing 
arrangement that can be a solution of the problem. So before proceeding 
further it is proper to mention as to what the hung parliament is. 
Hung Parliament : 
Our recent constitutional history is one of the Hung Parliaments, 
long Presidential consultations before inviting someone to form a 
government, short-lived governments thereafter and the phenomenon of the 
"outside support" which is withdrawn for the flimsiest of reasons. This has 
cast a grave doubt on the survival of our present constitutional arrangement. It 
has emboldened those who have been advocating the presidential system to 
renew their campaign, which is now finding fresh adherents. Those who wish 
to see the preservation of parliamentary form of government must devise new 
constitutional doctrines and conventions to meet the challenges posed by 
current political realities, which are likely to make "hung" parliaments a 
recurring feature. 
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Dr. Granville Austin, a leading American scholar who has worked 
extensively on the Indian constitution is struck by the fact that the Indian 
constitution is silent on the issue of "hung parliaments" and states that the 
framers did not anticipate a situation in which no single party would have a 
majority in Parliament.*' While many constitutional luminaries point out to 
the wide gap between the words of the constitution and practice, the 
parliamentary impasse is often seen as a result of outright majoritarianism, 
during the first three decades of republic.*^ 
The Reader's Digest Dictionary defines a "Hung Parliament" as a 
Parliament wherein no party has won a working majority".'^ When such a 
situation occurs, there is no obvious choice of government. Therefore, four 
possible consequence arise, they are, in no particular order, a coalition 
government, a minority government (a government formed with "outside 
support), a national government (incorporating the possibility of all political 
parties i.e. multiple parties without a coalition) and lastly, the most extreme 
of all solutions, re-elections : 
It is also necessary to note, at this stage that a Hung Parliament is 
not a time specific definition. Even where anyone party or pre-electoral 
alliance has received a majority mandate and formed government, any 
reduction in the membership strength of this party or pre-electoral alliance 
may also result in Hung Parliament. Since my paper is concerned with the 
coalition solution of the problem, I am not going to advocate the option of the 
National Government, whereas this is one of the solution of the problem of 
Hung Parliament. Therefore, it can be submitted that the coalition 
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arrangement of the government is not a time-bound phenomena, it may occur 
at any time. Ironically a Hung Parliament is a triumph of democracy, being 
infact, a preferable avoidable phenomenon.^ ® 
In the context of first, there was a hung parliament in India as a 
result of the general elections held in 1989 when no party secured an overall 
majority of the seats in the Lok Sabha. However, the single largest party was 
invited to form the government with the outside support. The very fact that the 
party in power is supported by a party from outside to make up the deficiency, 
makes the government not a minority one but a majority one. Whether the 
party that is extending its support joins the government or not is immaterial 
from the point of view of English constitutional conventions. In other words, 
it may be treated at par with the coalition having the required majority, 
whether formed prior to the election or after the declaration of the results 
following the general election. In the context of the latter situation, there was 
a hung parliament during 1979 when the ruling party got split into smaller 
factions. What happened then was that the leader of a party having about 80 
members of parliament was requested to form the government with the outside 
support extended by the other political parties. In the end, such a government 
was forced to resign even before facing the vote of confidence and the 
dissolution of Lok Sabha became inevitable. Taking both the situation together 
it may be said that the term hung parliament need not be consequent only as a 
result of the general elections, but should also include the consequences of 
any split or defections through which the ruling party or the coalition is 
reduced to a minority. 
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England's View : 
So the result or consequence of a hung parliament is either a 
minority government or a coalition which can command a majority in the 
House. In this regard, a fundamental question that comes to everybody's mind 
is whether such a majority is a condition precedent for the formation of a 
government in the parliamentary system of government. If one looks at the 
experiences outside India, and more particularly from England, then such 
experiences should be analysed carefully in the context of the written 
provisions of the Indian Constitution rather than simply following those 
practices with any valid reason. In England, the hung parliament occurred as a 
result of general elections held in 1923, 1929 and 1974. On all these 
occasions, the minority governments were established. The coalition 
government of any sort was not preferred under those circumstances. This 
uniformity in having minority governments whenever there is hung parliament 
can be taken as a norm or a constitutional convention in England because of 
the practice established in 1923 and the same that has been followed in 1929 
and 1974. 
The existing party system in England, the nature of parliamentary 
supermacy that the legislature is enjoying in the light of an unwritten 
Constitution and long standing social, cultural and political factors that are 
unique to Britain have led to the establishment of such a norm or a 
Constitutional convention. Could such norms be made applicable to other 
Constitutions as well remains a valid question. In this regard, the statement 
made by Edmund Burke must be kept in mind, that is the Constitution can be 
copied but not the sentiments. 
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Option with the President and Shared Will : 
What happens when such a situation arises either due to no party 
having majority after general elections or by spliting or defecting from the 
ruling party. The constitutional institution of the President comes under the 
constant vigil of the will of the people as some author put their elaboration by 
recommending as to how much wills of the People of the country, the party or 
combination of the parties are holding. 
As one of the eminent Constitutional expert, Mr Subhash C. 
Kashyap^' puts forward his views that the founding father of our constitution, 
in their wisdom, adopted the first past-the-post or majority system of election 
where under the person getting the largest number of votes cast is deemed to 
have got the mandate of the people and is declared elected. Majority of all 
members of Lok Sabha are so elected by a fractured mandate i.e. with more 
votes cast against each one of them than for them. Therefore, on the same 
logic, under our electoral system, the party or alliance that obtains the largest 
number of seats - not necessarily absolute majority - should be presumed to 
have received the mandate of the people. 
On the same time, the other jurist^^ has even suggested that it is 
necessary to provide in the Representation of People Act 1951 that no 
candidate shall be declared elected from a constituency unless he has secured 
at least 50 per cent of the total votes polled, there should be a repoll to elect 
one of the two candidates who have secured the largest and the next largest 
number of votes in the first pool. Moreover, to make an elected candidate a 
representative of the constituency in the real sense, there has to be a provision 
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in the Representation of People Act 1951 to the effect that unless at least 40 
per cent of the total number of votes in a constituency are polled, the election 
will not be valid and there should be a repoll. 
With these submissions, it can logically be deducted that, the 
constitution incorporates within it a form of self-government not mere good 
government, therefore the president who is supposed to be a protector of the 
constitutional sanctity and spirit is constitutionally bound to honour the will 
of people in terms of self-government. 
With these principles and propositions, it is necessarily required to 
observe the suggestions and ways to the President to break such impasse of 
hungness. Jennings^^ says that the Queen has three possibilities in case of 
spliting and defection and two, when no party obtains a majority at a general 
election. 
In case of first -
(i) formation of a coalition ministry 
(ii) formation of a minority government by any one party with the intention 
of advising dissolution and 
(iii) formation of a minority government able to maintain itself. 
In the second case Jennings points out, as : 
(i) formation of coalition government, and 
(ii) formation of a minority government with opposition support. 
It is desirable here to note the six propositions advocated by Rajeev 
Dhavan based on the political developments in India during 1989 the 
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propositions are : 
1. A government defeated in the House may, in certain circumstances, 
appeal to the electorate. But a government which is defeated at the 
polls, prima facie, totally exhausts its opinion to stake a claim to form a 
government for the next parliamentary term; 
2. In the event of a defeat of the previous government at the polls, the 
people have willed a change in the government. Effect must be given to 
the will of the people by first exploring the possibility of an alternative 
government to the one that has just lost the election; 
3. In the circumstances outlined above, the Prime Minister defeated at the 
polls must offer his resignation - the resignation to take effect when the 
process of selecting the Prime Minister has been completed. Such a 
resignation should be made even if the outgoing prime Minister's party 
having lost the majority, remains the largest single party after the 
election; 
4. The President must explore first the possibilities of the opposition 
forming the government, giving first choice to the person who claims 
the largest support; 
5. Where a leader singly, and without competition, states that he is able to 
form a government such government must be permitted to test its 
strength on the floor of the House; and 
6. Where the opposition refuses, or gives up the attempt to form a 
government, the President must then (and only then) explore the 
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possibilities of the party defeated at the polls forming a government, 
and testing its majority on the floor of the House. 
These propositions, in the opinion of Rajeev Dhavan, are extracted 
from the constitution and principles of electoral, parliamentary democracy on 
which the constitution is founded.^^ These propositions propose that there 
shall be some sort of majority or the other in the Lok Sabha for the 
appointment of a government. 
Going with them, what Sarkaria Commission has determined, the 
guidelines are added value on scaling the thread inshrined them. The Sarkaria 
commission has some important recommendations to make on the choice of 
government in such scenarios, that have been use in the part on two previous 
occasions by past presidents Mr. R. Venkataraman and Dr. Shankar Dayal 
Sharma. In brief, the commission recommended that the President follow the 
undermentioned guidelines in inviting parties (alliances/coalitions included) 
to form government: 
1. The first preference is to be given to a pre-poll alliance commanding a 
majority in the House (option 1). 
2. The second preference is given to the single largest party without a 
majority of its own (opinion 2). 
3. The third preference is given to a post-election alliance with all partners 
joining the government (option 3). 
4. The fourth, and last, preference is to an alliance wherein some may join 
the government and others provide, outside support (option 4). 
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It can, thus, be submitted that the outcome of the President's act, in 
relation to the formation of the government, is either in form of coalition 
government based on pre-poll alliance, or post-poll alliance or minority 
government supported by the outside or alliances supported by the outside 
support not sharing the responsibility of the ruling combinaiton in case of 
hung parliament. Except them, the extra-constitutional demands for national 
government or presidentinal form of the government, do not sustain here 
because of our system which is based upon the Westminster FPTP model of 
elections but we forgot that it presupposed for its success a two major parity 
system and the demand for presidential form of government cannot draw our 
attention as the Supreme Court has pronounced the "parliamentary form of 
govemment"^^ as the basic structure of the constitution that can not be 
destroyed due to the ruling provided by the Apex Court in Keshavananda 
Bharati's case (1973). 
Now what remains is the only option of coalition government which 
is historically proved in Indian sense as feeble, week and unstable government. 
This chaos not only causes the economic loss but hampers the country over 
all progress. It can better be estimated by taking account of the last Lok 
Sabha's expenditure which cost the exchequer about Rs. 5,000 crore^^ and 
many times more than that amount was spent by political parties. All this 
money ultimately came from people's pockets. A country where indirect taxes 
amount to 80 per cent of the revenue and money-bags who give money to 
political parties, either white or black, do not give it from their pockets but 
recover them by increasing prices. Thus the ultimate burden of elections falls 
on the people. It is the poor section of society that suffers most when 
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premature elections are inflicted on them for no fault of theirs but of their 
"representatives" in elected bodies. 
As far as the minority governments supported by outside are 
concerned, though they are recognised by the constitutional system, even 
recognised by British system of the government, yet they are not politically 
sound or even morally constitutionally sound.^' They can not be said to be a 
fraud on the Constitution but a fraud on people's mandate for government, so 
it can be submitted that in applied sense, they are not in tone of self-
government. They are week, feeble government. In place of them the coalition 
government is a better option to execute the people's will if certain safeguards 
be provided for lack of stability and execution of the people's will. 
Coalition as Solution : 
A few ways are suggested below in which the concept of good 
governance can be reconciled with that of a coalition government so as to 
solve the deadlock in a Hung parliament. Some are concrete measures enacted 
through positive law, others are intangible normatives requiring an 
intemalisation by all the actors in the nation's political theatre. All accept the 
proposition that coalitions can not be avoided in a Hung Parliament, though 
they can certainly be regulated. At another level, they even encourage the 
formation of effective coalitions. 
1. Prohibition on Regional Parties : Democracy is part of the basic 
structure of the Indian constitution. Therefore the idea of banning a regional 
party from contesting national level elections would seem prima facie 
unconstitutional. But a closer look at this approach may be useful when 
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discussing modes of eliminating an unstable situation of Parliament. While 
Art. 19(l)(c) gives every citizen the right to form associations, it is subject 
to the right of the state to make any law affecting such right in the interests of 
the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality. Thereore, it 
can be concluded that where the right to form a political party is itself subject 
to reasonable restrictions, law may circumscribe the jurisdiction of its 
operations, irrespective of democracy being the basic structure of the 
constitution. What is advocated is that only National parties be permitted to 
contest National elections. What exactly a National party is would be beyond 
the scope of this paper for it would be necessary to examine the seats that 
each party holds in every states to determine a national presence. However it 
can be stated safely that there must be two variables involved in the 
determination of a national party. The first of these should be the number of 
states the party must have a presence in and the second, a minimum number of 
seats to be held by a party in each of these minimum number of states. 
Regional parties should not be allowed to contest national elections. This is 
in consonance with the Indian constitution's commitment to federalism. The 
idea of having separate politics at the centre and in the states would be 
rendered useless if states provided a fragmented centre. 
In alternative way, it can be submitted that there may be a trend 
towards developing a system of two major federal parties or alliances. It may 
be possible for several broadly like-minded parties to come together on the 
basis of a common minimum programme or a national agenda and form a 
coalition government, with another similar coalition forming the opposition. 
The emergence of the National Democratic Alliance Government after the 
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thirteenth general elections in 1999 has been a pointer in that direction. But, 
it should not preclude any party on its own occupying in future a predominant 
position on the basis of popular support to its policies and programmes. 
However, if it is to be assumed that the idea of prohibiting regional 
pairties from contesting national elections is repugnant to the Indian 
constitution, then a viable alternative is to look at and import the principles of 
contract law into election law. Every candidate subscribes to a manifesto. The 
manifesto is a collection of promises made to the pubilc. The public votes in 
return for these promises. The expectations of the public aroused in lieu of 
promises made in the manifesto, constitute a form of legal consideration and 
complete the process of formation of valid contract, binding the offeror to 
perform or, rather to honour the promises made. The vote is, hence a 
manifestation of legal consideration and a contract exists between every 
successful candidate and each person who voted for him. Therefore, every 
time a candidate attempts to change his party it is in fact a variance of 
promises, a repudiation of contract resulting in the necessity for such 
candidate to resign from such public office forthwith. The Anti-Defection law 
in the X Schedule of the Constitution remedies this to some extent when it 
states that a valid defection occurs when one-third of the members of a party 
defect. This, however, has to be viewed in the light of two criticisms. Firstly, 
one-third of the party does not constitute sufficient percentage to be deemed 
to have been the party whose manifesto was "actually" voted for. Such a 
deeming provision would be tenable only where half or more of the original 
party defect. This would create a reasonable doubt as to which is the 'real' 
manifesto and both factions would be saved from the breach of contract. 
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Furthermore, if regional parties are allowed to contest, their gains in 
parliament can not be very large and one-third of their party would not be a 
very substantial amount. Therefore, once again, to prevent easy defections, 
there needs to be a substantial raise in the defection percentage. It is 
necessary here to discuss X schedule from other angle also i.e. from hung 
parliament's. 
Hung Parliament and the Tenth Schedule : 
There will be large scope for defections from one vulnerable party 
to another, circumventing the relevant provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the 
Constitution. It would therefore be proper to study the various provisions of 
the Schedule and suggest ways and means to deal effectively with the evil of 
defection. 
Despite the constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985, popularly 
known as the Anti-Defection Law, which seeks to outlay defections, the legal 
provisions thereof so for led the presiding officers of the State Assemblies to 
give different interpretations of the concerned cases, not resulting in the 
curtailment of the evil of defections but in giving tremendous impetus to its 
growth. The gcmeral phenomenon increasingly noticed has been that more 
than onethird of the members of a party represented in the legislative bodies 
stage defect ions on the specious ground of a 'split' which is legally exempt 
from incurring disqualification. It is most unethical for legislators to use this 
armour and shift their loyalty after elections to another party from the one on 
whose ticket and symbol they have been elected. Such shifting of loyalty 
normally confers on the defected members power and pelf which they were 
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not originally enjoying. It is also apprehended that corruption and bribery 
were behind some of the defections. 
This sad phenomenon had been increasingly noticed after the 1967 
elections to the Lok-Sabha when the political picture of a monolithic party 
ruling the Centre and a number of State changed with no political party 
securing absolute majority thereby creating the necessity of forming coalition 
governments of parties not necessarily like-minded. As these were 
opportunities of alliance not being based on any common ideology but based 
on the sole purpose of clinging to power, these Governments were quite 
unstable and encouraged the evil of defections. 
A number of legislators corssed the floor of the House for monetary 
considerations. Ministries fell because of large-scale defections and new 
Ministries were formed with the support of fresh defectors. Some of the 
MLAs even changed sides three or four times during the course of a single 
day. 'A new phraseology Aya Rams and Gaya Rams' was coined to describe 
defections. It was also estimated that after the 1967 general election during 
the one-year period, 175 Congressmen defected to other parties and the 
Congress party gained 139 members by way of defections from other parties. 
It was estimated that after the 1967 general election, 800 MLAs defected 
between 1967 and 1970. We have had the sorry spectacle of the entire flock 
of our elected representatives on one State led by their shrewd leader shifting 
loyalty. 
The act of defection was known in the House of Commons as 'floor-
crossing'. Even Sir Winston Churchill and Lloyd George had at least at one 
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time or the other stage 'floor crossing'. Of course in that country, floor-
crossing was quite often the outcome of honest deferences of opinion. The 
underlying principles of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, otherwise 
termed as Anti-Defection Law, are quite laudable. But putting the legal 
provisions thereof to actual practice produced ill effects. 
These provisions require urgently drastic changes in the following 
manner to make the law quite effective. 
(i) First, the Speaker or Chairman (vide paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule) 
is made as the final arbiter in determining the disqualification cases 
under the Anti-Defection Law. Para graph 7 of the Schedule barring the 
jurisdiction of the courts has been struck down and the decision of the 
presiding officer is now made subject to the judicial review by High 
Courts and the Supreme Court. Still making the Presiding Officers the 
deciding authorities in this important matter passes one's 
comprehension since the Speakers in our country are elected every 
time in a contest with the support of the majority party in the House 
which is the ruling party unlike in UK and elsewhere where the principle 
of'once a Speaker always the Speaker" normally applies. 
(ii) The Election Commission should be made the deciding authority as in 
all other types of disqualifications under the Constitution. 
(iii) Till the Commission decides the legal issues, there is scope also for an 
interim order passed either by it or by the Presiding Officer of the 
House concerned disqualifying the member from holding 'any office' 
under the government or participating in any debate or voting in the 
House, 
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(iv) A reasonable time-limit, say three or sixmonths should be fixed in the 
law, for the final disposal by the Election Commission of a 
disqualification case. 
(v) Having regard to the sacred principles of democracy, there is absolutely 
on justification for treating differently the types of members namely, 
the one-third of the members of a party on the ground of 'split' as in 
paragraph 3; merger of parties if two-thirds members of the party 
agreed to such merger as in paragraph 4 of the said Schedule; 
independent and nominated members. In fact, there should not be any 
legal question of a member 'voluntarily giving up his membership' of 
his party being separately treated. 
(vi) In all such cases, the result should be made the same. After elections 
are over and the House is constituted or fucntioning, if any one of the 
above mentioned contigencies arises, the seat should be declared by the 
Election Commission as vacant. In other words, the member should not 
be made entitled to continue as such member once a declaration is 
made by the Election Commission. Of course, the rule of law and 
principles of natural justice should be applied before the Election 
Commission takes a final decision in a given case. 
The object of passing the Anti-Defection law in the tenth schedule 
was to constrain defections, to restrict horse trading and to get rid of the 
myriad of suitcase politics^*, but ,in effect, it had become an enabling law for 
larger defections. As the Constitution Commission has said,"en bloc 
defections are permitted". Defectors are usually lured with ministerships or 
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Other political offices and perquisites "so openely that it really makes a 
mockery of our democracy". The commission recommended that all defectors 
- whether individual or group - must resign and contest fresh election. They 
should be debarred from holding any public office of a minister or any other 
remunerative political post without winning at a fresh election. Also, votes 
cast by them to topple a government should be treated as invalid.^^ However 
recent events testify, splits, splits within splits, making and breaking of 
countless parties have not only tainted the political scene but also smeared it 
with unprecedented pettiness. Whilst considering the topic of 'hung 
parliament' the discussion can not be just limited to the aftermath of elections 
and any proposed solution must also comprehend events wherein a functioning 
government is reduced to a minority due to defections. 
Tackling the problem in a different focus, one can question the 
propriety of allowing defections at all. Most political parties, on record, have 
gone to state that they would suitably amend the Anti-Defection law to reduce 
the freqiiency and ease of splits. However, the apathy of hung parliaments and 
assemblies could perhaps be better solved had political parties looked to 
German and French experiences to root out defections in its entirety which 
can be explained as follows : people do not vote for candidates but for parties 
i.e. the ballot paper of a constituency contains a list of political parties as 
against the name of candidates. If a political party is voted in a constituency, 
then it would designate its party worker of that constituency to represent it in 
the parliament. The logic that follows, is that if a M.P. defects, he not only 
ceases to be member of the political party but would necessarily and logically 
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ceases to be an M.P. because, he owes his seat to his party and cannot under 
any circumstance part with it. 
2-Pre-Poll Coalitions as a Norm : The first is what one may call a change 
in political attitude. Till now political parties have resorted to coalitions and 
outside support techniques to meet their ad hoc political aspirations splits 
and defections are constantly engineered to meet these aspirations at least at 
the state level. The general opinion then is that coalitions can not lost. There 
is no proof to the effect that coalitions can not lost. There are countries 
which have proved the contrary. However, the difference lies in the reasons 
for the coalition. In India, till now coalitions are the result of all the wrong 
reasons. Hitherto, political parties have been too shortsighted to realize the 
futility of ad hoc overnight coalitions. Thus there is a general trend of one 
party aligning with the other so as to survive a vote of confidence the next 
day. There seems to be an evident failure of perception here. Is it really 
possible for two parties divergent in ideology, with hostile opponents in 
recent elections and with contradictory manifestoes, to foresee a longlasting 
alliance. This is a myopic view created by the distasteful craving for the 
power. It is suggested that though coalitions are the right step in making the 
best out of hung parliaments, there is a need for a mature understanding of the 
implications of co-alignments. Political parties now have a wealth of 
experience as to what can go wrong in a coalition. These problems must be 
pre-empted, one national party has already taken the correct step in this 
direction, having secured a coalition before heading to the polls. However, 
even this party only secured a national agenda after the polls. It is necessary 
that pre-poll coalitions become the norm. This is doing justice to an 
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electorate which is often forced to be ruled by a coalition consisting of the 
party it voted against in the polls. However, such a change is possible only if 
there is a political will for it. Parties must realise that their responsibility 
extends beyond forming a government. It extends to providing a justly formed 
government, according to democratic norms. The conscious realization of 
this imperative responsibility is what we call a change in political attitude. 
3. A Statute Regulating Party Politics : Following from this last point, it is 
suggested that there should be a statute regulating party politics in the case of 
hung parliament. This statute may either be a constitutional one or a 
legislative one. This statute must regulate at one level coalition governments. 
It may provide against post-poll alliances since these are basic violations of 
democratic norms. Another provision may be to disqualify a party from 
national politics if it withdraws from a coalition within a specific period of 
time. Of course, this shall require a proper definition of the term "withdrawl". 
For instance, if the party officially continues to support the coalition but its 
members constantly vote against that coalition, it must be considered in pith 
and substance, a withdrawal of support. The disqualification of those who have 
retreated on their word to-the nation is not only an apt punishment but also 
serves as a sufTicient deterrent to withdrawal. The statute must also provide 
against one party supporting a minority party from outside, since in effect the 
supporting party is propping up the government. It should, therefore, be forced 
into accountability by making it sit on the treasury benches. One may question 
the democratic worth of such a statute. For instance, can the main coalition 
party take advantage of situation where the minor partner is forced to vote for 
a statute despite the statute being potently against its ideology. There are 
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many reason why this is unlikely to happen. Firstly, the implication of getting 
involved in a coalition being what they are under the envisaged statute, it is 
likely that parties shall choose the partners carefully. Further, the sanction on 
a partner wishing to pull out shall only be for a minimum time period whereby 
stability can be secured. Also, those tactics shall reflect badly upon the major 
party and it shall lose out in the next election that by itself must be deterrent 
enough. Besides this, since the minor party shall also be part of the council, 
there shall be a filter process at the policy making stage in the cabinet itself. 
Also, in exceptional circumstances, the party may be allowed to pull out of 
the coalition, the power to decide whether a circumstance is exceptional, 
must lie with a tribunal constituted by parliamentarians themselves. Lastly 
this is a classic situation where a change in political attitude would come in 
handy. It would give rise to a healthy convention such as the restraint of the 
major partner from impinging upon its minor partners ideological sensibilities 
despite the fact that the minor partner has made clear its desire to leave the 
government. Such an attitude may even lead to a reconciliation between the 
two. 
Thus, these arc the political parities which participate in the 
democratic processes of nation's governance must themselves be democratic 
in their internal orgnisation. They need to be regulated by law. Party 
membership must be open to all citizen without any distinction, party 
elections must be regular, free and fare. °^ 
4. A Great Role of the President: Finally, it is suggested that there should 
be a greater role of the President in the situation where a hung parliament 
exists. The Constitution must be amended to at least allow for an efficient 
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President in a Hung Parliament scenario. As yet, situation is that the President 
continues to be bound by the advice of the caretaker council of Ministers 
even where that Council has lost the support of the house, theoretically 
meaning the support of the nation. Fortunately convention has developed so as 
to prevent this illigitimate council from taking major policy decisions while 
it exists. However, what this means is that the nation floats aimlessly in space. 
Until a new government comes along. In a Hung Parliament scenario this new 
government can be long in coming. Till then at least the President should have 
the run of the Government. He already has inherent powers of legislation 
(Art. 123) and execution (Art. 53). He must now be enjoined and enabled to 
exercise them. As a result the nation shall at all times have some sort of 
government. 
The question remains as to what the President must do in the case of 
a hung parliament. This is undoubtedly a situation incomparable to one where 
a single party commands the majority of the house. Where in the latter case 
the President is bound to invite that party to form the goveniment, the former 
case affords him an opportunity to exercise his personal discretion. There 
have been arguments to the effect that even this personal discretion should be 
guided by a constitutional express provisions. Greater freedom may also be 
given to the president in deciding on the method of government in the 
interregnum. For instance, if the President so desires, he may wish to follow 
the precedent set by Ireland where a Council of Elder Citizens sits in the 
absence of a Parliament. 
One may be tempted to criticise the views submitted above in that 
we have assumed the fact that a coalition is in fact possible every time under 
119 
a Hung Parliament. We submit that it is not. However, it is also submitted that 
the above given suggestions facilitate, at one level, the necessary formation 
of coalitions, and at another level, the existence, at all times, of a government 
in the real sense of word, for the nation. A conscious change in political 
attitude shall lead to the realisation that coalitions can not be done away with. 
They are India's version of democracy. This shall encourage all to make the 
best possible coalitions. 
In the end it is submitted that though coalitions are not the logical 
outcome of a Hung Parliament, they can certainly become the most desirable 
one if regulated in the right way the only other option is an election, and 
though elections are the price for democracy, it must also be remembered 
that democracy does not come cheap and India can not afford the cost 
frequently. With this analysis, the desirable outcome produced by the situation 
in terms of viable proposition , it is now required to go through the influence 
over the text of the provision of Article 356 as to whether it constitutes a 
democratic check on the political version of the provision. 
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Chapter - 3 
COALITION REGIME A N D 
ARTICLE 3 S 6 : AUTO-
REGULATION OF POLITICAL 
GIMMICKS 
1. A Brief Account of Legislative History : 
The Constitution of India contain in part XVIII the 'Emergency 
provisions'. They are the provisions which remained a big test for federal and 
democratic principles of the constitution.This kept on laying a blamworthy 
put on several aspects of the political government as well as the values of the 
day. It is still not a part that is not in controversy in a long constitutional and 
political history. Hence is required a brief account of the back ground of the 
provisions, though. Here is concerned with the Art.356 - provisions in case of 
failure of constitutional machinary in states - yet it is desirable to take notice 
ofthe part XVIII. 
(A) The Government of India Act, 1935 : 
The division of power between the Union and States in a federation 
has to yield to the necessities of an emergency when war or external 
agression or armed rebellion may threaten the existence ofthe nation'. Both 
the constitution and the Government of India Act, 1935 expressly provide for 
enlarging the legislature as well as the executive powers ofthe Union in such 
abnormal conditions. The provisions of the Constitution have drawn on the 
Government of India Act, 1935 but modified its scheme that Act dealt with 
three types of emergencies arising on -
(i) failure of constitutional machinery relating to the government of 
federation, 
(ii) similar failure relating to the government of a province 
(iii) and the proclamation of an emergency when the security of India was 
threatened by war or internal disturbance. 
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Part II of that Act which dealt with the federal executive, set out 
provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery at the federal level. 
Section 45 provided that if the Governor General was satisfied that situation 
had arisen in which the government of the federation could not be carried on 
in accordance with the provisions of the Act, he could by a proclamation 
"declare that his functions shall, to such extent as may be specified in the 
proclamation, be exercised by him in his discretion" and "assume to himself 
all or any of the powers rested in or exercisable by any federal body or 
authority". 
Part III which dealt with the Governor's provinces contained section 
93 which set out similar provisions for failure of constitutional machinery in 
the province enabling the government to issue a proclamation and enlarging 
his functions and powers. 
The subject of legislative powers was dealt with in part V of the Act. 
Under section 100, the federal legislature alone had the power to make law 
with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Federal legislative list 
and the provincial legislature alone had the power to make laws with respect 
to any of the matters enumerated in the provincial legislative list; whereas 
both the federal and provincial legislatures had the power to make laws with 
respect to any of the matters enumerated in the concurrent legislative list. 
Section 102 of the Act, however, provided that if the Governor General in his 
discretion declared by a prolamation of emergency that a grave emergency 
existed whereby the security of India was threatened," whether by war or 
internal disturbances" the federal legislature would get the power to make 
laws with respect to any of the matters even in the provincial legislative list. 
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Thus the effect of the proclamation was to enlarge the legislative 
compentence of the federal legislature to encompass all the legislative lists. 
(B) Reasons for Enacting Sections 45 and 93 : 
In the Government of India Act, 1935, Ss 45 and 93 were enacted 
because one section of the congress party had declared its intention to enter 
the legislatures only in order to wreck them from within, since they fell far 
short of the party's demand for full self government. Section 12(l)(a) of the 
Government of India Act, 1935, provided that in the exercise of his function, 
the Governor-General shall have the following special responsibilities, that is 
to say, - (a) the prevention of any grave menance to the peace or tranquility of 
India or any part thereof.^ In the house of Lords, the Marquess of Lothian 
moved an amendment to add the following words to para (a) - " or the 
subversion of the institutions set up in this Act-'. 
"In moving this amendment the Marquess observed that by general 
consent the basis of the Bill was that it was intended to set up institutions 
based on responsible government in India.To secure this the Governor -
General should be armed with adequate powers to intervene in the event of 
any attempt being made, while acting within constitutional forms, to subvert 
the principles of responsible government and substitute for them some form 
of party dictatorship, the proposed amendment was, however, withdrawn on an 
assurance given by the Marquess of Zetland that if a really serious attempt 
was made to subvert the constitution, even by constitutional means it would 
be contrary to the general scheme set out in the Act and the Governor -
General would be justified in taking action under section 45^. 
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Thus, the history of Ss 45 and 93 of the Government of India Act, 
1935, shows that this power is not accurately described as an emergency 
power. Sections 45 and 93 appeared in separate chapters entitled" provisions 
in case of failure of constitutional Machinery". Section 102 had the marginal 
note" power of Federal legislature to legislate if an emergency is proclaimed". 
Section 102 was included in a group of sections which appeared in part V, 
chapter I, "Distribution of Legislative powers". Section 102 is too long to 
quote, but a comparison with Art 352 and 353 will show that those Articles 
are based substantially on s. 102. The power conferred on the President to 
ensure the proper functioning of the constitution in the discharge of the duty 
laid upon the union to protect every state against external aggression or 
internal disturbance and to ensure that the government of every state is carried 
on in accordance with the provisions of this constitution (reproduces the 
language of Ss.45 and 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935). No doubt 
there were no fundamental rights called by that name in the Government of 
India Act, 1935. There were, however, four sections which were in substance 
fundamental rights though not so called^ and it is not without significance that 
the proclamation of Emergency did not involve a suspension of those 
sections, nor did such proclamation enable legislatures to make lows which 
but for ihc emergency, they would not have been able to make.^ Correct 
drafting would have placed the emergency provisions in the chapter on the 
distribution of legislative power, and if it was intended to authorise 
suspension of fundamental rights and the making of laws which but for the 
emergency, could not have been made because of these rights, that provision 
should have been inserted either in part III of the constitution or in corporated 
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as a proviso to the Article on the distribution of legislative power - since 
fundamental rights act as a fetter on legislative power. Such drafting would 
have led to a clearer understanding of the nature of the powers now grouped 
together in part XVIII of our Constitution.^ 
(c) Constitutional Framework : 
The Constitution provides for three different types of emergency. 
The first arises on a proclamation under Art. 352 if the security of India or 
any part thereof is threatened" by war or external aggression or armed 
rebellion" the related provisions of this type of emergency are contained in 
Articles 353, 354, 355, 358, 359 as also Articles 83 and 250. The second is 
dealt with by Article 356 which arises on the failure of constitutional 
machinery in a state. The related provisions of this type of emergency are set 
out in Articles 355, 357, and 365. The third is a financial emergency dealt 
with by Art. 360. This type of emergency was not envisaged in the 
Government of India Act 1935. On the other hand, the constitution does not 
deal with the type of emergency contemplated by Sec. 45 of the Government 
Act, 1935, namely the failure of the constitutional Machinery at the national 
level.* 
(D) Legislative Changes : 
Art. 356 has undergone material changes by constitutional 
amendments. The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 omitted the 
words "or Rajpramukh" and "or Rajpramukh, as the case may be" from clause 
(1) of Article. The thirty eight Amendment Act which came into effect from 
1st Aug. 1975 sought to add a clause to Art. 356 by which the satisfaction of 
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the President would be final and conclusive and not questionable in any court 
of law. The terms of the said amendment made the amendment retrospective 
as from the commencement of the constitution. The Forty - second 
Amendment which came into effect from 3rd January 1977 amended Art 356 
by extending the period of approval at one time to one year instead of six 
months as it stood earlier. However, the forty fourth Amendment Act, 1977 
which came into effect from 28th June 1979 restored the earlier situation, 
the clause relating to one year was again substituted by the period of six 
months. Further the provision regarding finality of the satisfaction of the 
President was declared intact. A new sub article was added which made the 
period of proclamation subject to the outer limit of one year unless there was 
a proclamation of emergency under Art. 352 in the state and the Election 
Commission certified that the holding of the general elections was not 
possible in which event the period could be extended for three years at the 
most. The proviso in respect with the state of Punjab has been substituted by 
the constitution (Fifty-ninth Amendment) Act 1988, Sec. 2, and omitted by 
the Constitution (Sixty third Amendment 1989, sec. 2, (w.e.f. 6.1.1990) and 
again inserted by the Constitution (Sixty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1990, sec. 
2 (w.e.f. 16.4.1990). The Sixty-Seventh Amendment, 1990 said that in clause 
4, in the third proviso, for the words "three years and six months" the words 
"four years" shall be substituted. The Sixty-Eight Amendment, 1991 
substituted "five years" for "four years" in clause (4), third proviso. 
2. The Article 356 and Federal Polity : 
Art. 356 is one of the provisions of the Constitution, which were 
most keenly discussed in the Constituent Assembly. Among the distinguished 
129 
members who very ably even poignantly, analysed its nature and implications 
and contested its incorporation were P.S. Deshmukh, H.V. Kamath, Shibhan 
Lai Saxena and H.N. Kunzroo. They were apprehensive of the sweeping and 
unfettered nature of the powers sought to be vested in the President (and 
through him in the Union Council of Ministers) and felt that the powers, if 
and when exercised, would not merely violate the federal character of the 
polity envisaged by them but also make a mockery of democratic principles 
and purposes by -
(a) seeking to put the states under the permanent tutelage of the Union 
Government, 
(b) encouraging and fostering among the state legislators the tendency to 
behave 'irresponsibly' and to look towards the centre to bail them out of 
their own created mess, and 
(c) strengthening the already too authoritarian nature of the centre in the 
"dual polity of India". 
Analysing the far-reaching implications of the newly suggested Art. 
356, P.S. Deshmukh said : "Now this, I have no hesitation in saying, is a very 
radical change, and a change which is neither in conformity with the 
federation nor is it likely to be administratively beneficial or even 
practicable".' "I feel that by these articles", observed Shibhan Lai Saxena, "we 
are reducing the autonomy of the states to a farce. These articles will reduce 
the State Governments to great subservience to the central Government".'^ 
"There are", warned H.V. Kamath, great dangers lurking in the Article (Article 
278 redrafted as Article 356) brought before us today." The dangers are that 
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on the pretext of resolving a ministerial crisis or on the pretext of purifying 
or reforming mal-administration obtaining in a particular state. President may 
have recourse to this Art. 278.1 am sure this article is not intended for 
resolving any ministerial crisis that might arise in a particular state. For that 
the... remedy lies in the dissolution of the legislature by the Governor and a 
reference to the electorate... A mere crisis or a vote of no-confidence in the 
Ministry by the Legislature, even a repeated vote does not and can not, 
empower the President of the Union Government to intervene and proclaim an 
emergency".*^ In the pithy but pregnant words of H.N. Kunzru, the Union 
Government was, thus, being given "power to intervene to protect the electors 
against themselves".'^ 
Stung by the references to the disturbing similarity, if not identical, 
wording of the provisions relating to central intervention in case of failure of 
constitutional machinery in the provinces under the Government of India Act, 
1935 and the states under the provisions of the Constitutions, which was then 
on the anvil and which was to constitute the 'cornerstone' of the new national 
polity the proponents and supporters of the new Article sought to justify 
draconian nature by -
(a) observing that the fears and suspicions of the critics were ill-founded 
and too exaggerated, 
(b) claiming that instead of hanging over the State Governments as the 
proverbial sword of Damocles, the Article was meant to subserve the 
cause of democracy in the states, insure the integrity of the states 
against internal disturbance, domestic chaos and political instability and 
ensure constitutional government in the states, and 
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(c) expressing the fond hope and conviction against its misuse or abuse 
for narrow partisan ends. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyer observed that "apart from 
being an impediment to the growth of healthy provincial and state autonomy, 
because the primary obligation is cast upon the Union to see that the 
constitution is maintained".^^ Thakur Das Bhargawa added that "it is only a 
cementing measure. It gives responsibility to the centre to see that the 
provinces proceed with their administration in a business like and 
constitutional manner".'^ 
"Whether the power is exercised by a local legislature or by 
Parliament is a matter of convenience and the actual essence or principles of 
democracy are not involved"'^ , eloquently waxed K. Santhanam in elucidating 
and upholding the Article as fully democratic. "In this case ordinarily certain 
powers and functions are exercised by the provincial legislature. When the 
State Constitution breaks down, these powers and functions come back to the 
Central Executive and Central Legislature, which are as popular and as 
democratic as the State Government and Legislatures therefore, the 
Government of the State is not taken away even from the representatives of 
the state concerned. Only the representatives of the state concerned have to 
govern the state in co-operation with the representative of other parts of India 
that is the only limitation which is being placed and this limitation is 
necessary because the constitution has broken down in a particular state"." 
Dr. Ambedkar, Chairman of Drafting Committee, was, however, not 
so sanguine or confident; he was, as a matter of fact, somewhat different and 
apologetic as he could not rule out the possibility of the emergency 
provisions being "abused" for partisan ends, he conceded that "that objection 
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applies to every part of the Constitution which gives power to the centre to 
over-ride the provinces. In fact I share the sentiments expressed., that the 
proper thing we ought to expect is that such articles will never be called into 
operation and that they would remain a deadletter".'* 
Notwithstanding the considered opinion, lucid expressions, and fond 
hopes of the fathers of the Constitution regarding recourse to Article 356 by 
the Central Government as a 'last resort', if not a dead letter, to coerce an 
erring state, no provision of the Constitution has been so often used, misused 
and abused as Article, 356: 108 times since 1954.'^ Studies into the 
circumstances and purposes prompting central intervention^^, popularity 
characterised as imposition of President's rule, show that it had been generally 
motivated by the desire to bring about a shift of power to the proteges of the 
Central Government, from one group to another subject to the vagaries if the 
pole verdict, from one party to another. 
Take example of most unprecedented situation in 1977 and 1980. 
The Lok Sabha Elections in the year and, in between, the judgment of supreme 
court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Union of India^' have added a new dimension 
to the nature and scope of the emergency power' under Article 356. The Lok 
Sabha Elections of 1977 had resulted in a stunning victory of the Janata Party 
and in an unprecedented rout of the Congress, which had till now been in 
power at the centre since 1946, and of course, the 'beneficiary' of the 
emergency provisions of the Constitution, their use as well as abuse. For the 
first time since independence, a non-Congress Government was formed at the 
centre but what was still more striking was the failure of the Congress to 
snatch even a single seat in no less than nine northern states: Punjab, Haryana, 
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Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa 
and West Bengal. Never before had such a political debacle taken place in 
Indian parliamentary elections; the Janata juggemant, however, was unable to 
move down the Congress south of the Vindhyas, popularity called the South. 
The massive victory, not unnaturally, whetted the appetite of the 
Janata for power in the states, and for its leaders to put forward the thesis that 
the rout of the Congress in the northern states in the Lok Sabha elections was 
tantamount to a loss of mandate from, or confidence of, the electorate and the 
Congress ministries should seek a fresh mandate. The response from the 
Congress leaders was, of course, as expected, negative. The Home Minister, 
Charan Singh, therefore, formally "advised" the nine Congress Chief Ministers 
to 'advise' the Governors to dissolve the State Assemblies and order fresh 
elections. 
The advice was both unpalatable and unacceptable for reasons not 
for to seek the 'advice' was also significant and debatable as it put forward a 
new doctrine, namely, the verdict in favour of the 'opposition' at the Lok 
Sabha polls can be and should be interpreted as the withdrawl of the mandate 
from the ruling party at the state level, too. Overlooked, however, was the fact 
that elections to the Lok Sabha may be fought on different issue and bases, 
and that the candidates for the two forums have to address themselves to 
different, may be too different, constituents. 
"We have given our earnest and serious consideration to the most 
unprecedented political situation arising out of the virtual rejection in the 
recent Lok Sabha elections, of candidates belonging to the ruling party in the 
134 
various states" said Charan Singh in his identical letters.^^ And added, " a 
fresh appeal to the political sovereign would not only be permissible but also 
necessary and obligatory." 
To fore stall central intervention and dissolution of their 
Assemblies, several state Governments challenged the validity and properiety 
of the Janata view-point, the supreme court, however, upheld the power of the 
union Government to dissolve the Assemblies and dismiss the State 
Governments as " Article 356(5) makes it impossible for courts to question 
the President's satisfaction" on any ground". 
The learned Judges however, went on to unmistakably endorse the 
doctrine of federal paramountcy and 'emphibian Federlism' in observations 
one may respectfully term as uncalled - for or obiter dicta." A conspectus of 
the provisions of our constitution will indicate that whatever appearances of a 
Federal structure our constitution may have, its operations are certainly' 
judged both by contents of power which a number of its provisions carry with 
them and the use that has been made of them, more unitary than Federal. In a 
sense, the Indian union is Federal. But the extent of Federalism in it is largely 
watered down by the needs of progress and development of a country which 
has to be nationally integrated, politically and economically coordinated, and 
socially, intellectually, and spiritually uplifted. In such a system the states 
cannot stand in the way of legitimate and comprehensively planned 
development of the country in the manner directed by the Central 
Government. The question of legitimacy of particular actions of the Central 
Government taking us in particular directions can often be tested and 
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determined only by the verdicts of the people at appropriate times rather than 
by decisions of courts". 
The observations are uncalled for because the issue before the court 
was the validity or otherwise of'the President's satisfaction following the 
Home Minister's advice or demand concerning the dethronement of Congress 
Governments in the nine northern States where the Congress Party had 
suffered an unprecedented and humiliating rout in the elections for the Lok 
Sabha. 
Besides, the observations where neither in consonance with the 
intentions of the Fathers of the constitution nor with the nature and spirit of 
Federalism as generally elucidated by political scientists and jurists. Defining 
the nature of Federalism, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had observed. 
"The basic principle of Federalism is that the legislatative and 
Executive authority is partitioned between the centre and states not by any law 
to be made by the centre but by the constitution itself. This is what the 
constitution does. The states under our constitution are in no way dependent 
upon the centre for their legislative or executive authority. The Centre and the 
States arc co-equal in this matter.^ ^ 
Explaning the nature of the Indian constitution, he was quite explicit 
and emphatic that it established" a dual polity", a polity which Lord Bryce 
would have admitted, sought to assure national unity along with the identity 
and integrity of its constituent units."It establishes", said Dr. Ambedkar, "a 
dual polity with the Union at the Centre and the States at the periphery, each 
endowed with sovereign powers to be exercised in the field assigned to them 
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respectively by the constitution, the Union is not a league of states, united in 
loose relationship, nor are the states, the agencies of the Union, deriving 
powers from it. Both the Union and the states are created by the constitution, 
both drive their respective authority from the constitution, the one is not 
subordinate to the other in its own field, the authority of one is coordinate 
with the other.^ ^ 
"It is difficult to see how such a constitution can be called 
centralism. It may be that the constitution assigns to the centre a larger field 
for the operation of its legislative and executive authority that is to be found 
in any other Federal Constitution. It may be that the residuary powers are 
given to the Centre and not to states. But these features do not form the 
essence of Federalism"^^ 
"The chief mark of Federalism lies in the partition of the legislative 
and executive authority between the centre and the units by the Constitution. 
This is the principle embodied in our Constitution. There can be no mistake 
about it. It is, therefore, wrong to say that the states have been placed under 
the centre".2<» 
Elucidating the nature and philosophy of Indian Federalism, no less 
a scholar and jurist than Singhvi observed : 
"While the centre unquestionably occupies the commanding heights 
in the constitutional polity of India, it would be unrealistic to under-estimate 
the power of the constituent states of the Indian Union... the constitution lays 
down the foundation of co-operative federalism^^ in India not by the device of 
a meticulous balance of an approximate equivalence of power between the 
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centre and the states, but by emphasising the pre-eminence of the centre 
occasionally and somewhat as the Karta in Hindu joint family. It assumes the 
equality of States inter se or equality between the centre on one hand and the 
states on the other cooperation in the federal framework depends upon the 
harmonious working of the Federal power structure, in the stability and 
effectiveness of the centre, in a just system of resolution of centre-state and 
inter-state conflicts and in an adequate institutional system for consultation, 
co-ordination, interchange and integration".^^ 
Explaining and defending the overriding powers of centre vis-a-vis 
states. Dr. Ambedkar had said : 
"I think it is agreed that our constitution, notwithstanding many 
provisions which are contained in it whereby the centre has been given powers 
to override the provinces, none-the-less is a Federal constitution. It means 
this that the provinces are as sovereign in their field which is left to them by 
the constitution as the centre is in the field which is assigned to it. In other 
words, barring the provisions which permit the centre to override any 
legislation that may be passed by the provinces, the provinces have a plenary 
authority to make any law for the peace, order and good Government of the 
province. Now, when once the constitution makes them sovereign and gives 
them primary powers to make any law for peace, order and good Government 
of province, really speaking. The intervention of the centre or any authority 
must be deemed to be barred, because that would be an invasion of the 
sovereign authority of the province. That is a reason of the fact that we have a 
federal Constitution that being so, if the centre is to interfere in the 
administration of provincial affairs, as we propose to authorise the centre by 
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virtue of Art. 278 and 278-A, it must be by and under some obligation which 
the constitution imposes upon the centre'.^^ 
In the Lok Sabha Elections of 1980, there was, however, an ironic 
reversal of fortunes and of roles after the polls. The Congress (I) was returned 
with a thumping majority while the Janata Party cut a sorry figure in the nine 
northern states, and the doctrine of the Federal mandate was now triumphantly 
flaunted against its erstwhile proponents. The Janata Governments were duly 
dismissed, the State Assemblies were dissolved, and fresh Elections were 
ordered over and against Janata objections regarding the arbitrariness and 
'undemocratic' high-headedness of the Congress (I) Government at the centre. 
But the Janata protests and arguments were countered by the Congress (I) 
spokesman by reminding them their own doctrine of federal mandate. Once 
again a political question was fore-closed by Article 356(5), which makes it 
impossible for courts to question the President's satisfaction "on any ground". 
The plaintiffs had become the defendants and unwilling victims of their own 
narrow and too legalistic an approach to a problem. 
The then Chief justice had, therefore, quite rightly observed in State 
of Rajasthan V. Union of India that "in so far as growth of healthy conventions 
on such a subject (Central intervention) are essential for the satisfactory 
operations of the machinery of democratic government, this is a matter on 
which there could and should be a broad agreement or consensus between all 
parties interested in a satisfactory working of the democratic system in this 
country".30 This opinion is fully based on the doctrine of cooperative 
Federalism. What developments have gone after this in the field of judicial 
pronouncements are more desirable to be discussed in the heading ahead. 
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3. Foundation of Proclamation : 
The foregoing discussion was on the effect of the provisions on the 
federal concept or centre-state relations. Now it is in essence to examine the 
foundation on which such power of assuming the administration of the 
impugned state by the President generates. Equally it is necessary to signify 
the term proclamation. The term proclamation is a method by which the 
people are informed of the reasons.which compelled the President to assume 
functions of the government of a state. To know the basis, one has to put one's 
right into the Duty-Situation that fills the foundation of the liability. The 
Constitution of India expressly enjoined on the union this duty situation to 
ensure proper functioning of state's constitutional public authorities and 
authorised the President to perform the duty within the procedural framework 
explicitly provided therein. Under our constitution this obligation arises due 
to incorporation of Art. 355 since a close reading of the provisions of the 
articles 355 to 357 and 365 would clearly show that they constitute a single 
code; of which, article 356 is the one most talked about and subject of 
controversy allegedly on grounds of having been frequently misused and 
abused. It is important that article 356 is read with the other relevant articles 
viz. articles 256, 257, 355 and 365. Insofar as article 355 also inter alia 
speaks of the duty of the Union to protect the State against external 
aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that the government of the 
State is carried on in accordance with the Constitution, it is obvious that 
article 356 is not the only one to take care of a situation of failure of 
constitutional machinery. The Union can also act under article 355 i.e. without 
imposing President's rule. Article 355 can stand on its own. Also, Union 
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Government can issue certain directions under articles 256 and 257. While 
article 356 authorises the President to issue a proclamation imposing 
President's rule over a State if he is satisfied that a situation has arisen in 
which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with 
the provisions of this Constitution, article 365 says that where a State fails to 
comply with Union directions (under articles 256, 257 and others) "it shall be 
lawful for the President to hold that a situation has arisen in which the 
Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution". The scheme of the Constitution seems to 
clearly suggest that before rushing to issue a proclamation under article 356, 
all other possible avenues should be explored and as Dr. Ambedkar said, 
article 356 should be used only as a matter of last resort. It should first be 
ensured that the Union had done all that it could in discharge of its duty under 
article 355 that it had issued the necessary directions under articles 256-257 
and that the State had failed to comply with or give effect to the directions. 
Defending the provision (Art. 277-A) Dr. B.R. Ambedkar said "....as 
members will see, article 277-A (Art. 355), says that it shall be the duty of 
the union to protect every unit, and also to maintain the constitution. So far as 
such obligation is concerned, it will be found that it is not our constitution 
alone which is going to create this duty and this obligation. Similar clauses 
appear in the American Constitution. They also occur in the Australian 
Constitution, where the Constitution, in express terms, provides that it shall 
be the duty of the Central Government to protect the units or the states from 
external aggression or internal commotion. All that we propose to do is to 
add one more clause to the principle enunciated in the American and 
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Australian constitutions, namely, that it shall also be the duty of the union to 
maintain the Constitution in the provinces as enacted by this law. There is 
nothing new in this and as I said, in view of the fact that we are endowing the 
provinces with plenary powers and making them sovereign within their own 
field, it is necessary to provide that if any invasion of the provincial field is 
done by the centre it is in virtue of this obligation. It will be an act in 
fulfilment of the duty and the obligation and it can not be treated, so far as the 
constitution is concerned, as a Wanton, arbitrary, unauthorised act that is the 
reason why we have introduced article 277-A".^ ^ 
In furtherance of the defence in respect of the obligation on the part 
of the Union Government, Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar by giving a reason 
as to why such obligation is indispensable under the circumstances, said that 
the primary thing concerning the nation and the union Government is "to 
maintain the Constitution". If the import of that expression is fully realised, it 
will be noticed that there can not be any intention to interfere with the 
provincial constitution, because the provincial Constitution is a part of the 
Constitution of the Union. Therefore it is the duty of the union Government 
to protect against external aggression, internal disturbance and domestic 
chaos and to sec that the constitution is worked in a proper manner both in the 
states and in the union. If the constitution is worked in proper manner in the 
states, that is, if responsible Government as contemplated by the constitution 
functions properly, the union will not and can not interfere. The protagonists 
of state autonomy will realise that apart from being an impediment to the 
growth of healthy provincial or state autonomy; because the primary 
obligation is cast upon the union to see that the Constitution is maintained. 
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Such a provision is by no means a novel provision. Even in the typical federal 
constitution of United States where state sovereignty is recognised more than 
in any other federation, you will find a provision therein to the effect that it is 
the duty of union or the central Government to see that the state is protected 
both as against domestic violence and external aggression. In putting in that 
article, we are merely following the exmaple of the classical or model 
federation of America^^ then, again, there is a similar provision in section 60 
of the Australian commonwealth constitution to the effect that it is the duty 
of the executive government to maintain the constitution.^^ 
In co-relation of the duty-situation it can be analysed by taking 
acocunt of the Art. 355 of the Indian Constitution in this method also. Art. 
355 by imposing a duty on the union to secure that the government of every 
state is carried on according to the provisions of the constitution, recognizes 
the right of every state to carry on its government according to the provisions 
of the constitution. The right obviously flows from the fact that the 
constitution of India contains a constitution both for the union and the states. 
The states, like the union, have three great departments, namely, the 
legislature, the Executive and the judiciary. And the states have exclusive 
legislative and executive power with respect to matters in list II including 
taxation. But the right to carry on the government of a state according to the 
provisions of our Constitution is subject to a liability - a state can not carry 
on its government so as to bring about a failure of constitutional machinery. 
Corresponding to the liability of the state is a power of the union to ensure 
that in the case of a failure of constitutional machinery in a state the 
government of a state is carried on according to the provisions of our 
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Constitution. The power thus conferred is purposive the purpose being to 
ensure that the government of a state is carried on according to the provisions 
of our constitution. To make the power of the union effective. Art. 356 
enables the President to impose what is generally known as the President's 
Rule. Given the purpose for which the power is conferred, any exercise of 
power designed to achieve a different purpose must be invalid.^'' 
Art. 355 states, 'It shall be the duty of the union to protect every 
state against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that 
the Government of every state is carried on in accordance with the provisions 
of this constitution". It may be noted that the two expressions namely external 
agression and internal disturbances used in Article 355 have also been 
mentioned in Article 352. Therefore, connotations of these two expressions 
in Article 355 must of necessarily be different from the connotations of the 
same expressions used in the Art. 352. The 'external aggression' and 'internal 
disturbance' may be classified into three categories and they are 'external 
aggression' and 'internal disturbance', 
(i) which threaten the security of India or any part of the territory thereof 
(ii) which render impossible for the government of a state to function in 
accordance with the provisions of the constitution, and 
(iii) which threatens law and order situation in any state. 
The first category is amply covered by Article 352 and the last 
category, by virtue of entry in the state list^ ^ is within the exclusive domain of 
states. Therefore, Art. 355 covers only the second category of 'external 
aggression' and 'internal disturbance'. This conclusion gets an additional 
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confirmation in the last clause of Art. 355, according to which it is the duty 
of the Union "to ensure that the Government of every state is carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of this constitution". The expression 'to ensure' 
is to make safe. That is to say, it is the duty of the union to make safe for the 
government of a state to function in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution by removing such external aggression and internal disturbance 
which are detrimental to such functioning. Thus, in Art. 355 the duty of the 
Union to protect every state against external aggression and internal 
disturbance is inextricably linked with its duty to ensure functioning of 
constitutional public authorities in the states in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution and consequently 'external aggression' and 
'internal disturbances' postulated in this Article are those which render such 
functioning of state machinery impossible. 
The expression 'external aggression' takes different shapes and 
forms. It need not necessarily be an overt act of forcibly crossing the 
internationally recognised boundaries of India by regular forces of an outside 
power. It may even be a covert act of sending trained irregular or agent 
provocateurs by a foreign country to indulge in acts of sabotage with a view to 
overthrowing the government in any state of India, or of clandestinely and 
actively supporting with money and material any guerilla activity or 
disgruntled section of the people in a state, etc. Similarly, 'internal 
disturbance' does not necessarily mean large scale' domestic violence as it is 
understood in the United States. Significantly enough the framers of the Indian 
constitution carefully avoided the use of the American expression 'domestic 
violence'.^ *^ So constant ministerial instability due to the absence of clear 
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mandate by the people to any one party in the legislature, political instability 
due to endless practice of defection by the members of the legislature, the 
general widespread and continuous unrest, the wilful disregard of 
constitutional provisions by any constitutional public authority in a state, the 
calculated move by any authority functioning under the constitution in a state 
to set at naught constitutional provisions and to prevent other authorities 
from functioning etc., would amount to 'internal disturbance' within the 
meaning of Article 355, for each of them has sufficient potentialities to 
prevent the machinery of the state from functioning in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear that all covert acts of 
aggression by an outside power and all types of internal disturbances 
mentioned above, which prevent or are capable of preventing the proper 
functioning of Constitutional machinery in a state, are, in fact, 'external 
aggressions' and 'internal disturbances' respectively within the meaning of 
Article 355 of the Constitution. 
Though Article 355 stipulates the duty of the Union towards states, 
it does not indicate any power and procedure to fulfil the duty. But such 
power and procedure have been specified in Art.356, which says that if the 
President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is 
satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the state can 
not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this constitution, the 
president may by proclamation assume all or any executive functions of the 
state, declare that powers of its legislature shall be exercised by or under the 
authority of Parliament and make necessary incidental and consequential 
provisions, including provisions for suspending any provisions of this 
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constitutions relating to any body or authority in the State, for giving effect 
to the objects of the proclamation. But the president is not authorised to 
assume to himself any of the powers vested in a High Court, or to suspend the 
operation of any provision of this constitution relating to high courts. 
(A) Constitutional Duty to Issue Directions to States : 
Before analysing the phrase 'the President may proclaim', it is 
desirable to see the hopes of the constitutional makers, about the exercise of 
the power given under Art. 356 that certainly will open the new dimension of 
the aspect of the proclamation. In the light of the legislative history of Art. 
355 and 356, as above discussed, i.e. the provisions of Ss 45 and 93 of the 
G.I. Act. 1935 relating to the failure of constitutional machinery, and the 
precendent on which Art. 355 was based, namely. Art. 4(4) of the 
U.S.constitution, it is reasonably clear that Art. 356 was meant to be a last 
resort to preserve parliamentary democracy to which our constitution is 
committed. On the point Dr. Ambedkar in constituent Assembly said that the 
use of this drastic power would be a matter of the last resort: 
"I hope the first thing (the President) will do, would be to issue a 
mere warning to a province that has erred that things were not happening in 
the way in which they were intended to happen in the constitution. If that 
warning fails, the second thing for him to do, will be to order an election 
allowing the people to settle matters by themselves. It is only when these two 
remedies fail, that he would resort to this Article".^' 
Besides the hopes of the constitutional makers, and the 
constitutional mandate, the provision of Art 365 unfold the other aspect of 
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our discussion, though, it is the part of same notion. This articles also 
determines the foundation of the exercise of the power on the ground of'not 
to comply with the provision of the Constitution'. 
The provisions of Art. 365 have been often interpreted in such a 
manner as to give an impression that under this article the President has been 
invested with a sweeping power to interfere with the affairs of any state. It is 
said that 'having regard to the fact that the President has the power to issue 
directions to the State Government under numerous provisions of the 
constitution, it would seem that Art. 365 arms the President with an all-
pervasive power to suppress the Government of a state on the ground that its 
failure to carry out any or some of his directions has created situation 
contemplated in Art. 356.^ ^ 
It is mentionable that the crucial words used in Art. 365 are: ' any 
direction given in the exercise of the executive power of the union under any 
of the provisions of the constitution" the words any directions here have been 
amply qualified by two phrases, namely, given in the exercise of the executive 
power of the union and 'under any of the provisions of the constitution". 
Necessarily therefore the meaning of the words 'any directions' must be 
understood in the light of these qualifications. 
In this connection, it may be noted that Article 53 of the 
Constitution vests the" executive power of the UNion" in the President, which 
shall be exercised by him" in accordance with this constitution". Then Art. 73 
says that the "executive power of the union" shall extend " (a) to the matters 
with respect to which parliament has power to make laws and (b) to the 
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exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the 
Government of India by virtue of treaty or agreement", the above provisions 
give an idea that the "executive power of the Union" comprehends the power 
to administer or to carry into effect valid laws made by Parliament and the 
exercise of its treaty powers. 
Having thus rested the "executive power of the Union" in the 
President and having stipulated the extent of the "executive power of the 
union", the constitution further says in article 256 that the executive power of 
the union" shall extend to "the giving of such directions" to the states as may 
be necessary to ensure that the executive power of every state is exercised in 
such a manner as to comply with laws made by Parliament. In the same manner 
Art. 257 extends the executive power of the Union to the giving of directions 
to the states (i) to ensure that the executive power of every state is so 
exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power 
of the union;^^ (ii) as to the construction and maintenance of means of 
communication declared in the direction to be of national or military 
importance,'*^ and (iii) as to the measures to be taken for the protection of 
railways within the state'*'. Finally, article 339 (2) extends this power to the 
giving of directions to any state as to the drawing up and execution of 
schemes specified in the direction to be essential for the welfare of the 
Scheduled Tribes in the State. These are the three articles of the constitution, 
which speak about the giving of directions to the states in exercise of the 
executive power of the union. 
No doubt, two other articles of the constitution, namely Articles 
344 (6) and 350A, authorise the President to issue certain directions, the 
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President is authorised to issue directions by the former to give effect to 
recommendations of the Language commission appointed under that Article'*^ 
and by the latter to secure adequate facilities for instruction in the mother 
tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic 
minority groups in any state.'*^ But a comparison of the provisions of these 
two articles with the provisions of Articles 256, 257 and 339(2) and a close 
scrutiny of the words used therein would show that directions, which the 
President is authorised to issue under them, are not directions by him in 
exercise of the executive power of the union. Consequently, they are not the 
kinds of directions envisaged in Art. 365. The President may, under Articles 
344(6) and 350A, issue directions to the states setting out norms or 
prescribing principles to be followed by the states in carrying into effect the 
purposes of those articles. Since these directions are not covered by article 
365, failure of any state to comply with such directions will not attract the 
provisions of article 365. So the direction, which the president is empowered 
to issue under Articles 344(6) and 350A, may be described as non-executive 
directions and it is left to the good sense of the state to obey them. 
A letter written by a Union Minister to the Chief Minister of a State 
advising him to recommend to the Governor to dissolve the legislative 
Assembly is not a 'direction' within the purview of Art. 256 and that even 
though it may constitute a 'threat' it would not give rise to any justiciable 
cause of action in favour of the state for declaration or injunction.^^ Nor has 
a private party any cause of action arising out of default on the part of a state 
to comply with any direction of Union under this Article.^^ 
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This above analysis leads to the conclusion that the words 'any 
directions' in Article 365 would comprehend only those directions, which the 
president could issue under Articles 256, 257 and 339(2) of the constitution 
in exercise of the executive power rested in him. Therefore, during normal 
period^^ if a state fails to comply with a direction issued by the President 
under one of these three articles, then the President may invoke the 
provisions of Art. 356. Besides, the dominant theme of Articles 256 and 257 
is the compliance of states with the laws of parliament and uninterrupted 
operation of the executive power of the Union in every part of the country. In 
a Federal laws and Federal executive acts taken thereunder in any part of the 
country without violating the basic federal norms. Therefore, an inevitable 
conclusion is that Article 365 is neither an extraordinary provision, nor it 
confers on the President "all pervasive power" to interfere with the affairs of 
a state in a situation of his choice. 
(B) Presidential Satisfaction for Proclamation : 
Article 356, states that "If the president, on receipt of a report from 
the Governor or otherwise is satisfied that the situation has arisen....". 
Sequentiy the conditions can be put as a basis of the proclamation as (i) a 
report from the Governor of the states, (ii) satisfaction of the President as to 
the existence of a situation stipulated in the article and then (iii) proclamation 
by the President. 
So the proclamation conditions the fact that President has to satisfy 
himself as to existence of a situation contemplated in it. Here the 'satisfaction' 
is subjective one not objective, of the President. It means a constitutionally 
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spirited Presidential satisfaction, and its anti-thesis, is the personal 
satisfaction; that is self-legally justified satisfaction or otherwise, requires a 
debate and analysis to testify the fact. The Article requires a report from the 
Govemer of a state. No doubt, the article does not say specifically whether 
the report of the Governor should be 'speaking' or 'non-speaking' report. But 
it is clear that the President has to satisfy himself from his satisfaction 
regarding the existence of a situation contemplated in the article on the basis 
of the Governor's report, which is possible only if the Governor submits a 
speaking report. Needless to say that any satisfaction, which the President 
contrives to form on receipt of a non-speaking' report, would amount to 
substitution of the Governor's satisfaction for that of the President regarding 
the existence of a deteriorating situation in a state. Therefore, the report of 
the Governor must contain some facts, on the basis of which the President 
would be able to form his opinion whether or not a situation contemplated in 
the article has arisen. 
Besides, it is self-evident that in as much as the President's 
satisfaction rests on the report of the Governor, he is duty bound to furnish 
facts in his report, which must be clear and specific and not vague. It is now a 
well settled rule that no satisfaction can reasonably be formed by an authority 
on vague facts or report. In the constitutional Assembly this point has been 
made clear by Dr. Ambedkar when he said that "if the Centre is to interfere in 
the administration of Provincial affairs, it must be under some obligation 
which the constitution imposes upon the centre".^' This discussed situation is 
excepting the case covered by Art. 365; moreover, if he attempts to form his 
'satisfaction' on the basis of'non-speaking report' of the Governor of a state, 
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or on the basis of vague fact furnished by the Governor, he cannot be said to 
have satisfied himself within the meaning of Art. 356. In such a situation the 
entire question may become a justiciable matter. In other words, though the 
'satisfaction' of the President as such is not a justiciable matter the manner in 
which he formed his satisfaction, or whether or not he formed his satisfaction 
within the meaning of Art. 356, may be a justiciable matter. 
The Court ruled that the validity of Proclamation issued by the 
President imposing President's Rule is "judicially^* reviewable" to the extent 
of examining whether it was issued on the basis of any material at all or 
whether the material was relevant or whether the proclamation was issued in 
the malafide exercise of power".'*^ The material may be either the report of 
the Governor or something else, but it must meet the new test. The court also 
held that even if some part of the material is irrelevent, the court can not 
interfere so long as there is some part of the material which is relevant to the 
action.^ ^ 
Though Art. 163(1) obliges the Governor to act according to the 
advice tendered by his Council of Ministers excepting those matters with 
respect to which the constitution requires him to exercise his discretion, and 
though the giving of a report under Art. 356(1) is not so mentioned by the 
constitution as a function to be exercised by him in his discretion, it is 
obvious that in the matter^' of the Governor reporting to the President that 
there has been a break down of the Constitutional machinery there must 
necessarily be a matter in which the Governor can not possibly act according 
to the advice of his Council of Ministers.^^ The reason is that as a result of 
such report, if adverse, the State Government itself would be suspended, so 
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the Governor's council of Ministers can not be made to sign their own death 
warant. 
Now the approach is to examine the other source of satisfaction that 
has been qualified by incorporation of the term 'otherwise' in the constitution. 
The original article - merely provided that the President should act on the 
report of the Governor. The word "otherwise" was not there. Now it is felt that 
in view of the fact that article 277A [Now article 355], which proceeds article 
278 [Present article 356] imposes a duty or an obligation upon the centre, it 
would not be proper to restrict and confine action of the President, which 
undoubtedly will be taken in the fulfilment of the duty, to the report made by 
the Governor of the province. It may be that the Governor does not make a 
report ... I think as a necessary consequence to the introduction of article 
277A, we must give liberty to the President to act even when there is no 
report by the Governor and when the President has got certain facts within his 
knowledge on which he thinks he ought to act in the fulfilment of his duty.^-' 
Thus the words 'or otherwise' appeared in the Art. 356 indicate that 
the President may act under Art. 356(1) on information received from sources 
other than the Governor's report. This would include union agencies such as 
the report of some Union Minister^^ or advice of the Union Council of 
Ministers. On the other hand, the word 'shall' in the Art. 74 suggests that 
whether the President has or has not received a report from the Governor, the 
President can act under Art. 356(1) only in accordance with the advice 
tendered by the Union Council of Ministers, and if the latter so advise, the 
President can not but issue a proclamation under Art. 356(1) in respect of the 
state concemed.^^ But it is notable fact that no use of Art. 356 can be made 
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unless it can be held that the Govemoment 'cannot be carried on in accordance 
with the provisions of the Constitution'.^'' Mere dissolution of the Assembly 
on the advice of the chief Minister does not constitute a source of 
Presidential satisfaction.^' 
Thus, it is all arisen out of the duty situation incumbent upon the 
union government - a harmonious notional fill-up in the federal structure of 
the country. The sanction against the states incorporated in Art. 356 is 
founded upon woven obligation obliged by the constitutional provisions. It is 
the foundaton of the principle of the protection of the states in given 
situation. 
(4) Extent and Effects of the Proclamation : 
(a) Extent and Meaning of the Provision : In the Constituent Assembly, 
there were questions to be asked to Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as to the meaning of 
"failure of Constitutional machinery". Ambedkar in his reply gently put his 
attention on the historical use and meaning of the words -
"It would take me very long now to go into a detailed examination of 
the whole thing and, referring to each article, say, this is the principle which 
is established in it and say, if any Government or any legislature of a province 
does not act in accordance with it, that would act as a failure of machinery. 
The expression failure of machinery 'I find has been used in the Government 
of India Act, 1935. Every body must be quite familiar therefore with its de 
facto and de jure meaning. I do not think any further explanation is 
necessary".^ * 
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It will be seen that the words we have in Dr. Ambedkar's answer are 
an evasion of the difficulty pointed out by Pandit Kunzru. A heavy price had to 
be paid for this evasion in the years to come.^' Hence, it is not possible to 
contemplate each and every situation to come in order to enlist it, however 
the court and jurist have justified the validity of certain grounds establishing 
their proper for invoking Art. 356. For instance, where the party having a 
majority in the Assembly declines to form a ministry and the Governor's 
attempts to find a coalition Ministry able to command a majority have 
failed.^ ° In case of Aboo, K.K., Vs. Union of India^', it was held that, after 
general election, no party is able to secure a working majority in the 
legislative Assembly. Continuingly, when a new state is created as a result of 
territorial reorganisation or upgrading of a union territory and there is no 
legislature for such state until election is held therefore, resort may be had to 
Art. 356 as to stop gap arrangement. Resort can be made on the gorund of 
gross mismanagement of the affairs of a state Government, or abouse of its 
power^ ,^ corruption on the part of the State Governments^, A subversion of 
the constitution by the state Government while professing to work under the 
constitution or creating disunity or disaffection among the people to 
disintegrate the democratic social fabric^; or to subvert its basic features' 
such as federation or democracy.*' Where a Ministry, although properly 
constituted, acts contrary to the provisions of the constitution or seeks to use 
its powers to purposes not authorised by the constitution and the Governor's 
attempts to call the minsitry to order have failed.** 
Where a State Govt, fails to comply with directions issued by the 
Union under the following Articles even after warning - Art. 257(2),(3); 353, 
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360(3); 339(2).^ "^  Where the Ministry, although having the confidence of the 
majority in the Legislature, fails to meet an extraordinary situation, e.g. an 
outbreak of unprecedented violence; a great natural calamity such as a severe 
earthquack, a flood, or a large epidemic, whose failure amounts to an 
abdication of its governmental power.^ * A threat to the security of the state 
owing to external aggression or armed rebellion which would have attracted 
Art. 352(1) or such external aggression or internal disturbance as would have 
justified action under Article 355. In short, a danger to national integration or 
security of the state or aiding or abetting national disintegration or a claim 
for independent sovereign status.^' A state Government entering into an 
alliance with foreign power.'^ A political party sekeing to subvert the 
principles of responsible government^', and to set up a party dictatorship.^^ 
These are the situations in which as a last resort - as expected by 
constitutional framers - Art. 356 can validly be exercised in fulfilling the 
obligation on the part of the Central Government. Notwithstanding that this 
can not constitute an exhaustive list. Only the constitutional imperatives are 
based on the required extension of the principle. 
(b) Effects of Proclamation : When a proclamation is made under Art. 356, 
it will be open to President to specify in such proclamation that -
(i) He will himself exercise any or all of the following powers in 
connection with the administration of the state concerned -
(a) All or any of the functions of the state Government; 
(b) All or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor; 
(c) All or any of the powers vested in any body or authority in the 
state other than the legislature of the state; 
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(iii) The powers of the state legislature shall be exercisable by or under the 
authority of the parliament. 
When a declaration to this effect is made by the President, it 
shall be competent for Parliament to direct that the legislative power of 
the state legislature shall be exercisable by the President himself or by 
any other authority to whom such power may be delegated by the 
President.^^ 
(iii) Any of the provisions of the constitution relating to any body or 
authority in that state, other than the High Court, shall be suspended in 
whole or in part. 
(iv) Any other incidental or consequential provision as may be necessary or 
desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation. 
As far as chapter VI of the Sarkaria Commission Report is concerned, 
it deals with emergency provisions, namely, articles 352-360. The Sarkaria 
Commission has made 12 recommendations; 11 of which are related to article 
356 while 1 is related to article 355 of the Constitution. Thus, it can be 
submitted that the provisions of the articles have honest constitutional notion, 
not to invoke favoured interpretation. As it has been such constant political 
interpretation that it can not be stopped by only moral appeals. Hence this is 
not contents of the article but the contentions which are blameworthy having 
constructed for their own benefit. As it has already been discussed, that the 
provision bearing unitary character required its place in the federal 
Constitution warrants the situations which has been meant to be dealt with it. 
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So only the political intentions are at stake to be purified and the flow of 
political ingenuity through the significant Constitutional institutions is 
pertinent to be traced out further. 
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Chapter - 4 
C A B I N E T CAMOUFLAGE A N D 
POLITICAL GOVERNORS : A 
SERIOUS INGENUITY 
Article 74 begins with the words as "there shall be a Council of 
Ministers to aid and advise the President". The number of members of the 
Council of Ministers is no where mentioned in the constitution. It is 
determined according to the exigencies of the time. Likewise the constitution 
does not classify the members of the Council of Ministers into different 
ranks. All this has been done informally, following the English practice. The 
Council of Ministers is, thus, a composite body, consisting of different 
categories like Cabinet Ministers, State Ministers and Deputy Ministers. It is 
the cabinet which is an inner body within the Council. According to the 
Salaries and Allowances of Ministers Act', each Minister gets a sumptury 
allowance at a varying scale, as per his rank, and a residence, free of rent. 
Position and Functions of Cabinet : 
It is now settled that since the cabinet system of Government has 
been introduced into the Indian constitution based upon the British Model and 
since all the conventions can not possibly be codified exhaustively, it would 
be legitimate to refer to the British conventions in interpreting the provisions 
of Art. 74-75 unless, of course, they are excluded or modified by these other 
provisions of the Constitution of India^. So it becomes necessary in the 
context to discuss the position and function of the cabinet with historical 
touch. It is through the institution of the cabinet that the absolute monarch of 
England has been transformed into a constitutional ruler - the formal head of 
the Executive.^ In Law and in strict theory, the Crown is still the source of all 
authority, and the cabinet, as such, is still unknown to the law.^  But though 
unknown to the law, the cabinet is the "driving and steering force" in the 
English system of Government today. The main principles upon which this 
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system of responsible government rests were evolved as a result of the 
Revolution of 1688, viz. (1) the sovereign is irresponsible, but (2) He must 
act through Ministers enjoying confidence of Parliament (i.e. of the majority 
in the House of Commons) and must retain them only so long as that 
confidence is maintained. This latter principle rests entirely upon convention 
and there is no law to enjoin it. 
In the words of Ilbert^ 
"The essential feature of the Cabinet system of government, those 
which distinguish it from the Presidential system of the United States, are 
that the king's Principal Ministers, the men who arc responsible for the 
government of the country, must be members of Parliament, and must resign 
office if they are unable to command and the confident in the House of 
commons". 
In the words of Parliamentary Committee on the Machinery of 
Government^ the main functions of a modem cabinet are three fold -
"(a) the final determination of the policy to be submitted to Parliament; 
(b) the Supreme Control of the national executive in accordance with the 
policy prescribed by Parliament; and 
(c) the continuous coordination and delimitation of the interests of the 
several Departments". 
(a) The primary function of the cabinet is formulation of the policy 
according to which the nation is to be governed. It is, by its very nature, 
incapable of carrying on the actual administration of the country. What the 
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cabinet does is to determine the policy by consultation amongst its members 
who are the heads of the different Department or "ministries" and after the 
policy is determined, it is the duty of each of the Departments to carry out 
that policy and also to fill in the details within the frame work of the policy 
laid down by the cabinet (and approved by Parliament either by a debate or by 
legislation where legislation is necessary to carry out the policy). 
(b) The next function is to control the entire administration in the 
matter of implementation of the policy so laid down. Even in carrying out the 
policy thus laid down, reference to the Cabinet becomes necessary whenever 
any question of policy is involved in taking an administrative decision. In fact, 
one of the potent sources of evolution of new policies is the problems arising 
out of the administration of existing policies and laws. To certain extent, it 
depends on each individual Minister to determine which matters should be 
referred to the cabinet; but the exercise of this discretion is controlled by the 
very nature of ministerial responsibility, and the loyalty of each Minister to 
the cabinet and ultimately to the Prime Minister. While, therefore, it would 
be unnecessary and unwise for a Minsiter to refer questions of mere 
adminsitrative details to the cabinet which it has no time to deal with, it would 
be equally unwise for a minister to withhold questions involving policy from 
the cabinet and make a decision on his sole responsibility. Even the prime 
Minister can hardly afford to commit himself to major questions without 
prior consultation with his colleagues. In this matter, as in all matters relating 
to the cabinet, there is no hard and fast rule, but the whole machine works 
smoothly according to convention and good sense. Apart from questions 
raising new issues of policy, a Minister would, as a matter of prudence, place 
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before the cabinet issues which have external implications or are likely to 
raise serious controversy in Parliament or a dispute with another Department. 
(c) Next in importance is the part played by the cabinet in legislation. Its 
initiation and control in the matter of legislation has become so much 
overwhelming that, Ilbert observed.^ 
(d) The control of the cabinet over financial legislation is almost absolute. 
The cabinet has the sole responsibility of preparing and laying before 
Parliament both the estimates for expenditure as well as the proposals 
for taxation. 
It is the cabinet which co-ordinates and guides the political action 
of the different branches of the government, and thus to create a consistent 
policy.* Hence Bagehot called it "a hyphen that joins, a buckle that fastens, the 
executive and legislative together". It formulates the general policy of the 
government and is collectively responsible to Parliament for that. Apart from 
this general function of co-ordination and leadership, it exercises actual 
executive and legislative functions. As the adviser of the crown, the cabinet 
exercise all the prerogative and statutory powers of the crown and its 
individual members administer the various Department of government. On the 
other hand, it possesses the exclusive right of initiating and conducting public 
bills in Parliament and exercises exclusive control over all financial 
measures. 
The Cabinet, in fact, forms the pivot round which the whole machine 
of England revolves. 
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"on the one hand, they are the king's ministers exercising their 
powers in the king's name, and it is by them, and not by either house of 
Parliament, or by any committee of either house, that the government of the 
country is carried on. On the other hand, they are members of legislature 
liable at any moment, so long as Parliament is sitting, to be called to acocunt 
for their actions by the House to which they belong, and are dependant for 
their tenure of office (technically on the king's pleasure), but practically on 
the goodwill of the House of commons".' 
Deliberations of Cabinet : 
Not only its existence but the working of the Cabinet system, as a 
whole, rests on convention. As Gladstone observed -
"the cabinet lives and acts simply by understanding, without a single 
line of written law or constitution to determine its relations to the monarch, 
or to Parliament, or to the nation; or the relations of its members to one 
another, or to their head". 
The entire proceedings of the Cabinet meeting are informal'°, 
except that since 1917 the cabinet has a Secretariat^' to keep minutes of its 
proceedings - which, however are, not meant for the public, there is no order 
of precedence at cabinet meetings, nor any quorum. Except on unusual 
occasions, no vote is taken'^, and any minister who can not reconcile himself 
with the decision taken at the meeting must resign.'^ 
"Resignations may entail the breaking up of the Cabinet and, in 
addition, a party split. Great efforts are therefore, made to secure agreement. 
Compromise is the first and last order of the day".''* 
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The advice tendered by the Cabinet through the Prime Minister must 
formally be unanimous, and the king has no right to enquire into cabinet 
divisions. Sometimes the Prime Minister even ventures to advise the king 
against the adverse opinion of the cabinet, but before doing that, the Prime 
Minister must be very sure of the strength of his personal leadership. 
Particular matters are referred to committees of the Cabinet, for the purpose 
of speedy and efficient disposal. 
Another characteristic of cabinet deliberations is their secrecy. A 
cabinet decision being theoretically an advice to the crown, it can not be made 
public without the consent of the crown. So, even though a resigning Minister 
is permitted to make a statement in parliaments^, referring to the causes of 
his differences with his colleagues, cabinet discussions can be disclosed in 
such statement only with the permission of the crown, through the Prime 
Minister. Each member of the cabinet is prohibited from disclosing any 
information relating to cabinet deliberations not only by the Oath which he 
takes as a member of the Privy Council but also by provisions of the official 
secret Act. 
The rule of secrecy binds the members of a cabinet even after 
retirement or fall of a cabinet. Hence, a former Minister cannot disclose the 
deliberations of a previous cabinet or the attitude of any member of the 
Cabinet, including himself. 
All these principles are generally being follwoed in India. The 
principle of homogeneity is illustrated by the fact that there have been 
resignations of individual Ministers who failed to agree with the policy 
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decisions of cabinet, e.g. among other resignations, Dr. Ambedkar resigned in 
1951 on the ground of slow progress of Hindu Code Bill. 
All the major decisions take place at the meetings of the Cabinet but 
to help the cabinet in coming to decisions, the cabinet, as in England* ,^ has a 
member of standing committees which discuss matters in a more informal 
manner and report their conclusions to the cabinet. The committee system 
within cabinet, which is itself in the nature of a committee, is a time-saving 
device. The whole thing being informal, there is no fixed number of cabinet 
committees; but mention may be made of the Defence committee, planning 
committee. Economic committee. Foreign Affairs Committee, Appointments 
sub-committee. Production and Distribution Committee, Parliamentary 
Affairs committee. The proceedings of a cabinet committee are as secret as 
those of the cabinet itself. To assist the cabinet in its work, there is a cabinet 
Secretariat, headed by a secretary to the Government of India. 
Evolution of Cabinet as a Coalition : 
The text of the term coalition has not been unknown to the Indian 
Political system, rather to say, to the Parliamentary form of Government. As 
the cabinet system does not only embody the principle of representative 
government accountable to people's representatives in Parliament, it also 
incorporates the principle of coalition. As already mentioned, coalition 
means a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. As our constitution 
gives pace way that there is no bar to the appointment of a person from 
outside the legislature as Minister. But he cannot continue as Minister for 
more than 6 months unless he secures a seat in either House of Parliament 
(by election or nomination, as the case may be), in the mean time.''' 
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The evolution of the cabinet and its practices, such as collective 
responsibility, during the 18th Century England, points out Patrick Gordon 
Walker, a minister in the Harold Wilson government, was a sort of an anti-
monarch alliance drawing sanction from the Parliament. It was meant to beat 
the practice of the king meeting and doing business with his ministers one by 
one in his closet. Later the same principle was gradually charmelized from the 
king to Parliament as the locus of power shifted. 
The evolution of the Cabinet system in India reflects building of a 
similar alliance. Even though the Interim Government formed on 2 September 
1946 under Nehru's leadership, following intense negotiations on the 
proposals of the Cabinet Mission plan, was not cabinet in the strict sense of 
the term it was Viceroy's Executive Council - Nehru treated the Council to be 
the Cabinet and was firm on making it function as one. nehru's assertion in his 
letter to Viceroy Lord Wavell on 1 September 1946 that "this Government 
will function as a cabinet and will be jointly responsible for its decisions" was 
an indication of his desire to create and maintain a solid alliance against 
British, obviously Nehru's effort to create a coalition against the British 
before the transfer of power and to give the Interim Government the status of 
a cabinet succeeded. 
True, the Dcvc Gowda Government is the first coalition of political 
parties to occupy office at the centre. But the Cabinet system in India has 
experienced functioning of coalition governments from the outset. In fact, 
going beyond the arguments presented in the foregoing paragraphs the cabinet 
system has evolved as a coalition, the Interim Government and the first cabinet 
at the centre were indeed grand political experiments of coalition govt. 
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Moreover, a study of socio-economic profile of the Indian cabinet over the 
years in the Book'* reveals that cabinet making in India has been an exercise 
in composing social coalitions. 
According to the cabinet Misison plan the Interim Government, 
prior to the transfer of power from the British to the Indian representatives, 
was to be a coalition of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. 
The composition of the First Indian Cabinet after the Muslim league refused 
to join the Government, reflected the need to ensure representation to various 
sections of the Indian society, hence apart from seven members of the Indian 
National Congress in the twelve member "cabinet", there was a member each 
representing Sikhs, Indian Christians, Parses, Depressed classes (i.e. 
Harijans) and Muslims. Not only that, since the Muslim League had refused to 
join the interim Government, two members were referred to a Muslim 
members of Congress. 
However, the first real coalition government in political terms was 
constituted a month after the first Interim Government, when the Muslim 
League decided to participate in the pre-independence governance. The Indian 
National Congress Muslim League fourteen member "cabinet" dropped three 
members (including two Muslim members) from the first one and inducted 
five nominees of the Muslim League. The functioning of this government, 
which lasted for nine months, brought out the travailes of a coalition of unlike 
minded parties. It was also a good lesson in what a coalition should not do. 
But this coalition, made up of a party attempting to pursuade the 
other against partition of the country, and the other bent upon partition, was 
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doomed from the very begining. It lacked political homogeneity, one of the 
essential features of the cabinet government. Not reconciled to the pre-
eminent position of Nehru, the league members refused to attend the informal 
"cabinet meetings" organised by Nehru, arguing that such meetings had no 
locus standi. In fact, Liaqat Ali, the leader of the Muslim league group, 
organised similar meetings for the League members. Consequently, the 
Congress and the League came as two separate (and warring) groups to the 
formal meetings. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in 'India wins Freedom' has 
written in considerable detail about how Liaqat Ali effectively used his 
finance port folio to check every proposal made by the Congress members. 
The first few years after independence witnessed national coalition 
government in operation. Nehru's first post-independence cabinet did not 
consist of Congress members alone the seventeen member cabinet had six 
non-party members. Some of them were accommodated to represent different 
sections of Indian society, while others were invited to represent different 
point of view. As a part of perhaps the post-independence nation building 
strategy, Nehru persuaded even his critics like B.R. Ambedkar and Shyama 
Prasad Mookerjee, to join his cabinet. Others like Dr. John Mathai were in 
the cabinet as experts in their own right and not bound by party decipline to 
tow the Nehru line. Naturally, the cabinet was likely to, and it indeed did, 
function like a coalition since few of his cabinet colleagues were dwarfed by 
his personality, the Prime Minister was primus inter pores. 
It, however, needs to be noted that this coalition was not as a result 
of the ruling party's political compulsions. It was a coalition volunteered by 
the leader of the political party which was firmly in saddle, therefore, it 
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would have lasted only as long as the ruling party and its leader could 
accommodate the views of the coalition members, thus, by late 1950's 
personalities like Matthai, Mookerjee, Ambedkar and CD. Deshmukh resigned 
from the cabinet on policy differences. 
Indeed, the Cabinet system in the present coalition situation is rather 
result of the ruling party's compulsion, a vorocious act on the part of the 
parties coalescing to remain in power in the disguise of the pluralistic nature 
of the society. Though the present NDA govt, led by Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
is an excellent example of coalition government, but the United Front (UF) 
government led by H.D. Deve Gowda has been described as the first true 
coalition govt, at the centre. The previous experiences such as the janata party 
government led by Morarji Desai, the Charan Singh led Samajwadi Janata Party 
government, V.P. Singh's Janata Dal government or the Chandra Shekhar 
government are not regarded as genuine coalition governments because in the 
Janata party the parties, except the Akali Dal, had merged together and others 
were either minority governments supported by a major party from outside, or 
a transitory phenomenon. In the U.F. India has, for the first time in its post-
independence history, thirteen political parties coalescing after the general 
elections to form a government at the centre, that the U.F. despite the 
coalition, is dependant on external support from the Congress, the second 
largest party in the Lok Sabha, adds another significant political dimension to 
the coalition. 
How will the cabinet government function in this coalition situation? 
this will be the most important question from the point of view of India's 
governance now that the Deve Gowda government has conclusively won the 
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vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha and hopes to stay in office for a 
reasonable amount of time. For, despite the common Minimum Programme 
(CMP), there will be pressures from within as well as from without. 
Differences amongst political parties representing diverse interests have 
begun to emerge on an array of issues that have either not found a place in the 
CMP, or keep arising out "outside supporter" Congress, with a history of 
withdrawing such a support twice, brings in an additional factor of uncertainty. 
Immunities of the Cabinet: 
This is another aspect of the concept which is, in essence, to discuss 
for the purpose of bringing home the clear picture of relativity that is 
susceptible to open the door for political ingenuity. It is clause (2) of Art. 
74*' of our constitution which prevents the jurisdiction of the Court to come 
into the way of the relationship of President and cabinet in terms of giving 
advice to him. This clause embodies the principle of confidentiality and 
secrecy of cabinet deliberations and of the advice tendered by the Council of 
Ministers to the President, who has the power to dismiss them. Even though 
after the 1976 amendment of Cl.(l), the President is bound to act according 
to the advice of the Council of Minsiters, the courts are powerless to compel 
the President to take the advice of the Council of Ministers on any matter and 
then to act only in accordance with such advice because courts are barred by 
the constitution to compel production of the advice^®, or the reason behind 
that advice, if any, tendered by the Council of Ministers. In shorts, if any 
President flouts the Council of Ministers, the latter may proceed against him 
politically, by way of impeachment, but can not obtain any legal relief^' from 
the courts. 
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If, however, the Government produces the papers showing what 
advice was in fact tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President, e.g. 
where malafides is alleged, there is no bar to the court looking into such 
papers and to come to its findings on the basis thereof.^ ^ Similar would be the 
position if the Government, for any reasons, discloses to the public the advice 
tendered to the President or reasons therefore.^^ 
But though the court can not compel the Government to produce the 
advice tendered by the Ministers to President or the reasons therefore, there 
is nothing to prevent the court to compel production of the materials upon 
which the advice or its reasoning was based, because the "materials" can not 
be said to be a part of the advice.^^ In other words, the bar of judicial review 
is confined to the factum of advice but not the reasons, i.e. the material on 
which the advice is founded^', e.g. the correspondence between the Ministers 
and the chief justice of India in the matter of transfer of or confirmation of 
certain Additional Judges, on the basis of which the Council of Ministers 
tendered their advice.^^ Upon such disclosure of the materials, it is competent 
for the court to give relief to the litigant in cases of Non-compliance with 
constitutional requirements or of malafides. 
Where, no quorum no meetings and no number of the mcmbcrs^^ of 
cabinet are prescribed, all thing is secretly policiscd and done in the form of 
the function. And the cabinet as a team is confidentially known and no 
proceedings and no advice could be taken before the court of law for scrutiny 
due to the immunity as provided under Art. 74(2), one can come to the stage 
of finding probably in favour of misusing the stronger position of the centre. 
As has already been said that, wherein the coalition situation, the misuse of 
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Art. 356 can be made possible due to the allied partner's sharing the executive 
government's i.e. cabinet, internal pressure of self favoured. It, is, however, 
satisfactory that the judicial travelling has reached somewhat near destination 
in 1994, in which the land-mark judgment came in S.R. Bommai's case^*, 
wherein, it has been propounded that Art. 74(2) is not a bar against the 
scrutiny of the material on the basis of which the President has arrived at his 
satisfaction for issuing the proclamation under Art. 356(1). It merely bars an 
inquiry into the question whether any, and if so, what advice was tendered by 
the Ministers to the President. What Art. 74(2) provides is that an order 
issued in the name of the President could not be questioned on the ground 
that it was either contrary to the advice tendered by the Ministers or was 
issued without obtaining any advice from the Ministers. 
Thus, it is, hereafter, necessary to find the hitch, which is provided 
in our system, which is the potential of Misusing the constitutional spirit, 
which is only discernible by the political perceiver for their party benifits not 
for the nation. So in furtherance of such linkage it is necessary to detect the 
further positions that softens the ways to use the powers for their own benifits 
in the name of the constitutionalism. 
The Political Governor : 
The Constitution of India declares that there shall be a Governor for 
each state^^, but an amendment of the Constitution makes it possible to 
appoint the same person as the Governor for the two or more states.^^ As the 
President is the Chief Executive of the Union of India and the Executive 
power of the Union is vested in him-"; the Governor is the Chief Executive of 
every state and the executive power of the state is vested in him.-'^  
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Art. 155 of the constitution provides that "the Governor of a state 
shall be appointed by the President". However, the original plan in Draft 
Constitution was to have elected Governor the committee known as Provincial 
constitution committee was appointed by the President in pursuance of a 
resolution on April 30, 1947. It was presided over by Sardar Patel. It 
suggested a model provincial constitution with an elected Governor with a 
four years term, who would be removable for his misbehaviour by 
impeachment. The Charges against him could be framed by the lower House 
of the provincial legislature; and could be tried by a special committee of 
upper House of the Federal Parliament. The Governor was to have special 
responsibilities and discretion in relation to matters connected with grave 
menace to peace and tranquility, summoning and dissolving the Provincial 
Legislature, superintendence and control of elections, the appointment of the 
Provincial public service commission and the Provincial Auditor-General. In 
other respects he was to exercise his powers on the advice of the provincial 
council of Ministers in accordance with the conventions of responsible 
government which were set out in a schedule. The ordinance making power 
was provided too. 
The committee held their sitting in June, 1947, and discussed the 
Constitutional Adviser's Memorandum of May 30, 1947, with the object of 
enunciation of the Principles of a model provincial constitution. These 
principles were laid down in the report presented to the Assembly by the 
committee chairman Sardar Patel on 15 July, 1947, speaking on his motion 
for consideration of the report, he said that it dealt with the principles and not 
the details or exact legal forms of the model provincial constitution. He 
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observed that it was agreed jointly by the PCC and UPC that "it would suit the 
conditions of this country better to adopt the parliamentary system of 
Constitution"; and added that on the question of Federal type provincial 
Constitution qua the groups there was difference of opinion. 
The term "Governor" was not very much liked, but was accepted for 
want of better one. Because of the ill repute earned by the Governors of the 
British Indian provinces for their being the principal functionaries who 
performed acts of suppression of the freedom movement. The term had 
become synonymous with foreign repressive rule. Its use in the report of the 
PCC completely upset Maulana Hasrat Mohani who moved an amendment, and 
wanted that he be called "President" of what he called the Provincial Republic. 
Shri Nehru said that there was not much in terminology, if "the ideas and 
principles we have in view" were not lost sight of.^ ^ Patel while moving the 
PCC report did not accept the Maulana's amendment; and it was later negatived 
by the Assembly. 
The PCC suggested that "for each province there shall be a Governor 
to be elected directly by the people on the basis of adult suffrage". It was felt 
that the Governor's election should, as far as possible, synchronise with 
general election of the Provincial Assembly except when the latter was 
dissolved in mid-term. Patel did not think it to be an ideal arrangement; and 
said that the question arose whether the Governor should be elected even 
though he had merely limited powers. The suggestion of the PCC was made to 
lend dignity to the Governor's office. He added that a Governor who would be 
elected by adult franchise of the whole province would exert considerable 
influence on the popular ministry as well on the province as a whole. 
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The proposal for a popularly elected Governor seemed to have been 
made in the context of the cabinet mission proposals which provided for a 
looser union in which the provinces would be vested with larger powers and 
functions. The raison de etre was the desire to accommodate the secessionist 
Muslim League by ensuring that the Governors of the Muslim majority 
provinces would commonly be Muslims. A Governor elected by adult 
franchise would certainly have reflected the communal character of the 
Muslim majority provinces, and this would have been welcomed by the 
Muslim League. Because of this it was not so much evidence that the idea was 
taken from the American practice of election of the state Governors. In fact 
the proposal was justified only on the ground of expediency. 
When the considerations of political expediency was no longer valid, 
the proposed looser federation idea, and along with it the suggestion for the 
institution of popular Governors were abandoned. In the post partition 
constitution they had no validity whatever. It was thought that a candidate for 
Governorship would be a man of substance, age and experience. He would not 
be a public servant, or a person who might have retired during the preceding 
five years. 
The PCC did not, however, recommend to vest a state Govenror with 
powers to act a discretion, except in the case of a grave menace to peace and 
iranquality in the province. It thought that vesting discretionary powers in him 
would bring about a conflict between him and ministry, and would rob the 
system of harmony with the Legislative Assembly which was sine qua now of 
any type of parliamentary responsible government. The PCC limited the 
Governor's discretion to make a report to the President on the conditions 
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prevailing in the province. He was also given powers of summoning, the 
Houses of, and dissolving the Assembly of the provincial legislature.-''* The 
PCC recommended that a Governor should have only a special responsibility 
in the matter of "prevention of any grave menace to the peace and tranquility 
of the province" to report to the President who would be authorised to report 
to the Federal Legislature to enable him to secure the legislation "he 
considers essential" (clause 15) He would not act a discretion. This raised a 
heated controversy. Two amendments were moved to it: 
(i) Pant : He should have no discretion; and the minsitry should act 
effectively. 
(ii) Munshi Gupta : The Governor should, by a proclamation, assume to 
himself "all or any functions of Government" under communication to 
the President. The proclamation would operate for two weeks. 
The recommendation as also the amendments encroached upon the 
powers of the ministry. Pandit Pant opposed them "with force". On the other 
hand, many others thought "it is a dangerous thing not to provide for 
emergency powers". Pant said it was not intended that the Governor would be 
a 'Sahasrabahu' and would not have more than two hands and two eyes. It would 
be impracticable to keep the Governor aloof from the administration 
consequent to responsible cabinet system of government, and at the same 
time to handle a delicate menacing situation. 
Simultaneously it would be dangerous to empower him to overrule 
the cabinet and bypass the legislature. In a delicate situation the ministry and 
not the Governor would have a free hand and converse the Munshi Gupta line 
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for a mere discretionary power to report was of no avail. The Governor should 
be enabled "to act immediately with some chance of success" in the event of a 
sudden flare up or a violent erruption. While he sould act only when 
immediate action must be taken, and there was no time to report to the 
President and receive instrucitons from him. He should be the judge of the 
imminence of danger, should immediately act, and should communicate 
forthwhith the initial action taken up by him. If he acted perversely, he could 
be impeached. The weight of opinion appeared to favour the Munshi Gupta 
amendment which was later adopted. 
More specifically, the following arguments were put forward in 
favour of appointment in the Constituent Assembly-'^ . 
(1) It would save the country from the evil consequences of still another 
election, run on personal issues. To sink every province into the vortex of an 
election with millions of primary voters but with no possible issue other than 
personal, would be highly detrimental to the country's progress. 
(2) If the Governor were to be elected by direct vote, then he might 
consider himself to be superior to the Chief Minister, who was merely 
returned from a single constituency, and this might lead to frequent friction 
between the Governor and the Chief Minister. 
But under the Parliamentary system of Government prescribed by 
the Constitution the Governor was to be constitutional head of the state - the 
real executive power being vested in the Ministry responsible to the 
legislature. 
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"When the whole of the executive power is vested in the council of 
Ministers, if there is another person who believes that he has got the backing 
of the province behind him, and therefore, at his discretion he can come 
forward and intervene in the governance of the province, it would really 
amount to a surrender of democracy".^^ The expenses involved and the 
elaborate machinary of election would be out of proportion to the powers 
vested in this govenror who was to act as mere constitutional head. 
(4) A Governor elected by adult franchise to be at the top of the 
political life in the State would soon prefer to be the Chief Minister or a 
minister with effective powers. The partly in power during the election would 
naturally put up for Governorship a person who was not as outstanding as the 
future Chief Minister with the result that the state would not be able to get the 
best man of the party. All the process of election would have to be gone 
through only to get a second rate man of the party elected as Governor. Being 
subsidiary in importance to the chief Minister, he would be the nominee of 
the Chief Minister of the state, which was not a desirable thing. 
(5) Through the procedure of appointment by the President, the Union 
Government would be able to maintain intact its control over the states. 
(6) The method of election would encourage separatist tendencies. The 
Governor would then be the nominee of the Government of the particular 
province to stand for the Governorship. The stability and unity of 
Governmental Machinery of the country as a whole could be achieved only by 
adopting the system of nomination. 
"He should be a more detached figure acceptable to the province, 
otherwise he could not function,and yet may not be a part of the party machine 
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of the province. On the whole it would probably be desirable to have people 
from outside, eminent is something, education or other fields of life who 
would naturally co-operate fully with the Government in carrying out the 
policy of the Government and yet represent before the public something above 
the politics".^' 
The arguments which were advanced, in the Constituent Assembly, 
agianst nomination are also worthy of consideration : 
(i) A nominated Govenror would not be able to work for the welfare of a 
state because he would be a foreigner to that state and would not be able 
to understand its special needs. 
(ii) There was a chance of friction between the Govenror and the Chief 
Minister of the state no less under the system of nomination, if the 
Premier of the state did not belong to the same party as the nominated 
Govenror^* 
(ill) The argument that the system of election would not be compatible with 
the Parliamentary or cabinet system of Government is not strong enough 
in view of the fact that even at the center there is an elected President to 
be advised by a Council of Ministers. Of course, the election of the 
President is not direct but indirect. 
(iv) An appointed Governor under the instruction of the centre might like to 
run the administration in a certain way contrary to the wishes of the 
cabinet. In this tussle, the cabinet would prevail and the President 
appointed Governor would have to be recalled. The system of election. 
185 
therefore, was for more compatible with good, better aiid efficient 
Government plus the right of self Government. 
(v) The method of appointment of the head of the state executive by the 
federal executive is repugnant to the strict federal system as it obtains 
in U.S.A. and Australia. 
Hence, with these main arguments that if the Governor was to be 
elected directly, then he might consider himself to be superior to the Chief 
Minister and this might lead to frequent friction between the two. Also direct 
election of the Governor could encourage separatist tendencies, as he would 
in that case be the representative of only the people of the state. So the 
stability and unity of the Governmental machinery of the country as a whole 
demanded that the Governor should be nominated by the Centre. M.V. Pylee 
also shares this view and agrees that when the Governor is elected directly by 
the people on the basis of adult franchise, he becomes a direct representative 
of the people and may very well try to exercise his powers not as a 
constitutional head of the state, but as its real head. Such a position is very 
likely to create a rivalry between the Governor and the Council of Ministers 
whose members also are directly elected by the people. Apart from the 
possibility of a clash between the Governor and the Council of Ministers, the 
direct election of the Governor creates a serious problem of leadership at the 
time of general election.^' The other aspect that the Canadian constitution 
which provides for a strong centre seems to have particularly influenced the 
Constituent Assembly in this connection. In Canada, the Governor General 
appoints all the Governors who hold office during his pleasure. This provision 
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as such has not affected the smooth working of the Canadian federation. On 
the contrary, it has on several occasions proved beneficial. 
Presidential Pleasure : 
Art. 155 of the Constitution vests complete power in the President 
for the selection and appoint of the Governor. Simultaneously, the succeeding 
Article prescribes the duration of his office by stating that "the Governor 
shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. This means in effect 
that he is a nominee of the Central Government. But two conventions have 
generally come to govern his nomination.^^ The Central Government 
ordinarily consults the state concerned before announcing the appointment so 
that the person occupying his office is one who is acceptable to the concerned 
state ministry. This is a sound practice though it has not been adhered to in a 
few cases. 
Before the General Election of 1967, no importance was given to 
this convention, because in centre and almost in all the states, the Congress 
was ruling party. But after 1967, it assumed a new significance when coalition 
governments came into being. There arose a controversy between the centre 
and non-Congress governments in various states. In this connection the 
difficulty was that the state governments misunderstood the meaning of 
consultation. But it is simply consultation and not the consent of the Chief 
Minister or the state cabinet, there is no logic in it. In Haryana, when Rao 
Birendra Singh was the Chief Minister, he had consultations with the central 
Government on the issue of the Governor's appointment. The centre refused 
to accept that the panel of names should be discussed with him or that he be 
taken into confidence, the centre suggested only one name and not a panel of 
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names.^' In Punjab, Gumam Singh had disproved of two persons who were 
proposed as Governors by the Central Government. He suggested instead a 
few other names but none of these was appointed/^ What they acheived was 
only the appointment of non-Congressman as Governors of their respective 
states/^ 
There are cases where the Chief Minister was not consulted at all. 
For instance in appointment of Sri Prakash (Madras) and Kumaraswami Raja 
(Orissa), the respective Chief Minister had gone on record that they were not 
consulted. In Uttar Pradesh,the appointment of B. Gopal Reddy was announced 
before the formation of the New Government headed by Charan Singh. In Lok 
Sabha, S.M. Banerjee wanted to know whether Charan Singh would be 
consulted and this appointment would be reconsidered.^ Y.B. Chavan, the then 
Home Minister, said that there would be no consultation.'*^ 
Another convention is that the incumbent of this office comes from 
outside the State concerned. This again, is a wholesome arrangement, because 
such an incumbent does not have his local political roots and affiliations and 
would, thus, be free from State level party politics. But this convention has 
also been violated in some of the cases. For instance, H.C. Mukherjee J.C. 
Wodiyar Bahadur, Karan Singh and Ujjal Singh were appointed Governors of 
West Bengal (1951), Mysore (1956), Jammu & Kashmir (1965) and Punjab 
(1966) respectively the case of H.C. Mukherjee is very interesting. It is 
reported that when Nehru wanted to appoint a non-Bengali, the then Chief 
Minister of West Bengal B.C. Roy strongly objected saying that West Bengal 
would not tolerate a non-Bengali Governor and B.C. Roy was not a man to be 
trifled with. 
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Criteria Recommended by tfaie Sarkaria Commisison : 
The Governors came into great prominence after 1967 and have 
adopted different standards and practice in various states to suit the interest 
of the ruling party at the centre, because right type of persons were not 
chosen for this high office. The Commission on centre-state Relations 
(Sarkaria Commission) very rightly observes in its report. 
In all the evidence before us, a common thread is that much of the 
criticism against the Governors could have been avoided if their selection had 
been on correct principles to ensure appointment of right type of persons as 
Govemors.^ ^ 
Most of the replies to the Sarkaria commission's questionnaire 
received from a cross section of the public are criticle of the quality and 
standard of some of the persons appointed as Governors. To summarise their 
comments. 
1. Discarded and disgruntled politicians from the party in power in the 
Union, who can not be accommodated elsewhere, get appointed. Such 
persons, while in office, tend to function as agents of the Union 
Government rather than as impartial constitutional functionaries. 
2. The number of Governors who have displayed the qualities of ability, 
integrity, impartiality and statemanship has been on the decline. 
Sarkaria commission's survey of the appointments of Governors 
made since independence till October 1984, shows that over 60 per cent of 
Governors had taken active part in politics, many of them immediately prior 
to their appointment. Persons who were eminent in some walk of life 
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constituted less than 50 percent. This percentage shows a steep fall when the 
figures for the period from 1980 onwards are compared with those for Nehru 
period (August 1947 to May 1964)*'', notwithstanding the fact that the 
Government of India accepted the recommendation of the Administrative 
Reforms Commission in this regard/* 
The commission on centre-state Relations has observed that there 
was a wide spread feeling that in some cases Government were appointed on 
considerations extraneous to merit. The dignity of the office suffered when 
persons defeated in elections were appointed. A state Government has cited 
recent instances of persons who had to resign from offices as Ministers 
following judicial strictures, being subsequently appointed as Governors. 
Therefore, the commission recommends that a person to be appointed as a 
Governor should satisfy the following criteria*^ : 
(i) He should be eminent in some walk of life. 
(ii) He should be a person from outside the state. 
(iii) He should be a detached figure and not too intimately connected with 
the local politics of the state; and 
(iv) He should be a person who has not taken too great a part in politics 
generally and particularly in the recent past. 
In selecting a Governor in accordance with the above criteria, 
persons belonging to the minority groups should continue to be given a chance 
as hitherto. 
The Sarkaria commission received various suggestions in regard to 
the mode of selection of person for appointment as Govenrors. These may be 
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broadly grouped under two categories. Firstly there are those which are aimed 
at making involvement of the state-Government in the selection of the 
Governor more meaningful. Secondly there are those which seek to lay down 
consultation with, or concurrence of a constitutional authority or body in the 
selection of a Governor. 
Role of State Govenrment in Selection of Governor : 
The Sarkaria Commission considered the following suggestions 
made in matter of involving the state Government in the appointment of the 
Governor.^ " 
(i) Appointment from a panel to be prepared by the state legislature; or 
(ii) Appointment from a panel to be prepared by the state Government (in 
effect the State Chief Minister) or invariably with the concurrence of 
the State Chief Minister, or 
(iii) Appointment invariably in consultation with the state Chief Minister. 
Preparing a panel of names in accordance with the suggestion at (i) 
above will, in fact, mean a process of direct or indirect election by the state 
legislature. A Governor so 'selected' may well seek to override the powers of 
his Chief Minister, leading a friction between them and distortion of the 
system of responsible government. Such a Governor can hardly be expected 
to function as a constitutional head of the state. This was the reason why the 
constitutional farmers gave up the proposal to have an elected Governor. 
As far the other suggestions, namely, that the Governors should be 
appointed either from a panel to be prepared by the State Government (in 
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effect, the state Chief Minister) or with the concurrence of the State Chief 
Minister, neither of them is a workable proposition. If the prime Minister, and 
the Chief Minister belong to different political parties, the process of 
selection will frequently end in deadlock, instead of concurrence. Secondly, 
if in the process a Chief Minister's concurrence for appointment of an 
'insider' backed by his party in the legislative Assembly were to be obtained 
the selection will be vulnerable on the same ground on which the framers of 
the Constitution rejected the proposal to have a Governor directly or 
indirectly elected by the state. Besides this, there is a real danger that 
regional chauvinism might dictate the preference for a person of parochial 
views as Governor. 
The Sarkaria Commission clearly says "we can not, therefore, 
subscribe to the suggestion that the Governor of a state should be appointed 
either from a panel to be prepared by the State Government or with the 
concurrence of the Chief Minister".^' 
The commission has also examined the suggestion that the Governor 
should always be appointed after consultation with the Chief Minister of a 
state. There has never been any difference of opinion political or public 
circles as to the desirability of such consultation. The framers of the 
Constitution were of the view that the person to be nominated as Governor 
should be acceptable to the state Government and the Chief Minister should 
be consulted. To quote Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru, the Governor "must be 
acceptable to the Government of province". "The Administrative Reforms 
Commission recommended^^ that the convention of consulting the Chief 
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Minister should continue. The Government of India accepted this 
recommendation of ARC in early seventies. 
It is necessary to be quite clear as to the precise reasons why such 
consultation is essential. For proper working of the parliamentary system, 
there has to be a personal rapport between the Governor and the Chief 
Minister. The importance of such rapport will be easily comprehended when it 
is remembered that the Governor, as the constitutional head, has to act as 
'friend, philosopher and guide' of his council of Ministers, It is from this 
aspect of personal relationship that consultation with Chief Minister at the 
initiation itself, may help prevent the choice of a person with whom the Cheif 
Minister for personal reasons may not be able to work satisfactorily. 
Thus, the main purpose of consulting the Chief Minister is to 
ascertain his objections, if any, to the proposed appointment. If the Union 
Government considers that the objection of the Chief Minister are not 
groundless, it may suggest an alternative name. However, if it finds that the 
objections are frivolous or manifestly untenable, it may inform the chief 
Minister accordingly and proceed to make the appointment. 
The Sarkaria Commission found that consultation with the Chief 
Minister has not invariably been taking place in recent years. Some Chief 
Ministers have informed the commission that the Union Government did not 
ascertain their views before appointing Governors in their respective states. 
The general practice, as far as the commission has been able to ascertain, 
seems to be the Union Government merely informs the Chief Minister that a 
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certain person is being appointed as Governor of the state. Sometimes, even 
such prior information is not given 
The commission observes, "It is well established that 'consultation' 
in context means ascertainment of the views of the person consulted as to the 
suitability of the person proposed for the appointment. A mere intimation that 
a certain person is being appointed as a Governor is not 'consultation', as it 
reduces it to an empty formality".^^ In order to ensure effective consultation 
with the state Chief Minister in the selection of a person to be appointed as 
Governor, the commission has recommended that the procedure should be 
prescribed in the constitution, itself. Article 155 should be suitably amended 
to give effect to this recommendation. 
A suggestion was advanced that a National Presidential Council 
should be setup to advise the president on matters of National interest and 
inter alia for selection for persons to be appointed as Governors. The 
commission did not agree with this proposal for certain reasons and 
recommended that the Vice-President of India and the speaker of the Lok 
Sabha should be consulted by the Prime Minister in selecting a Governor. 
Such consultation will greatly enhance the credibility of selection process. 
The foregoing analysis thus leads to the conclusion that the first and 
foremost provision to be made is to ensure the appointment of fair minded 
man of high calibre and integrity as Governors. If this is done they will surely 
act efficiently and impartially in the discharge of the limited discretionary 
functions to be discharged by the Governor. Thus the mode of Governor's 
selection, which by and large represents the historical legacies of the colonial 
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days, needs fresh thinking and serious effort at reform to face up to the 
challenges of change with rhisting political developments in our times. 
Emergency Powers of Governors : 
As what the constitutional spirit provides the form to the person as 
Governor doesnot seem to be appearing in practice, it is rather political one. 
So the discretionary powers conferred upon such person is generally 
discharged politically. In the constitution, there is some area which provides 
the potential to be misused if the person as Governor is like-minded i.e. not 
of high profile. Here it is relevant to discuss some of his powers which are 
essential in furtherance of the findings. 
The Governor has no emergency powers^^ to meet the situation 
arising from external agression or armed rebellion as the President has^^, but 
he has the power to make a report to the President whenever he is satisfied 
that a situation has arisen in which Government of the State carmot be carried 
on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, thereby inviting the 
President to assume to himself the functions of the Government of the State 
or any of them.'* The situation 'Emergency, when compared with clause (1) of 
Art. 352, it is evident that Art. 356(1) does not speak of any 'emergency' of 
any kind; in fact the word 'emergency* is not used anywhere in Art. 356.^' It is 
a proclamation intended either to safeguard against the failure of the 
Constitutional machinery in a state or to repair the effects of a breakdown. It 
may be either a preventive or a curative action.^* 
Though it is somewhat reitration, that the situation arisen under Art. 
356 is politically interpreted and used as an emergency whereas constitution 
195 
does not provide that the powers are used under the Article under emergent 
form. The eminent jurist Shri Seervai states that when the Constitution intends 
to make a single transaction amount to a failure of Constitutional machinery 
it expressly does so.^^The effects of failure to comply with, or to give effect 
to, directions given by union under Art. 365 is obviously different from the 
"failure of Constitutional machinery in the states". 
While the marginal note to Art. 356 uses the words 'failure of 
constitutional Machinery in states", clause (1) of the Article uses the words 
'can not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution', 
The latter are intended words of the widest import and if applied literally, they 
might mean the failure on the part of the State Government to comply with 
each and every provisions of the Constitution, and whatever might be the 
degree or extent of such failure, and it is place wherein the political game is 
played whereas the eminent authors on Constitution and the apex court, time 
and again have made it very much clear. It is submitted that Machinery of 
government does not ordinarily fail if this and that provision of the 
Constitution is violated in the course of the State's multifarious activities. 
The Directives of State policy, which are "provisions of the "Constitution" 
furnish the clearest instance of this. In Rajasthan's case, it was stated that, in 
federal constitution the wide general words of Art. 356 can not be construed 
so as to rob the states of their autonomy within the sphere assigned to them 
and thus destroy the federal distribution of powers between the Union and 
States. Thus in Attomy General for Ontario Vs. Att. Gen. for the Dominion^ ,^ 
the Privy Council limited the general words of section 91 of Canadian 
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Constitution "peace order and good government" to such matters as were 
unquestionable for Canadian interest. 
It is clear from the judgements of the privy council and our supreme 
court cited above, that the literal meaning of an Article ought not to be given 
to it, if it practically destroy the autonomy of the States. In this connection, it 
may be noted that if the framers of our Constitution had intended that the 
Union should be able to supervise and interfere in the administration of states 
to secure good government, the framers would have adopted in unitary 
constitution for India with a large devolution of power in favour of the States. 
The very fact that the framers enacted a federal constitution with a 
Parliamentary form of government for the Union and the States shows that 
internal sovereignity was to be divided between the union and the states. A 
literal construction of the wide general words of Art. 356 which could enable 
the Union Executive to cut at the root of the democratic Parliamentary form 
of government in the state must be rejected in favour of a construction which 
would preserve that form of government. The exercise of that power must be 
limited to a "failure of the constitutional machinery", that is, to preserving the 
Parliamentary form of government from internal subversion, or from a 
deliberate deadlock created by a party or a group of parties, or from a 
deadlock arising from an indecisive electoral verdict which makes the 
carrying on of government practically impossible. As SC in Rajasthan's case 
said that, no doubt it is not possible to define precisely. The situations in 
which the power confered by Art. 356 can be exercised; but it is possible, 
negatively to state the situations in which the power can not be exercised. 
Now that the provision in Art. 356 has been resorted to by the Union 
197 
Government on 108 occasions till the time the paper has been written as 
shown in the following table-A, and there is a consensus amongst impartial 
observers and academicians that this extra-ordinary power has occasionally 
been abused to achieve political ends, the only way in which it has been 
ractified is to revert to the original narrow sense in which it had been 
explained by the makers of the Constitution.* '^ 
TABLE-A 
PRESroENT'S RULE IN STATES AND UNION TERRITORIES 
SI. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
State/U.T. 
Andhra Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Goa 
Gujarat 
No. of times 
President's 
rule imposed 
2 
4 
6 
2 
5 
Duration of President's rule 
From 
15.11.1954 
18.1.1973 
12.12.1979 
30.6.1981 
19.3.1982 
27.11.1990 
29.6.1968 
4.7.1969 
9.1.1972 
30.4.1977 
17.2.1980 
28.3.1995 
12.2.1999 
30.7.1998 
10.2.1999 
13.5.1971 
9.2.1974 
12.3.1976 
17.2.1980 
19.9.1996 
To 
28.3.1955 
10.12.1973 
6.12.1980 
13.1.1982 
27.2.1983 
30.6.1991 
26.2.1969 
16.2.1970 
19.3.1972 
24.6.1977 
8.6.1980 
4.4.1995 
8.3.1999 
9.6.1999 
17.3.1972 
18.6.1975 
24.12.1976 
7.6.1980 
23.10.1996 
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6. Haryana 21.11.1967 
30.4.1977 
6.4.1991 
21.5.1968 
21.6.1977 
23.6.1991 
7. Himachal Pradesh 30.4.1977 
15.12.1992 
22.6.1977 
3.12.1993 
8. Jammu and Kashmir 7.9.1986 
19.7.1990 
6.11.1986 
9.10.1996 
9. Kamataka 27.3.1971 
31.12.1977 
21.4.1989 
10.10.1990 
20.3.1972 
27.2.1978 
20.11.1989 
17.10.1990 
10. Kerala 23.3.1956 
1.11.1956 
31.7.1959 
10.9.1964 
24.3.1965 
4.8.1970 
5.12.1979 
21.10.1981 
17.3.1982 
1.11.1956 
5.4.1957 
22.2.1960 
24.3.1965 
6.3.1967 
3.10.1970 
25.1.1980 
28.12.1981 
24.5.1982 
11. Madhya Pradesh 30.4.1977 
17.2.1980 
15.12.1992 
23.6.1977 
9.6.1980 
7.12.1993 
12. Maharashtra 17.2.1980 9.6.1980 
13. Manipur 21.1.1972 
28.3.1973 
16.5.1977 
14.11.1979 
28.2.1981 
7.1.1992 
1.1.1994 
20.3.1972 
4.3.1974 
29.6.1977 
13.1.1980 
19.6.1981 
8.4.1992 
13.12.1994 
14. Mizoram 7.9.1988 24.1.1989 
15. Nagaland 22.3.1975 
7.8.1988 
2.4.1992 
25.11.1977 
25.1.1989 
22.2.1993 
16.0rissa 25.2.1961 
11.1.1971 
3.3.1973 
23.6.1961 
3.4.1971 
6.3.1974 
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16.12.1976 
30.4.1977 
17.2.1980 
29.12.1976 
6.6.1977 
9.6.1980 
17. Patiala and East Punjab 
States Union (PEPSU) 
4.3.1953 7.3.1954 
18. Punjab 20.6.1951 
5.7.1966 
23.8.1968 
15.6.1971 
30.4.1977 
17.2.1980 
6.10.1983 
11.5.1987 
17.4.1952 
1.11.1966 
17.2.1969 
17.3.1972 
20.6.1977 
7.6.1980 
29.9.1985 
25.2.1992 
19. Rajasthan 13.3.1967 
30.4.1977 
17.2.1980 
15.12.1992 
26.4.1967 
22.6.1977 
6.6.1980 
4.12.1993 
20. Sikkim 18.8.1979 
25.5.1984 
17.10.1979 
8.3.1985 
21. Tamil Nadu 
23. Uttar Pradesh 11 
31.1.1976 
17.2.1980 
30.1.1988 
30.1.1991 
30.6.1977 
9.6.1980 
27.1.1989 
24.6.1992 
22. Tripura 3 21.1.1972 
5.11.1977 
12.3.1993 
20.3.1972 
4.1.1978 
9.4.1993 
25.2.1968 
1.10.1970 
13.6.1973 
30.11.1975 
30.4.1977 
17.2.1980 
6.12.1992 
18.10.1995 
18.10.1996 
26.2.1969 
18.10.1970 
8.11.1973 
21.1.1976 
23.6.1977 
9.6.1980 
4.12.1993 
17.10.1996 
21.3.1997 
10.2.1998 Recommendations 
of Governor quashed by 
High Court 
9.3.2002 
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24. West Bengal 4 20.2.1968 25.2.1969 
19.3.1970 2.4.1971 
29.6.1971 20.3.1972 
30.4.1977 21.6.1977 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Goa 
Meghalaya 
Mizoram 
1 
3 
1 
2 
3.11.1979 
3.12.1966 
28.4.1979 
14.12.1990 
10.10.1991 
11.5.1977 
11.11.1978 
18.1.1980 
5.4.1967 
16.1.1980 
25.1.1991 
5.2.1992 
2.6.1978 
8.5.1979 
29. Pondicherry 6 18.9.1968 17.3.1969 
3.1.1974 6.3.1974 
28.3.1974 2.7.1977 
12.11.1978 16.1.1980 
24.6.1983 16.3.1985 
12.1.1991 4.7.1991 
Total 111 
In most of the cases, it has been imposed in the circumstances in 
which a stable ministry could not be formed, e.g. in 1951 in Punjab in 1953 in 
Pepsu, in 1954 in Andhra Pradesh, in 1956 in Travancore-Cochin, in 1961 in 
Orissa, in 1964 in Kerala, in 1967 in Rajasthan, in 1968 in Uttar Pradesh, 
West Bengal, Bihar and Punjab, in 1966 in Bihar, in West Bengal for the 
Second time, in 1970 on the resignation of Sri Ajay Mukherjee, Chief 
Minister of the United Front Ministry, in U.P. second time in 1970 when the 
Chief Minister Mr. Charan Singh refused to resign when he had lost the 
majority, he had advised the Governor to dismiss 14 Ministers of his Cabinet 
in the BKD Congress Coalition Ministry. In Orissa Second time in 1971, 
when the Chief Minister resigned and his advice for dissolution of Assembly 
was not accepted by the Governor, in Mysore in 1971 in Gujarat in 1971, in 
Punjab fourth time in 1971, in Tripura in 1971, in Bihar in 1971, in Andhra 
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Pradesh in 1973, in Orissa for the third time on March 3, 1973 when the 
Chief Minister Nandini Satpathi had to resign due to defection, in 1973 it was 
imposed in Manipur owing to defection. In 1973 President rule was imposed 
in U.P. when the Chief Minister Mr. Kamla Pati Tripathi had to resign due to 
the moral responsibility to the Ministry of the Police revolt. In 1974, the 
President rule was imposed in Gujarat due to student's agitation demanding 
dissolution of Assembly. In 1975 it was imposed in Uttar Pradesh to solve 
party disputes. In 1976 it was imposed in Tamil Nadu on the ground that 
according to the Governor's report, the Tamil Nadu Government had 
disregarded the direction of the Central Government in relation to the 
emergency and misused the emergency powers. The report also said that 
D.M.K. Ministry had by a series of acts of mal-administration, corruption and 
misuse of power for achieving partisan ends set at naught all canons of justice 
and equity which are halmark of democratic administration. The action of the 
Centre could not be called as democratic because the ministry enjoyed the 
full confidence of the Legislature as well as the confidence of the people. In 
1981, President rule was imposed in Manipur following the resignation of the 
Congress-I Ministry as a result of defection. On October 22, 1981, the 
President rule was imposed in kerala following resignation of the left front 
ministry headed by Mr. Nayanar because it was reduced to minority due to the 
withdrawal of the support by one of its constituents. On March 20, 1982 the 
President rule was imposed in Assam following the resignation of the 65 days 
old ministry of Congress-I led by Mr. K.C. Gogai as a result of defection. On 
March 18, 1982 this Article was invoked in kerala when the Congrcss-I led 
O.D.F, Ministry to Mr. Karuna Karan was reduced to minority due to 
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defection. In June, 1983, the President rule was imposed in the Union 
Territory of Pondicherry following resignation of Congress-I Ministers in 
D.M.K. led Coalition Government. 
In 1959 the President rule was imposed in Kerala in a peculiar 
circumstances. The Communist Ministry was dismissed on the ground that it 
had lost the confidence of the people, although it enjoyed the confidence of 
the Legislature. There was a widespread agitation against the Government and 
the law and order situation was beyond the control of the State Government 
justifying the imposition of the President rule. The action of the Central 
Government had been subject to criticism. 
In 1967 in Haryana, and in 1975 in Nagaland the President rule was 
imposed due to defections. In 1966 President rule was imposed in Punjab as a 
result of the bifurcation of the State into Punjab and Haryana and in Goa for 
holding an opinion poll. 
In 1976, President rule was imposed in two States - Gujarat and 
Orissa. In Gujarat it was imposed because of the failure of the coalition 
ministry due to defections. In 1976, in Orissa like Uttar Pradesh, this Article 
was invoked, to solve party disputes. The Chief Minister Mrs. Satpathy was 
asked to resign by the Congress High Command because she had defied 
certain directions of the High Command. The State Assembly was, 
however,kcpt under suspended animation. This was the fourth time the State of 
Orissa came under resident's rule, the last three occasions being the years, 
1961, 1971 and 1973. 
In 1977, Article 356 was invoked in very peculiar circumstances. 
The Assemblies of 9 States of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
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Punjab, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal and Haryana were 
dissolved and President rule was imposed on the ground that the Assemblies 
in these states no longer represented the wishes of the electorate. 
In 1980, Article 356 was invoked by the Congress (I) Government 
more or less in similar circumstances in which it was invoked in 1977 by the 
Janata Government at the Centre. The Assemblies of 9 States of Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Orissa, Gujarat, 
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu were dismissed and the President rule was 
imposed on them on the ground that they no longer represented the wishes 
and aspirations of the electorate. 
The President rule was imposed in Assam on December 12, 1979 on 
the ground that no Government was possible due to defection. The Janata 
Ministry led by Mr. G. Borbora which assumed office after elections in 1978 
resigned in September following defection from the party. It was succeeded 
by a newly formed regional party - Assam Janata Dal consisting mostly of 
dissidents Janata members. The Assam Janata Dal headed by Mr. Hazarika 
came to power with the support of the Congress, C.P.I, and Progressive 
Democratic Front. The Hazarika Ministry was reduced to minority when 
Congress and C.P.I, withdrew their support. Thereupon, on the report of the 
Governor, the Ministry was dismissed and the President rule was imposed in 
the State. 
In Oct. 1983 the President rule was proclaimed in Punjab in order to 
deal with the Akali Movement which had become violent and the Congress 
Government had failed to eliminate the extremists. The State Assembly was. 
204 
however, kept in suspended animation. The State Government was found to be 
very mild in dealing with extremists elements. 
In 1984, President rule was imposed in the State of Sikkim for the 
first time since it merged with India in 1974. Art. 356 was invoked in a very 
peculiar situation prevailing in this sensitive State. Mr. Bhandari was made 
Chief Minister when his party (Janata Party) returned to power with thumping 
majority. 
In September, 1986 the President rule was imposed for the first 
time in Jammu and Kashmir following the failure of the State Government to 
deal with law and order situation in the State. 
In 1988 President rule was imposed in the State of Tamil Nadu and 
Nagaland. The President rule was imposed in Tamil Nadu on 30 June, 1988 of 
the report of the Governor that no single party was in a position to form a 
stable Government. After the death of Mr. Ram Chandran the AIADMK party 
split into two factions, Janki group and Jayalalitha group. In a 233 member 
Assembly, Mrs. Janki Ramchandran could secure the support of only 99 
members in the House and that too after the police evicted the Congress 
members and the Speaker disqualified under the Defection Law all the 
AIADMK members belonging to the Jayalalitha faction. In Nagaland 13 MLAs 
left the ruling party of Congress-I and joined the opposition reducing the 
Hokishe Sema Minsitry into a minority. The 13 MLA's formed a separate 
party and joined hands with opposition and claimed that the combination be 
called to form the ministry. Whether formation of a separate group by 13 
MLAs as against 21 MLA's still with the Chief Minister amounted to split as 
205 
described in the anti-defection law was not clear. In view of the past history 
of such combinations breaking up soon after coming to power, the opposition 
claim to form the Government, the Governor was not convinced that a stable 
government could be possible. A full week was allowed to lapse to enable 
either party to establish a clear claim of having support of majority. 
In 1989 President rule was imposed in the State of Kamataka when 
eight months old Bommai Ministry was reduced to minority due to defection. 
In a 222 member Assembly Janata Dal had a strength of 111 members. Out of 
those 111 members, 19 MLA's had in writing informed the Governor that they 
had withdrawn their support to the Chief Minister. The Governor was of the 
view that no party was in position to form a stable ministry and hence he 
recommended to the President for imposing President Rule in the State. 
During the year 1990-91 President rule was imposed in Seven States 
viz., Jammu and Kashmir, Kamataka, Goa, Pondicherry, Assam and Tamil Nadu. 
In Jammu and Kashmir President rule was imposed in July, 1990 after the 
expiry of the Governor's rule. Under the State Constitution the Governor's 
rule was imposed in the State on Jan. 1990 when the Chief Minister Mr. 
Farooq Abdullah resigned, following the appointment of Mr. Jagmohan as 
Governor. Under the J & K Constitution Governor's rule cannot be extended 
beyond six months. In fact, the State Government was unable to tackle the 
terrorists activities and the new Governor was appointed with a view to tone 
up the administration. The Chief Minister found it an alibi and resigned. In 
Goa, the President rule was imposed on Dec. 14, 1990 when the Chief 
Minister was reduced to minority due to defection in the ruling party. 
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President rule was imposed in the State of Karaataka in a peculiar 
circumstances. Kamataka was placed under the President's rule on Oct. 11, 
1990 following a political crisis triggered by Chief Minister V. Patil's refusal 
to step down in defiance to the wishes of the Congress High Command. The 
Congress had a strength of 179 in a House of 225. The Congress Legislature 
party met and elected a new leader. But the Governor said that he would 
ignore the decision of the C.L.P. as it would be illegal and against the party 
constitution. He told that under the party constitution only the leader could 
convene the meeting after giving 7 days notice. As the outgoing Chief 
Minister did not attend the C.L.P. meeting and claimed that he had the support 
of majority legislators and recommended the dissolution of the State 
Assembly. In these circumstances the Governor recommended for the 
imposition of President's rule in the State. TTiis was a clear misuse of power 
for political purpose by the Governor. The Congress had the clear majority in 
the legislature and there was no political instability in the formation of the 
ministry. The Governor had no business to interfere in the party affairs of the 
Congress Party. The majority may change its leader at any time. The Governor, 
Mr. Bhanu Pratap Singh had acted in the similar way in which the previous 
Governor, Mr. Ram Lai had acted by dismissing the Rama Rao Ministry in the 
State. The members of N.F. Government at that time had condemned the 
action of the Governor. But after coming to power they behaved in the similar 
manner. Ultimately after eight days the President rule was revoked. 
In Assam President rule was im.posed on Nov. 29, 1990 on the 
ground that free and fair election was not possible due to the deteriorating 
law and order situation arising out of L.F.A. activities. The tenure of the 
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Assembly was about to expire on Jan. 8, 1990. Despite stomg advice by the 
Central Government the Assam Government had refused to declare 8 districts 
in Upper Assam as disturbed areas to enable the Security forces to deal 
effectively with the U.L.F.A. activities. The terrorists have links with some 
members of the Government. 
On Jan. 13, 1991, President rule was imposed in Pondicherry where 
the Chief Minister resigned as his coalition Government was reduced to 
minority following a split in the Janata Dal with 3 of its four MLA's switching 
over to the Janata Dal (S). 
On Jan. 13, 1991, President Rule was imposed in Tamil Nadu 
following breakdown of law and order in the State due to activities of Lankan 
Tamil Militants. 
On April 7, 1991, President rule was imposed in Haryana when three 
M.L.A.'s of Janata Dal (ruling party) were disqualified from the membership 
of Legislature as a result of which the Om Prakash Chautala ministry was 
reduced to minority. 
On Oct. 12, 1991, President rule was imposed in Meghalaya. 
On Jan. 7. 1992, President rule was imposed in Manipur since the 
ruling United Legislature Front (ULF) ministry had lost its majority with the 
resignation of 7 Janata Dal legislatures including two ministers. 
On April 4, 1992, President rule was imposed in Nagaland even after 
the Governor had accepted the advice of the Chief Minister and ordered the 
dissolution of the Assembly. In his report he had said that the ruling party in 
the State had failed and the law and order had been neglected. The Centre 
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considered the report of the Government and decided to impose President 
rule in the State. 
On Dec. 1992, President rule was imposed in the State of Uttar 
Pradesh when the government failed to protect the demolition of the disputed 
Babari Masjid of Ayodhya and the Chief Minister owing the moral 
responsibility had submitted the resignation of his government to the 
Governor. 
On March 12, 1993, President rule was imposed in Tripura when the 
term of the Tripura Assembly had expired and elections could not be held 
because it was postponed by the Election Commission on the gorund that the 
State Government had failed to ensure proper atmosphere for holding free and 
fair elections. The Chief Minister had resigned on Feb. 27, a day before the 
expired of the term of the Tripura Assembly but he was allowed to continue by 
the Governor as a Caretaker Government. 
On Dec. 15, 1992, President rule was imposed in three BJP ruled 
States of Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan and Assemblies 
were dissolved on the ground that these States were not implementing 
sincerely the ban imposed by the Centre on religious organisation. The main 
grounds on which the BJP Governments were dismissed were that the Chief 
Ministers of these States have connections with the RSS, a banned 
organisation, and secondly, that these governments had encouraged the Kar 
Sevaks to go Ayodhya. Thus the basis was mere suspicion that they would 
refuse to enforce the ban. There were no proof that they were not following 
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the directions of the Centre. The three Governors had submitted more or less 
identical report in 24 hours. 
After the decision of the Supreme Court in Bommai's case President 
Rule was imposed in the State of Uttar Pradesh on Oct. 19, 1995 when the 
BJP withdrew its support to the minority Government of Bahujan Samaj Party 
headed by the Chief Minister Miss Mayawati. In a House of 425 the BSP had 
only 59 MLAs, BJP 170, Samajwadi Party 127, Raj Bahadur group of BSP 10. 
owever, the Governor did not dissolve the Assembly and kept it in suspended 
animation presumably to explore all possibilities for the formation of the 
Government in the coming days. 
On September 19, 1996, President rule was imposed in the State of 
Gujarat following unruly scenes and violence in the Legislative Assembly 
amidst of which the Chief Minister Suresh Mehta had proved his majority by 
92 votes to nil in the 182 member House. The government was dismissed but 
the Assembly was kept under suspended animation. In this report the Governor 
had expressed doubts about the Chief Minister's claim of majority support in 
Assembly. In Assembly elections in March 1995 BJP had secured a two-third 
majority in the House and formed the government under the leadership of Mr. 
Keshubhai Patel. But soon thereafter internal dissentions started in the party 
and a senior party leader Shankar Singh Vaghela revolted against the 
leadership, under the compromise formula, the Chief Minister Keshubhai 
Patel had to resign and Mr. Suresh Mehta was made the Chief Minister. Inspite 
of this, Mr. Vaghela continued his anti-party activities. Ultimately, he was 
expelled from the party, he formed a separate party in the name of Gujarat 
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Janata Party and claimed the support of 42 MLA's. On Sept. 3 when the House 
met for considering the vote confidence motion, the Deputy Speaker 
recognised the breakway 42 MLA's group as a separate group and adjourned 
the House indefinitely. The Governor summoned the House on Sept. 13 and 
14 on the request of the Chief Minister for the purpose of proving his 
majority. When the House met agian, on the Speaker's order, the Deputy 
Speaker repeated his performance. The Deputy Speaker's action in not 
allowing the confidence motion to be considered, granting recognition to the 
group of 42 ignoring the fact that 18 had subsequently returned to the party, 
was patently illegal. The Constitution gives the power to recognise a separate 
group to the Speaker only. The Governor had summoned the House on 13 and 
14 for the purpose of proving the majority of the Suresh mehta government. 
When the House met the Chief Minister propsoed the name of a MLA of his 
party for Speaker. This was objected to by opposition and soon after the 
trouble started and there was unprecedented disturbance inside the House. 
Amidst this the Chief Minister secured a confidence vote by 92 votes to nil. 
President's rule was imposed in the State of Uttar Pradesh on Oct. 
17, 1996 on the ground that no party or group was in a position to form a 
stable government. In a House of 425 members the single largest party BJP 
and its allies had a strength of 176, Samajwadi Party 134, and BSP and its 
combine (the Congress) 100. The Centre acted on the report of the Governor 
that there was no possibility of a Stable Government. 
On Feb. 21, 1998 the Governor Mr. Romesh Bhandari dismissed the 
Kalyan Singh's Government and invited Loktantrik Congress Leader Jagdamika 
Pal to form the new Government. The Loktantrik Congress and the Janata Dal 
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(Rajaram Group) informed the Governor that with the withdrawal of support 
by them Kalyan Singh Ministry was reduced to minority and, therefore, it 
should be dismissed. The two parties claimed the support of the Congress, 
Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party, Ndr. Jagdamika Pal who was elected 
leader of this group claimed the support of 240 MLAs in the 425 member's 
House. The sudden development took place at a time when the second phase 
of parliamentary election were to be held just after two days and done clearly 
with the object of marring the prospects of BJP in the second phased of 
parliamentary election. The Governor, in order to please his political masters, 
acted with connivance of the Centre, the BSP and Samajwadi Party leaders. 
The President Mr. R.K. Narayanan asked him not to act in haste but he did not 
pay heed to the President's advice and administered the oath of office to Mr. 
Pal. Soon after the withdrawal of support Mr. Kalyan Singh met him and told 
him that he still enjoyed majority and was ready to prove it on the floor of the 
House. Some of the members of the Lok Tantrik Congress met the Chief 
Minister and told that they were misled by Mr. Pal and still support him. 
Some of them were present even when Mr. Kalyan Singh met the Governor. 
But floating the constitutional norms the Governor dismissed him and 
administered oath of office to Mr. Pal at 10.30 at night. 
The action of the Governor was challenged in the Allahabad High 
Court by one of the BJP Minister. In a landmark judgement the Allahabad 
High Court, ordered the restoration of Kalyan Singh's Government in the 
State as it existed on Feb. 21, 1998. 
On July 30, 1998 President's rule was imposed in the State of Goa 
and the Congress Government of Pratap Singh Rane was dismissed on the 
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ground that due to defection of 10 MLA's from his party forming a separate 
party 'Goa Rajiv Congress' the chief Minister was reduced to minority. He had 
however, proved his majority after the Speaker disqualified 10 break away 
MLA's under the defection law and restrained them from participating in the 
proceedings of the House. The leader of the dissident group Wilfred D Souza 
along with leader of opposition and M.G.P, leader met the Governor and 
staked claim to form an alternative government. Following this, both the 
factions of the ruling Congress conducted "parallel" proceedings on motions 
of confidence on the Rane Government leading to uproarious scene and finally 
adjoumemtn of the House. The Appropriation Bill was to be passed before 
July 31, but due to the satelmate between the two groups it was not possible. 
The rebel MLAs and the opposition members met in the same chamber with 
expelled Congress members and Deputy Speaker in the chair and conducted 
the proceedings in which a 'resolution' saying the Speaker had been unseated 
and the "confidence motion had been defeated" was passed. 
In view of this the Governor sent the report to the Central 
Government and requested for the imposition of the President's Rule in the 
State. 
On Feb. 12, 1999 President's Rule was imposed in Bihar and Rabri 
Devi Government was dismissed after the two successive massacres of Dalits 
by the members of Ranvir Sana. The Assembly was, however, kept in a 
suspended animation as required by the decision in the Bommai's case. The 
Governor S.S. Bhandari on September 1998 recommended for the imposition 
of the President's Rule in the State on the ground that there was a complete 
break down of law and order in the State. The Cabinet recommended dismissal 
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of the Rabri Devi Government and imposition of President's Rule under Art. 
356. The President disagreed with the recommendation and returned it to the 
Cabinet for reconsideration. The Cabinet decided to drop its 
recommendations purportedly in deference to the President's views. But 
several months later on Feb, 12 in the wake of two successive massacres 
involving Dalits the Central Government chose to reiterate its earlier 
recommendation. This time the President has to sign the proclamation as the 
Constitution enjoins him to give his assent if the Cabinet sends it back after 
reconsideration. The President's Rule was approved by the Lok Sabha. 
However, the BJP lead coalition Government was in minority in the Rajya 
Sabha and the Congress Party which enjoyed majority in Rajya Sabha has 
decided to oppose it. As a result the Government did not go to the Rajya 
Sabha and revoked the President Rule in Bihar on March 12, 1999. 
Recently, Article 356 has been invoked in the state of Uttar Pradesh 
because it did not appear to be feasible to form a stable government. In the 
general elections held for the State Legislature, the public gave a fragmented 
verdict with no party having a majority in the House; and no party wanted to 
support any other party to form the government. The Leader of the Samajwadi 
party staked his claim as the single largest party to form the government. He 
claimed that he would prove his majority on the floor of the house. Implicit in 
the statement was the fact that being in power, it would be easier for him to 
engineer defections from the other parties. The Governor was not satisfied 
with his claim. On the recommendation of the State Governor, the Central 
Government imposed the President's rule in the state on March 9, 2002. This 
is an instance of President' rule being invoked in a state because it was not 
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possible to form a viable government in the State due to the politically 
fragmental legislature. 
The Agency Role of the Governor : 
As has already been discussed that the Governor in between the 
centre and state is nominated by the President, he is not elected, therefore he 
is not a representative of the people of the state. So it is truthfully deducted 
that he bears loyalty to the ruling party at the centre and appeared to be more 
political. To diminish the sharpness of such loyality to the centre government, 
a prescription of emenancy and a person of a high profile is constitutionally 
recommended in the interest of the federal principles as called by the 
President of India, a Governor is to act as an interface between the centre and 
state governments for faster development backing the view by the Prime 
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee that Governors should play the role of "noble 
healer" to remove the suffering of the common people.^^ The constitution 
makers, too meant him to be an important link with the Centre. But for the 
political reasons, the office of the Governor would not have been 
controversial. In its report the study team of the Administrative Reforms 
commission on Centre-State relationship observed "The Governor functions, 
for most purposes, as a part of the State apparatus; but he is meant, at the 
same time, to be a link with centre.... the Constitution thus specifically 
provides for a departure from the strict federal principle, and it is relevant to 
observe that this departure is not fortuitous or casual".^^ Thus the Governors 
are required to play a dual role since they are the heads of the State 
Governments, and at the same time they are the representatives of the Centre. 
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Hence, it is the relationship to the centre the event of the opposition 
ruling at the state level that brings the picture into fore. Through such 
instrument placed for the constitutional purposes becomes the tool of 
political gain the other aspect which is discernible in such travelling is that 
now the Governorship is understood a platform for jumping into political 
field as Surjeet Singh Bamala, and Motilal Vora are sound examples. 
So how they assist in the process not only to the ruling party but 
themselves also in political arena, a discussion for that purposes is required, 
also the following discussion will show flow the governor during 
proclamation period assist the political motives which may push for misusing 
the provision when Art. 356 is impsoed on a state, all powers of governance 
get vested in the President who usually delegates the executive authority to 
the Governor. The Ministry ceases to function and the Governor runs the 
administration on behalf of the President. He, in fact, becomes the Governor 
and the ministry rolled into one and his functions and responsibilities increase 
considerably. He attends conferences such as the National Development 
Council and the Chief Ministers conference. Some Governors like Dharma 
Vira almost regularly attended the office in the Secretariat. 
Normally the Governor administers all the 66 subjects figuring in 
the state list of the Constitution. Important matters even in this sphere are 
referred to the functional Ministry at the centre for advice and even direction 
of all the Union Ministries the states have the more extensive and continuous 
relation with the Home Ministry, particularly its centre-state relations 
Division. While a state under President's Rule deals directly with the 
functional Ministries, copies of important correspondance are despatched to 
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the Home Ministry. Similarly the Union Ministries dealing directly with the 
State Government make it a point to mark copies of all the correspondence to 
the Home Ministry. Thus in the President ruled State's relationship with the 
centre, the Home Ministry play a co-ordinating role. 
During the President's Rule, the Governor may appoint advisers to 
assist him. Although the institution of advisers owes neither to the 
constitution nor to any statute, the practice is very old and dates back to the 
pre-independence period. In Bombay and the United Provinces, where section 
93 was imposed during second world war, the Governors appointed advisers, 
all being members of the ICS.^ 
Following independence, Punjab, the first state to have been brought 
under the Central rule in 1951, did not have any adviser. In 1961 when Orissa 
was placed under President's Rule, the Governor Y.N. Suthankar functioned 
without the help of adviser. Similarly Dharma \^ra did not appoint any adviser 
in West Bengal (in 1968) and old Mysore (in 1971) when he was the 
Governor. S.S. Dhawan, the Governor of West Bengal, on the other hand, had 
as many as five advisers with B.B. Ghosh as Principal adviser in 1970." The 
appointment of advisers are formally appointed by the Governor. The initiative 
is however, taken by the Union Home Ministry which prepares a panel of 
names for this purpose, subject to the approval of the Prime Minister. The 
appointment of advisers is accompanied by a formal distribution of portfolios 
among them, and they infact take the place of the Ministers, getting official 
papers directly from the Secretaries to the Government. The Government is 
thus releived of routine administrative matters which would otherwise have 
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shifted to him. The meetings of the advisers, which practically resemble the 
cabinet meetings, are presided over by the Governor. Although the Governor 
has the authority to set aside any action of his advisers, there were occasions, 
as Professor Maheshwari had pointed out when the Governor was 'over-ruled' 
by his principal adviser who, of course, had the backing of New Delhi.^ ^ In 
fact, the post which the Governor plays in relation to his advisers during the 
President's Rule depends essentially upon his own measure of experience and 
interest in administration, his personality and his rapport with the central 
political leadership. A 'non-professional' Governor lacking previous 
experience of administration tends to depend considerable upon advisers who 
have generally happened to be civil servants or retired civil servants. But a 
Governor like Dharma Vira with a long administrative back ground is most 
likely to involve himself actively in the day to day adminsitration and to 
dominate the advisers. 
A consideration that might have weighed with the central 
Government in transferring B.D. Pande from West Bengal to Punjab following 
the promulgation of President's rule there was that the civil service 
background of the latter could be of much help in overhauling and streamlining 
the police and civil administration in trouble-torn state. Even a Governor 
without having a civilian background can be effective if he takes a keen 
interest in administration. D.C. Pavate, for instance, an educationist' Governor 
of Punjab, first in 1968 and then in 1971. There is also a recent example of 
appointment of retired Supreme Court judge, Fatima Bibi as Governor to State 
of Tamil Nadu, in that case, after controversy in regard to appointment of 
Jayalalithaa as CM. tendered her resignation before the President withdrew 
218 
his pleasure. Furthermore, there also may be difference of opinion between 
the adviser and the Governor. In Jan. 1984 G. Jagathpathi, the Senior most 
adviser to the Punjab Governor, who was in-charge of Law and order, resigned. 
Although he said that he had resigned merely on health grounds, there was a 
strong rumour that he had difference with the Governor and/or the Central 
Government regarding the modus operandi of handling the law and order 
situations. Whereas Jagathpathi was reported to have preferred a strong line 
of action in dealing with extremists, the Governor, or even the Central 
Government, favoured a cautious approach.^^ There are instances when the 
advisers had been removed by the Governor on the directive of the centre like 
Harbans Singh, P.G. Gavai advisers to Punjab Governor. 
Immediately following the imposition of President's Rule on West 
Bengal in June 1971 Siddartha Sanker Roy, the Union Education Minister, was 
appointed minister without portfolio in-charge of West Bengal Affairs.^* The 
appointment of a central Minister in charge of a state under Art. 356 was first 
of its kind in the history of President's Rule in India. The Governor functions 
directly as the representative of the President, i.e. the Centre during the 
President's Rule. Simultaneously the Union Minister is also required to 
function as the representative of the Union cabinet, explaining the nature of 
his office Ray was reported to have stated that he was to function as a 
representative of Central Cabinet and to exercise the Presidential power of 
'superintendance, control and direction' which the President did on advice of 
the Council of Ministers, in respect of issues that were within the competence 
of the Central Govemment.^^ This innovation of the interposition of a 
functionary between the President and the Governor had the effect of 
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undermining the status of the latter as the former's representative under 
President's Rule. Moreover, it led to the establishment of what may be called, 
dyarchy. There was also every possibility of power conflict and lack of co-
ordination between the two authorities. No such unfortunate development, 
however, took place in West Bengal because Siddhartha Shanker Ray was at 
that time in the full confidence of the Prime Minister and therefore, got the 
absolute backing of the Centre. 
During his Governorship, Dharma Vira raised two pertinent 
questions. During the President's Rule, is the Governor just a mouth-piece of 
the centre or has he the duty and the right to speak out if the State's and its 
people's interests are jeopardized? Dharma Vira was of view that "in such 
circumstances, regardless of the consequences, it is the moral duty of a 
Governor to take the cudgets on behalf of the state and its people. A Governor 
who does not do so would not be 'worth his salt".^° The second one relates to 
propriety. How long is senior and busy functionary expected to await even the 
Prime Minister's pleasure? "Is the Prime Minister" to quote Dharma Vira, 
"entitled to treat high dignitaries such as governor with scant courtesy and 
expect him to cool his heels in Delhi for days on end? Does a Governor woe 
nothing to the maintenance of the dignity of the high office he holds"?^' 
During the President Rule in Gujrat from May 1971 to March 1972, 
Shriman Narayan, the Governor of Gujarat, played an active role in 
streamlining the administration, speeding up various development schemes 
and securing the clearance of the planing commission for a number of pending 
projects. He adopted some specific measures in maintaining rapport with the 
people and redressing their genuine grievances the Governor spent three to 
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four hours everyday in afternoon at Raj Bhawan for meeting the General 
public and receiving various deputations relating to practicle difficulties of 
the people. In most cases decisions were taken on the spot, and only in a few 
cases a ftirther study was considered essential before taking a final view. This 
system of face to face discussions between the members of the public and the 
officers in the Governor's presence became very popular, and many issues 
which had been pending for years were sorted out without much difficulty. In 
this system, a complaint cell was established also the same system had been 
followed in U.P. as it got popularity naming it as Raj Darbar. Mr. Motilal Vora 
took daily meeting with public having grievance during the President Rule in 
U.R 
Thus if the Governor is active, has an imaginative mind and 
willingness to take interest in the administration, can play a positive role in 
the economic development and administraiton of the State and also initiate 
new policy decisions during the President's Rule. On the other hand, if he is a 
'non active', Governor, he will have the natural tendency to leave the entire 
responsibility to his advisers and the Civil servants. As a consequence, the 
administration during the President's Rule will be something like a stop gap' 
measure. It will be 'routine oriented', rather than 'dcvclopmcnt-oricnted' 
administration. Now, within the defence mechanism of the Constitution, there 
is an ultimate agency - The judiciary - bearing the load of the protection. To 
what extent, this organ is capable to put a check on politically manufactured 
situation with an object to bring its own political advantage, is the linkage of 
the study. 
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Chapter - 5 
USE OF ARTICLE 356 AND 
JUDICIAL RESPONSES : SCENES 
OF PASSIVITY AND ZEAL & ZERK 
Pre-1977 : 
As has already been analysed that there are four important agencies 
provided by the Constitution itself. These all institutions derive their powers 
from the Constitutional provisions. First one - the President who is a creature 
of the Constitution - itself is a Constitutional head i.e. the protector of the 
Constitution and every people is expected to have the hope in relation to the 
Constitutional defence. But the doctrine of "aid and advice" whether it gives 
truly a weapon of manipulating in the hands of the ruling party at the centre 
taking the benefits of the immunities granted under Art. 361 of the 
Constitution ? Adversely what happened to the situation that has been arisen in 
state of Bihar wherein President K.R. Narayan made a precedent to get 
Constitutionality reconsidered.* Also the same recourse was made in U.P. 
Though the law of Constitution had conferred certain discretionary powers on 
the President, of the nature requiring the protection of the Constitution which 
was federal and so susceptible to infringement and violation of state's Rights 
with immunity if he was made bound by the advice of his Council of Ministers 
yet the Myth, of the President without trappings of power, was given the 
credibility of a Constitutional principle. Dr. Ambcdkar had told the 
Constituent Assembly in most unequivocal terms that the emergency 
provisions whould be called into operations by the President when he would 
be personally satisfied about the righteousness of the invocation of the 
provisions and also after taking proper precautions against their misuse.^ 
Another important agency, which came in process of decision-
making about the imposition of President's Rule in state was the State 
Governor, he could be used by the Central Government as a pawn on its 
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political chess-board and harnessed for grinding its axe only if he was 
appointed by them. It is not difficult to discern an outrageous paradox, made 
to project from the powers and position, stipulated to be conferred both on 
President and the Governor. The President being the head of the federal state, 
has to do much of the balancing between the centre and the states to fulfil his 
sacred trust of defending and protecting the Constitution, and the Governor, 
on the other hand, had none of such function to perform yet the former was 
stripped of his powers confirmed by the law of the Constitution while the 
latter was made vested with unlimited discretionary power. It did not accord 
with the system envisaged by the Constitution yet every thing came to be 
manipulated with a view to make the system subservient to the petty and peltry 
expediency of the Central Government. 
After the two important constitutional agencies, confided with the 
solemn trust of protecting the complex federal parliamentary system the only 
institution left to stand as a bulwork against any subversion of the Constitution 
was the judiciary. But a sad denousment came to stare into the eyes when it 
also egregiously failed to protect the Constitution, particularly the State's 
autonomy against the wanton and unwarranted encroachments by the Centre. 
In Rao Birendra Singh Vs. Union of India the Punjab and Haiyana High Court 
held that since the President issued the proclamation pursuant to his powers 
under Article 356 it was not an executive act of the Union so he was not 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court in view of Article 361(1). If 
there be any grounds, irrelevant and extravcous, as alleged, they could be 
discussed in both the Houses of the Parliament and made the gorund for 
disapproval at the time of discussion on the resolution. The High Court 
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pronounced the view that the judiciary did not have a competence to 
pronounce its verdict on the proclamation because it was only the Parliament 
which could have a discussion on the issue and decide it by its vote. It was 
also ruled that in view of Article 74(2) it did not fall within the ambit of the 
court to enquire if any advice was given to the President and also the contents 
of the advice. The Court further ruled that the Governor's report could not be 
questioned because the President acted in his satisfaction.^ Hence, the 
Parliament was held to be a right judge if two of the agencies misused their 
role. But the Constitution of justice could not be based on this process within 
the four walls of the Parliament because there may be the ruling party with 
clear majority. So the only organ remained is the judiciary in which the trust 
can be reposed to protect the Constitutional sanctity. 
So it is the role of the judiciary that is to be examined here for the 
purpose fo establish the just or unjust use of the said article. The Constitution 
of India right from its inauguration did not explicitly provide for nor did it 
exclude judicial review of President's power under Article 356. The 38th 
Amendment of Constitution enacted in the year 1975 placed the question of 
'satisfaction' of the President in declaring emergency beyond judicial scrutiny. 
It added a new clause (clause 5) to Article 356 which reads : 
"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution the satisfaction of the 
President mentioned in clause (1) shall be final and conclusive and shall not 
be questioned in any court of law".* 
Thus the Amendment wanted to make sure constitutionally that the 
issue of legality of proclamation of emergency was a political question and 
non-justiciable and hence beyond the purview of judicial scrutiny.^ The finality 
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clause was done away with in the year 1978 through the 44th Amendment by 
the Janata Government under the Prime Ministership of Morarji Desai. So 
after the 44th amendment the original position continues as regards the 
jurisdiction of the Court to judicially review the extra ordinary power granted 
to the President under Art. 356 of the Constitution of India. In state of 
Rajasthan's case - the Supreme court held 
"President's satisfaction would be open to judicial review only in 
those exceptional cases where on facts admitted or disclosed, it is manifest 
that it is malafide or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds".^ 
The power to issue President's Rule in the state has been challenged 
several times and the question of justiciability arose for consideration on 
twelve occasions in the Kerala HC (1965), in Punjab High Court (1968), in 
the A.P. High Court (1974), in the Orissa High Court (1974) in Supreme 
Court of India (1977), in the Kamataka High Court (1989), in Supreme Court 
(1998) and in Allahabad High Court of U.R in (1997) and in (1999). So let us 
examine the determination of the judiciary the area that hjis been darken since 
the first challanged in Kerala High court in 1965. 
K.K. Aboo Vs. Union of India^ 
This was the first case challenged in the Kerala High Court on the 
point of proclamation issued by the President of India. In this case on the 
resignation of the ministry that caused a breakdown of the Constitutional 
Government in the State of Kerala,the President dissolved the legislative 
Assembly and assumed the executive powers of the State to himself by a 
proclamation dated September 10, 1964, which was approved by the 
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Parliament by a resolution on September 30, 1964. A general election held 
thereafter, in February and March 1965, for the purpose of constituting a new 
legislative Assembly in the state; but no party was able to secure a working 
majority of seats in the legislature. 
The new legislature had never been summoned, under Article 174 of 
the Constitution, therefore the members elected could not be sworn in. After 
consultation with leaders of various parties, the Governor submitted his report 
to the President on the possibility of the formation of the government in the 
state. On March 24, 1965, the Vice-President, who was then discharging the 
functions of the President in the latter's absence out of India, revoked the 
proclamation of September 10, 1964 and issued a fresh proclamation under 
Article 356 assuming to himself all the functions of the government of Kerala 
and dissolving the newly constituted Legislative Assembly of the State. 
On behalf of Aboo, it was first of all argued that: the Governor 
could not recommend the imposition of President's Rule when the state was 
already under the rule of the President. Secondly, that the Assembly could 
only be dissolved after it was assembled. This would have given the Assembly 
an opportunity to consider the situation. The third argument was that the Court 
and the Parliament should consider the validity of the Presidential 
proclamation, the last argument was that the governor had acted malafide. 
The Court refused to go into the constitutionality of proclamation. 
Speaking for the Court M. Madhavan Nair J. held that the remedy lay with 
Parliament and not with the Court. He observed : 
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".... when the matter comes up before, it is open to Parliament to 
withhold approval. If the Parliament in its Supreme ^sdom, is not impressed 
with the Constitutionality, the legality or even the propriety of the 
proclamation, it will not give its approval to it. It requires no exposition by 
this court for such an action on the part of Parliament".* The Court went 
further and found that "the Governor had made a through enquiry as to the 
possibility of the formation of a Constitutional government "in the State 
before he submitted his report to the President as to the situation concerned". 
It was further held that the President had ample material for his satisfaction 
before he promulgated the impugned proclamation dated 10 September 1964.^  
The question regarding whether President's Rule could be imposed 
when a newly elected legislature was available to form the government, the 
Court held that Article 356 empowers the President, whenever he is satisfied 
that a Constitutional Govenrment is not possible in the State, to issue a 
proclamation thereunder so as to assume the government of the state to 
himself and assimilate its legislative powers to the Parliament. The Article 
356 does not prescribe any condition for the exercise of powers thereunder 
by the President, except the satisfaction of the President that a situation has 
arisen in which the government of the State can not be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the constitution. ^ ° 
As to the last question the judge made it clear that the governor had 
acted malafide even if, some political leaders have been preventively detained, 
the court also observed that President while acting under Article 356 
exercised power in his own right and the only sanction against him was 
impeachment. 
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It is quite interesting to note that even in this first case of judicial 
review the court though evading jurisdiction was eager to consider the factual 
legitimacy of the proclamation. Consequently the petition was dismissed 
without any interime relief as prayed for by the petitioner and all grounds of 
challenge to the proclamation was struck down thereby upholding the 
constitutionality of the proclamation. 
Rao Birendra Singh Vs Union of India** 
In State of Haryana the imposition of President's Rule was declared 
on 21 November 1967 and the legislative Assembly was dissolved, the 
petitioner contended (i) that the petitioner commanded majority in the 
legislative Assembly.(ii) that the satisfaction of the President while issuing 
the proclamation in fact means the satisfaction of the Union Home Minister 
which must be based upon some facts and circumstances, (iii) that the report 
of the Governor makes it clear that in fact the government could be carried on 
according to the constitution because the petitioner had continued to have 
majority in the legislative Assembly (iv) that the malafide nature of the 
proclamation is evident from the facts themselves that the petitioner took a 
bold stand in saying that he would not allow chandigarh and Bhakra project and 
because efforts were made be the centre to cause defections in the 
petitioner's party. 
The court held that the President while exercising under Article 356 
did not act on behalf of the executive of the Union but in a constitutional 
capacity and therefore, the exercise of power by the President was not 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the court. 
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"It is thus settled that the constitutional power of the President under 
Article 356 is apart and independent of the executive powers of the Union 
referred to in Articles 53, 73, and 77. Those Articles do not apply to the 
exercise of such power be the President. On this approach the whole edifice 
of this argument on the side of the petitioner that the proclamation was issued 
by the President in exercise of the executive powers of the Union and hence 
an executive act of the Union crumbles. This court can not even enquire into, 
in view of sub-article (2) of Article 74, whether any advice whatsoever was 
tendered by any Minister in connection with the issue of the impuned 
proclamation under Article 356".'^ 
Secondly reconsideration of the proclamation being specifically 
vested by the constitution in Parliament, excluded the jurisdiction of the court 
in this regard, thirdly, the court had no jurisdiction to require disclosure of 
material forming basis of the satisfaction of the President. 
Thus the court stated in this case also as it held in earlier case that 
the proclamation of emergence under Article 356, justiciability, legality or 
properiety of proclamation even the relevancy of recital as to satisfaction of 
President is not justiciable. Here again, though the court dismissed the 
petition and outrightly rejected all the relief sought by the petitioner it did 
not hesitate to state that there was sufficient material in the report of the 
Governor toshow that administration of the state had broken down.^' 
In case of Gokulananda Roy Vs Tarapada Mukharjee'^, the Calcutta 
High Court held that "the validity or legality of the incidental and 
consequently provisions contemplated by the Article 356(1) (c) is not 
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justiciable" because that is a matter entirely for the satisfaction of the 
President, the court further ruled that the Governor's report could not be 
questioned because the President acted in his satisfaction.'^ 
In West Bengal when Ajoy Mukherjee was dismissed in 1967 a writ 
petition was moved in the High Court callanging the action of the Governor. 
The court held that the exercise of discretion by the Governor in respect of 
the appointment and dismissal of the Chief Minister was absolute, unfettered 
and unrestricted. The court delivering its judgement dismissed the writ 
petition and ruled that his discretion of appointment and dismissal under 
Article 164(1) was absolute and unconditional and his exercise of discretion 
could not be challenged in a court of law under Article 163(2) and Article 
afforded him complete immunity from any legal proceedings taken against 
him.'^ 
Sreeramulu Vs. Union of India^^ 
The scope of Article 356 was, however, considered in greater detail 
and depth in 1974 by the A.P. High Court. Here the presidential proclamation 
was challenged on the ground that President's Rule was imposed in the State 
without exploring the possibility for the formation of an alternative ministry 
when the chief Minister resigned under the instruction of the congress high 
command. 
Justice Chinnappa Reddy held that a Presidential proclamation 
issued under Art. 356 is not susceptible to judicial review because the issue 
of the Presidential satisfaction under Article 356 is basically a political issue, 
the constitution does not enumerate a situation where President's Rule can be 
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imposed and there are no "satisfactory criteria for judicial determination of 
what is relevant consideration for invoking the power under Article 356. 
Consequently the question is intrinsically political and beyond the reach of 
the courts. 
While considering the question whether there are any legal 
limitation to the kind of action that can be taken under Article 356 of the 
constitution the judge assured that the only limitation on the exercise of 
power under Art 356 is political limitation, the considerations which are 
relevant for action under Article 356 and weighing of these consideration 
appear to be clearly matters of political wisdom and not of judicial scrutiny. 
The judge made it clear that the wide descretion allowed to the President in 
this regard pointed to the faith reposed by the Constitution in politics, 
politicians and the people, the court observed : 
"After everything is said and done, it is the people of the country 
who should resist despotic tendencies on the part of the President or the 
majority part in the Parliament and it is scarcely a matter for the courts". 
The main question was whether court could interfere if they had 
some doubts as to whether the action of the President was based on 
considerations that were not relevant to the failure of the Constitutional 
machinery in a state. Chinnappa Reddy presumably preferred courts not to go 
into this quesiton. But he suggested that in any consideration that guide to the 
failure of the Constitutional machinery in a State, the President's discretion 
must be relevant." Eventually it was pointed out by the Court that even 
assuming that there is limited judicial review there were no circumstances in 
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the instant case not justifying President's proclamation the petition was 
dismissed. 
It is significant to note at this juncture that it was in Sreeramulu 
case that for the first time the yardstick of judicial review of administrative 
action was sought to be invoked to test the validity of a Presidential 
proclamation under Article 356 though the repsonse of the Court was the 
same as before the articulation of the justification was more convincing. It is 
the head of the State that is entrusted with the discharge of the duty and the 
fact that it is the Parliament that is the final arbiter led to the inevitable 
conclusion that the court can never go into the merit of the proclamation 
issued by the President. 
In a subsequent decision in Hanumantha Rao Vs. State of A.P.'' the 
A.P. High Court reached the genith of abdication of judicial review. It hold 
that court can not examine the appropriateness or adequacy of the grounds for 
the taking of a decision by the President, nor any bad faith can be permitted to 
be attributed to him, the Court must a "judicial hands off in connection with 
this Presidential exercise of emergency power.^ ® 
If the basic premises of the interpretation in respect of the power 
and position of the President, are taken into consideration in brooks no 
ambiguity that the official view, which was supported by the Court in its 
different judgements, taken was that he was a constitutional head and in all 
matters whatsoever he was bound to act according to the "aid and advice" of 
his Council of Ministers. If this view was taken, be it correct or wrong, both 
the views can not be held simultaneously, that he acted on 'aid and advice' of 
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his council of ministers yet in matters of imposition of President's rule he 
acted on his own and the Council of ministers was not responsible for his 
action. If he had acted his own he would not have gone the lackadaisical way in 
such a bizarre fashion except very rarely when he committed a bonafide 
mistake and the constitutional machinery in states would not have been made a 
play thing of power of politics and dissolved so easily in a pronouncedly 
biased manner and if he had acted on the aid and advice of his ministers the 
responsibility for the erroneous action should have been squarely laid on the 
shoulders of the Central government. If this view would have been taken, 
which was the correct one the Constitution would not have been so blantantly 
violated with impunity and nobody made accountable for the reckless exercise 
of the most sensitive and sophisticated power. Further passing the buck and 
holding that it was within the competence of the Parliament to take a decisive 
verdict on the issue was not short of abdicating its own authority of protecting 
the Constitution in favour of a body which was neither intended to perform 
this function nor was competent of it for reasons of being in the heat of 
political sabre-rattling, stringently controlled by the party whip and thereby 
acting in a most partisan maimer. Since Palriament is a forum to debate the 
policies of the government and take a verdict on them but that does not mean 
that the policies so approved ipso facto attain constitutional validity. So also 
the approval of the emergency resolution by the Parliament, with government 
solidity voting for the resolution and the opposition marshalling its entire 
strength against it, overtaken by the heat of political fervour, and nothing sort 
of a dispassionate and unbiased consideration for the issiie from the angle of 
protecting the constitution motivates their stance. The view taken by the Court 
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mutatis mutandis apply to legislation enacted by the Parliament and on the 
basis of the same logic once an act is adopted by the Parliament it should 
also, like emergency resolution, get immunity from judicial review. Since the 
court, in consideration of the sacred trust reposed in them to protect the 
constitution, exercise judicial review on other policies enacted by the 
Parliament likewise it is equally incumbent upon them to have taken 
cognisance of the dispute relating to exercise of powers under Article 356 
and pronounced their verdict. 
When the President for all practical purposes was made to act on the 
aid and advice of his council of ministers it was erroneous to hold that Article 
74(2) barred the court from enquiring into the advice given to the President 
to promulgate emergency. Since the President was made a constitutional head 
and courts, in different judgements had also declared him bound by the advice 
of his ministers.^' it was not consistent to hold that the advice did not fall 
within the ambit of judicial review, particularly, in a matter where the abuse of 
the power had a very serious consequences of the nature of scuttling and 
cascading the basic structure of the Constitution.^^ 
Bijayananda Vs. President of India^ ^ 
In the instant case, the Constitutionality and legality of the President 
proclamation of 3rd March 1973 in Orissa state was examined by Orissa High 
Court. It was alleged in this case that, when the Chief Minister tendered 
resignation of her Council of Ministers, the Governor should have called the 
leader of the opposition party to form the ministry, the Court said that without 
testing its strength Governor's decision not to call the leader of opposition 
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party to form the ministry and to recommend for President' Rule under Art. 
356 are however not justiciable and no writ can lie to quash them for the 
following reasons :-
(a) Breach of the above convention is not enforceable in court of law; 
(b) the decision was not of the state Government but of the Governor 
without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and as such Art. 
361(1) is a bar; 
(c) the allegation of malafides against the Governor cannot be gone into in 
his absence.^^ 
While rejecting the challenge of imposition the division bench of 
the Orissa High Court ruled that the Presidential proclamation is not 
justifiable on the following grounds :-
(i) the wide source of information as contemplated by the expression 
'otherwise' gives ample indication that the President's satisfaction is 
not justiciable. 
(ii) the satisfaction and the basis of the satisfaction are both subjective and 
are not subject to judicial review. 
(iii) In view of the provisions under Article 74(2) and Article 361(1) the 
Court is not in a position to test the grounds of satisfaction. 
(iv) the provisions for parliamentary approval for continuance of the 
proclamation beyond two months from the date of proclamation gives 
clear indication that for a period of two months it can not be questioned 
either by Parliament or by courts, the fact that its continuance after two 
240 
months has been subjected to Parliamentary approval gives a further 
indication that it is not justiciable in court. 
(v) the satisfaction of the President is integrally connected with the 
question of enforcing the convention on the Governor's failure to call 
the leader of the opposition to form the Ministry. The convention being 
not enforceable. The satisfaction based on a decision whether to honour 
the convention or not is equally unenforceable.^^ 
However, the Orissa High Court was not totally unaware of the 
consequences ensuring from central interference in situations like those 
involved in the case before the court. The court observed that: "the stability 
of the contemplated ministry is not to be tested by delving into antecedent 
and contemporaneous conduct of legislators... but by physical counting of 
heads in the House itself. The court also criticised the conduct of the 
Governor in so far as he recommended President's Rule in the state without 
first calling Bijayanand to form the Government. By this the Governor fowled 
to honour the conventions prevalent in Great Britain. The court suggested 
that, on the fall of ministry, the Governor should automatically ask the leader 
of opposition to form the government". 
The court further stated that it is now well settled that the 
conventions which were prevalent in England at the time of framing of our 
constitution are to be honoured by different functionaries in working out of 
the constitution though they are not put into a written Instrument of 
Instructions. 
In the constituent Assembly there was a debate whether the well 
accepted conventions followed in England should be put into a written 
Instrument of Instructions for guidance, the proposal was not accepted.^^ 
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"The essence of Ambedkar's argument in December 1946, when he 
moved the inclusion of the President's Rule in instrument of Instructions, was 
that the Instrument had moral force. It established a code of behaviour, of 
procedure. A provincial legislature or the Union Parliament, said Ambedkar, 
could by citing the instrument, force a Governor, or the President to heed the 
advice of his ministries or face impeachment proceedings for violation of the 
Constitution. Ambedkar admitted that the provisions of the Instrument were 
not, strictly speaking enforceable or justiciable. And he rejected Naziniddine 
Ahmad's suggestion that thing be made justiciable - by allowing the President 
to be questioned as to whether he had followed the advice of his ministers -
because they would permit the courts to interfere in the affairs of Parliament 
and the Executive the system of checks and balances would be up set". 
A critical examination of these decisions reveals that the courts 
have given support to the Central Government consistently. They have taken 
the position that they could not go into the validity or otherwise of a 
proclamation, because of nonjusticiable nature of President's satisfaction by 
treating the circumstances sufficient to justify the centre's conclusion that 
there was a breakdown of constitutional machinery in the concerned State. 
The Kerala and Punjab High Court took a very restrictive view on the issue, 
approving the proclamation. These courts observed that they did not have any 
power to go into these questions at all. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, 
however, explained its stand on the basis of separation of powers, justice 
Chinnappa Reddy pleaded for an alternative testing of the merits of the 
proclamation. The Orissa High Court also followed the total ouster approach 
but Gati Krushna Mishra J. in his judgment censured the Governor for not 
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following political conventions which ought to have been followed. Thus, in 
all these cases before the various High courts, it was made known that there 
could be no judicial review of Presidential proclamation although the reasons 
for reaching the conclusions varied. None of these challenges had come 
before the Supreme Court. The matter came up for consideration in 1977 
before the Supreme Court in the State of Rajasthan's case. 
Post-1977 : 
Supreme Court in 
State of Rajasthan Vs. Union of India^ ^ 
In the Parliamentary elections of March 1977 the ruling Congress 
party suffered a massive defeat in nine states viz. Bihar, U.P., H.P., M.P., 
Haryana, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan and West Bengal. After the elections the 
Janata party came to power at the centre. On 17 April 1977, the Union Home 
Minister wrote letters to the Chief Ministers of nine states asking them to 
advise their Governors to dissolve the respective Assemblies and seek fresh 
mandate. Further, the Union Law Minister in a broadcast said that the 
governments in the nine congress ruled states had forfieted confidence of the 
electorate and that they seek the dissolution of the electrorate and that they 
seek the dissolution of the state legislature and obtain a fresh mandate. It was 
quite clear that if the suggestion was not acted upon, the union Government 
would invoke emergency powers under Article 356 and impose President's 
Rule and dissolve the state legislatures though this was not mentioned in the 
letter. 
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Six of these nine states namely Rajasthan, M.P., Punjab, Bihar, H.P., 
and Orissa in their writ petition to the supreme court submitted that the Home 
Minister's letter and the radio-broadcast of the law minister constituted a 
clear cut threat of dissolution of the Assemblies and disclosed grounds which 
are prime facie outside the purview of Article 356 of the Constitution. 
The court rejected the objections and held that the defeat of the 
ruling party in itself, without anything more, support the inference that the 
government of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions 
of the Constitution, but the present situation was wholly different. It was not a 
case where just an ordinary defeat had been suffered by the ruling party in a 
state at the elections to the Lok Sabha but there has been a total rout of its 
candidates which reflected a wall of estrangement and resentment and 
antipathy in the hearts of people against the government which may lead to 
instability and even the administration may be paralysed. Therefore, this 
ground was held to be clearly a relevant one. 
The court rejected the contention that judicial review of Presidential 
proclamation was totally barred. Bhagwati and Gupta J.J. held that, "merely 
because a question of political complexion, that by itself is no ground why the 
court should shrink from performing its duty under the constitution if it raises 
an issue of the Constitutional determination... merely because a question has 
a political colour, the court cannot fold its hand in despair and declare 
"judicial hand off".2* 
For the first time in State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India the Apex 
Court, departing from the earlier view adopted by different High Courts in 
244 
respect of proclamation of emergency made by the President under Articles 
356(1), formulated a view that, in certain circumstances, the challenge could 
be entertained for the exercise of judicial review. ^ ^ 
Before this historic judgement was delivered the High Court had 
taken a view that the immunity accorded to the President under Article 361 
exonerated him from any blame of exceeding his powers or acting with 
malafide motives. The judiciary, then thought that since the Presidential 
proclamation had to be approved or disapproved by the Parliament the proper 
and legitimate forum to decide about its fate was vested in that body. Thus the 
judiciary had, virtually, abdicated its essential function of affording protection 
to the Constitution to a political body like Parliament which was utterly 
partisan and was deep into political wrangles and completely wedded to the 
realisation of interests dictated by petty power politics. The judgement in this 
case reversed the trend to some extent by ruling that in a case where the 
government had disclosed the grounds of action taken under Article 356, and 
it was challenged on the ground of being malafide or extraneous to the 
situation, judicial review could be exercised but the court in view of the 
provision of Article 74(2) could not compel the government to disclose the 
grounds forming the basis of the impunged action.^^ It was also held by the 
Court that the President's satisfaction could not be challenged but only the 
existence of the satisfaction which would not be there if the grounds alleged 
were malafide or the exercise of power was wholly based on extraneous or 
irrelevant grounds. 
The court ruled, "the satisfaction of the President is subjective and 
cannot be tested by reference to any objective test. It can not be a fit case for 
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judicial determination. The court cannot go into the correctness or adequacy 
of the facts and the circumstances on which the stasfaction of the Central 
Government is based. But if the satisfaction is malafide or is based on wholly 
extraneous and irrelevant grounds, the court would have jurisdiction to 
examine it because in that case there would be no satisfaction of the President 
in regard to the matter in which he is required to be satisfied, the satisfaction 
of the President is a condition precedent to the exercise of power under 
Article 356(1), and if it can be shown that there was no satisfaction of the 
President at all, the exercise of power would be constitutionally invalid of 
course, in most of the cases it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
challenge the exercise of power under Article 356(1), even on this limited 
ground because the facts and circumstances on which the satisfaction is based 
would not be known, but what is possible, the existence of satisfaction can 
always be challenged on the ground that it is malafide or based on wholly 
extraneous and irrelevant grounds."^' 
The court in this case took the cognisance of the dispute for the 
first time, since the commencement of the Constitution, only for the reason 
that the government had given the grounds for the innvocation of the 
provisions of Article 356. But since the court had ruled that it could not 
enquire into the adeuqaucy of the facts and also could not compel the 
government to disclose the facts on which the advice to the President was 
based, because such an embargo was imposed by Article 74(2), the conspectus 
of judicial review was very much narrowed down. Even in this circumscribed 
field judicial review could be exercised if the government came out with the 
facts forming the basis of action taken under Article 356(1) which the 
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government was not likely to do unless the grounds conceived were prima 
facie genuine and bonafide and did not smack of political overtones. Since in 
most of the cases the provisions were used with malafides, most prominently 
peeping out from the blatantly outrageous action, it was most unlikely that the 
government would throw itself into the trap of a legal dispute and countenance 
the unfortunate denouement of its action being declared void and illegal. The 
formulations made by the Apex Court in this case virtually made the same 
scenario to continue except that now judicial review could be exercised on 
the grounds of the facts, forming the ground of the action, if made known by 
the government. On previous occasion the judiciary had held that the President 
enjoyed immunity under Article 361(1) and hence neither his satisfaction nor 
the existence of it could be challenged but in this case a distinction was made 
between the 'satisfaction' and 'existence of satisfaction' and the latter could 
not exist if the grounds taken were malafide or irrelevant. Yet about the 
interpretation of Article 74(2) barring the judiciary from making enquiry as 
to what advice was tendered by the council of ministers, in respect of action 
taken under Article 356 there was no change and the situation remained as it 
was before. In spite of it the judgement could be said to be a significant 
improvement because, through the ambit of judical review was made 
extremely restricted yet in certain circumstances, the existence of 
satisfaction was made subject to court's enquiry. 
Though the judgment was an improvement over the then existing 
position so much so that in certain situations the imposition of President's 
rule could come under judicial review yet the ruling given entitling the 
Central Government to invoke the provision of Article 356 and remove the 
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opposition ruled state governments for reason to create a better nexus and 
rapport between the Centre and states for effective implementation of the 
policies of the Central Government, was egregious and highly undemocratic. 
The court ruled, "Under our system, the quest of political power, through the 
formation of political parties, with different socio-economic policies and 
programmes and ideologies is legal. Hence, a mere attempt to get more 
political power for a party, is constitutionally not prohibited or per se 
illegal".^^ It was also held the extent of federalism is largely watered down by 
the needs of programme and development of a country which has nationally to 
be integrated, politically and economically to be coordinated, and socially, 
intellectually and spiritually uplifted. In such a system, the states cannot stand 
in the way of legitimate and comprehensive planned development of the 
country in the manner directed by the Central Government, taking us in 
particular direction, can often be treated and determined by the verdict of the 
people at appropriate times.^^ The judgement was highly undemocratic and 
unfederal. The Constitution did not intent to emasculate the federal element 
any more than it had already done by empowering the Union Government to 
impose its policies on states by issuing directives to have the Central policies 
uniformly implemented throughout the whole country, irrespective of the fact 
the state government might be ruled by the opposition parties. What quantum 
of power was so conferred on the Centre was sufficient and any further 
encroachment on the powers of states was not only unwarranted but also did 
not square up with the basic postulates of the Constitution. This judgment 
made the constituent states of the Indian Union as mere subordinate adjunct 
of the Centre and made entirely dependent on the Central Government for 
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their survival as independent Units. Since the raison d'etre of party system, 
which is the breath of breath and bone of bone of democracy, makes for 
competitive politics and principle of mandate to acquire respectability and 
logic of the existence of the system, to permit and legalise dissolution of 
state governments simply for the reason that it was ruled by a opposition party 
out at the very roots of democracy and federalism. In a federal state different 
parties ruling at the Centre and the states is a normal phenomenon and has to 
be reckoned with equanimity. If the ground, permitted by the apex court, is 
invoked the whole system, in a twinkle of eye crumble down like a house of 
cards. Taking this process, persistently and indefinitely, would wrought for 
the end of the democratic system and the federal structure would cease to 
exist. The logic of the judgement looks burlesque and preposterous and makes 
the basic structure of the Constitution to fritter away.^ ^ 
In A.K. Roy Vs. Union of India^^ a constitution bench of Supreme 
Court observed that the Rajasthan's case is often cited as an authority for the 
proposition that the court ought not to enter the "political thicket". It has to be 
bom in mind that at the time when the case was decided, Article 356 contained 
clause (5) which was inserted by the 38th Amendment, by which the 
satisfaction of the President mentioned in clause (1) was made final and 
conclusive and that satisfaction was not open to be questioned in any court on 
any ground. Clause (5) has been deleted by the 44th Amendment and, 
therefore any observation made in the Rajasthan's case^^ on the basis of that 
clause can not any longer hold good. It is arguable that the 44th Constitution 
Amendment Act leaves no doubt that judicial review is not totally excluded in 
regard to the question relating to the President satisfaction. 
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After the Rajasthan's case the question of judicial review of 
Presidential Proclamation under Article 356 arose for consideration in 
Gauhati and Kamataka High Courts. President's Rule was imposed in Nagaland 
on 7th August 1988 when eight month old congress ministry headed by 
Hokisha Sema was reduced to a minority due to defections there was a 
difference of opinion between Chief Justice Raghaur and justice Hansaria.^' 
The former held that the Union of India cannot be compelled to tender any 
information to the court because of Article 74 of the Constitution. On the 
other hand, justice Hansaria held that as the material which formed part of 
"other information" was not before the Court and as the same did not form 
part of the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers under Art. 74(1), 
Union of India should be given an opportunity to disclose the information to 
the Court. Justice Hansaria ruled that should the Union of India fail to give 
the "other information" the court would have no alternative but to decide the 
matter on the basis of the matter placed before it.-'* 
High Court in : 
S.R. Bommai and Others Vs. Union of India^' 
The Presidential proclamation was challenged in Kamataka High 
Court. In state of Kamataka, the then mling party came in minority due to 
defection caused by the party members. The concemed govemor made a 
report to the President of India to impose the President's mle in the State. 
The imposition of President's rule in Kamataka on 29 April 1989 and the 
dissolution of the Legislative Assembly based on the Govemor's report and 
on "other information" was challenged before the Kamataka High Court. The 
full bench held that Presidential proclamation was justiciable. 
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The Court held that the Proclamation made under Art. 356 of the 
Constitution is justiciable and the Courts could look into the materials or the 
reasons disclosed for issuing the proclamation, to find out whether those 
materials or reasons were wholly extraneous to the formation of the 
satisfaction and had no rational nexus at all to the satisfaction reached under 
Article 356 of the Constitution. 
Chandrachud J. stated, 
".. If, however, the reasons given are wholly extraneous to the 
formation of the satisfaction, the proclamation would be open to the attack 
that it vitiated by legal malafides"^° 
On the point Bagwati and A.C. Gupta J.J. supported the above view : 
" But one thing is certain that if the satisfaction is malafide or is 
based on wholly extraneous and irrelevant grounds, the court would have 
jurisdiction to examine it....".^^ 
Justice Fazal Ali advancing his view linking with the basic postulates 
of the Democracy justified the judicial hand in the circumstances : 
"this is the new democratic culture of an open society towards which 
every liberal democracy is moving and our country should be no exception. 
The concept of an open government is the direct emanation from the right to 
know which seems to be implicit in the right of free speech and expression 
guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(a). Therefore, disclosure of information is regard 
to the function of the government must be the rule and secrecy an exception 
justified only where the strictest requirement of public interest so demands. 
The approach of the court must be to attenuate the area of secrecy as much as 
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possible consistently with the requirement of public interest, bearing in mind 
all the time that disclosure also serves an important aspect of public 
interest".'*^ 
On the essentials of the report of the Governor, the court stated that 
the Governor's report envisaged under Article 356(1) has to necessarily 
contain the facts reflecting the situation which has arisen in the state and the 
inferences drawn and conclusions reached by him on those facts. Since the 
satisfaction required under Article 356 is that of the President i.e. the 
Council of Ministers, and not of the Governor. Therefore, the Governor's 
report should essentially contain the material facts and circumstances which 
are relevant to assess the situation leading to the particular satisfaction. 
Further, the court declined to decide the scope of Art. 74(1) with reference to 
the question whether "other information" could be called for "the impugned 
proclamation indicates that the satisfaction of the President was based on the 
Governor's report and other information. This "other information" which has 
not been disclosed may be perverse, motivated and irrelevant to the issue and 
capable of distroying the valid material disclosed in the report of the 
Governor".'*^ 
The Court further held that this is not a pre-condition to the 
Governor sending the report to the President to conduct a floor test to test 
veracity of support to ruling party. Recourse to floor test before sending 
report to the President is neither compulsory nor obligatory on the part of the 
governor, there is no provision in the Constitution or elsewhere which makes 
it obligatory or compulsory for the governor to test the veracity of support to 
the ruling party by having recourse to floor test as a pre-requisite for sending 
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up recommendation to the President for exercise of his power under Art. 
356(1). 
Thus the judicial reasoning carried the progress of the judicial 
intervention of the exercise of the power conferred by Art. 356 to the 
President of India. Though the Court could not grant relief in eighty's decade 
to the victims of the misuse of the provision, the credit went to judicial 
stepping into the grounds said in Rajasthan's case. The journey in the instant 
case remained short of expectation that was culminated in the case of 
Jagdampika Pal in the state of U.P. in which the composite floor test was 
ordered by the Allahabad High Court. 
Sunder La! Patwa Vs. Union of India^ 
After the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya on 6th 
December 1992, the President rule was impsoed in U.P., M.P., H.P. and 
Rajasthan. The imposition of President's Rule in M.P., H.P. and Rajasthan 
were challenged in the respective High Courts. The M.P. High court departed 
from the earlier decisions held that the presidential proclamation can be 
challenged in court of law. The court held that after the 44th Amendment of 
the Constitution, clause (5) of Art. 356 has been repealed resulting in 
enlarging the scope of judicial review. Therefore, the Presidential 
proclamation is open to judicial review on the ground of irrationality, 
illegality, impropriety or malafide or in short, on the ground of abuse of 
power. 
The court in the instant case pointed out that sudden outbreak of riot 
resulting in failure on the part of State government to maintain public order 
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does not justify the President's rule in the state. The power can be used only 
in an extreme difficult situation viz. where there is an actual and imminent 
break down of the constitutional machinery, as distinguished from failure to 
observe a particular provision of the constitution or worsening of law and 
order situation. Since Article 356 of the Constitution authorises serious 
inroads into the principles of Federation. As regards the "other information" 
the court stated that the Union cabinet can not claim privilege. 
"As has been held by the Supreme Court in Rajasthan's case^^, the 
satisfaction of the President has to be, in the scheme of the Constitution, 
based on the aid and advice of the cabinet. The decision to impose the 
President's Rule is virtually taken by the cabinet and the action of the 
President is subject to judicial review in a court. Although the President can 
not be made a party a court of law, union government representing the cabinet 
can claim no previlege or protection against the disclosure of such "otherwise 
information" in its possession and which was made the basis of 
proclamation".'*^ 
As already said that the Presidential proclamation issued under 
Article 356 is open to judicial review on the settled principles and limits 
within which any other administrative action of the Government is so 
reviewable. The same question came before the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy's 
case**', the court held thus. 
Thus, the court had clearly held that there was no material to infer 
that the state government could not be carried on in accordance with the 
provisions of the constitution or that the constitutional machinery had failed. 
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Therefore the court ordered to restore the dismissed ministry as also the 
dissolved Assembly. The judgement of M.P. High Court is a "significant 
milestone in legal history" since it is the first case where the Court struck 
down a Presidential proclamation as unconstitutional.'** Here to determine the 
justifiability of the power the court considered the ratio in the Rajasthan's 
case. 
Supreme Court in : 
S.R. Bommai Vs. Union of India^' 
This came before a Bench of 9 judges^° under the circumstances as 
on 21 April 1989, the President issued a proclamation under Article 356 
dismissing the Bommai Government as already discussed, the President 
issued a proclamation under Article 356(1) dismissing the government of 
Meghalaya and dissolving the legislative Assembly on 7 August 1988, the 
President issued a proclamation dismissing the government of Nagaland and 
dissolving the legislative Assembly. The validity of proclamation was 
challenged in the Gauhati High Court. The petition was heard by a Division 
Bench comprising of the chief justice and Hansari J. (1988) as already 
mentioned. The Bench dcffcrred on effect and operation of Article 74(2) and 
hence the matter was referred to the third judge. But before the third judge 
could hear the matter, the Union of India was granted special leave to appeal 
and further proceedings in High Court were stayed. On 15 December 1992, 
the President issued a proclamation under Article 356 dismissing the State 
Governments and dissolving the legislative Assemblies of Rajasthan, Madhya 
Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. As already said that these proclamations were 
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challenged in respective High Courts. The M.P. High court allowed the Writ 
petition, but writ petitions relating to Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh were 
withdrawn to the Supreme Court and were numbered as transfer case No. 8 of 
1993. 
This case raised very important questions about the power of the 
President to issue a proclamation under Article 356 (failure of Constitutional 
machinery in the States) including, interalia, the power to dissolve state 
Legislative Assemblies. The court laid down the following propositions : 
(i) Presidential proclamation dissolving a state legislative Assembly is 
subject to judicial review. 
(ii) Burden lies on the government of India to prove that relevant material 
existed (to justify the issue of proclamation). 
(iii) Courts would not go into the correctness of the material. 
(iv) If the court strikes down the proclamation it has power to restore the 
dismissed state government to office. 
(v) A state Government pursuing anti-secular politics is liable to action 
under Article 356. 
The six judgements in Bommai's case occupy 235 pages in the 
Supreme Court Cases (SCC). It deals with the large number of observations, 
often conflicting made in those judgements, therefore it is only desirable and 
purposeful here to give some detail in the line of the above propositions. 
The first and most important question which the Supreme Court had 
to determine was whether the President's proclamation under Art. 356 was 
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justiciable and, if so, to what extent. All judges were unanimous in holding 
that the President's proclamation was justiciable, though they differed widely 
as to the extent of the justiciability. Ahmad J. in muffled sort of way observed 
that: 
"since it was not disputed before us by the learned Attorney General 
and Mr. Parasaran, the learned Counsel for the Union of India, that a 
proclamation issued by the President on the advice of his Council of 
Ministers headed by the Prime Minister is amenable to judicial review, the 
contraversy narrows down to the determination of the scope and ambit of the 
judicial review i.e. in other words, to the area of justiciability".^^ 
As regards the judgement of Verma and Yogeshwar Dayal JJ. it is 
clear that it holds the President's proclamation is justiciable within very much 
narrower limits. There is no dispute that the proclamation issued under Article 
356 is subject to the judicial review. The deeming provision in Art. 355 is an 
indication that cases falling within its ambit are capable of judicial scrutiny 
by application of objective standards. The facts which attract the legal fiction 
that the constitutional machinery has failed are specified and their existence 
is capable of objective determination, it is, therefore, reasonable to hold that 
the cases falling under Art. 356 are justiciable". The other brother judges like 
Sawant J. for himself and Kuldeep Singh J. observed : 
"It is not disputed before us that is the proclamation issued under 
Art. 356(1) is open to judicial review. All that is conteded is that the scope of 
the review is limited".^^ 
K. Ramaswamy J. dealt with justiciablity of the President 
proclamation at length. He observed: "the question relating to the extent, 
scope and power of the President under Article 356 though wropped up with 
political thicket, per se it does not get immunity from judicial review".^^ 
The judgment of Jeevan Reddy J. contained an elaborate discussion 
of justiciability of the President's proclamation in which he reviewed 
numerous cases on the power of the Chief executive or the President of India 
to issue a proclamation under Article 356(1) was not immune from judicial 
review.^ '* He added that the proclamation was justiciable to the extend 
indicated by him in conclusion 7 which summerised his view on the question 
of justiciability. It is submitted that the unanimous decision of all the judges 
that the validity of the President's proclamation under Article 356 is 
justiciable is correct.^^ 
In the constitutional law of India^^ Dr. Basu has pointed out that 
judicial review of a proclamation under Article 356 would lie on any of the 
grounds upon which any executive determination which is founded on 
subjective satisfaction can be questionable. By way of exmaple he has cited 
the following grounds : 
(a) that the proclamation has been made upon a consideration which is 
wholly extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose for which the power under 
Article 356 had been conferred by the Constitution, namely, a breakdown of 
the constitutional machinery in a state, or, in other words, where there is no 
"reasonable nexus" between the reasons disclosed and the satisfaction of the 
President, because in such a case, it can be said that there has been no 
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"satisfaction" of the President which is a condition for exercise of the power 
under Article 356. 
(b) that the exercise of the power under Article 356 has been malafide, 
because a statutory order which lacks bonafides has no existence in law. 
Though the pre- hand proposition propounded by Dr. Basu is in 
confirmity with the unanimous opinion of the judges in the present case, yet 
justice K. Ramaswami did not consist the line with that of the satisfaction of 
an administrator. He observed : 
"The rule that the satisfaction reached by an adminsitrative officer 
when found to be based on irrelevant grounds, the whole order gets vitiated 
has no application to the action under Article 356, Judicial review of the 
Presidential proclamation is not concerned with the merits of the decision 
but to the manner in which the decision had been reached. The satisfaction of 
the President can not be equated with the descretion conferred upon an 
administrative agency of his subjective satisfaction upon objective material 
like in detention cases.... the satisfaction of the President being subjective, it 
is not judicially discoverable by any manageable standards and the court would 
not substitute their own satisfaction to that of the President".'^ 
Upto 1994, it has long been established that the President's 
satisfaction under the scheme of the Indian Constitution is of the Council of 
ministers enjoying confidence in the House. The immunities provided under 
the Constitution can not be enjoyed by the ministry by stating that they cannot 
be called before the Court. The propositions submitted by Dr. Basu have fully 
been acknowledged by the judiciary in Bommai's case this made the 
Presidential proclamation subject to judicial enquiry. 
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Yet another significant fact that now emerges is that the apex court 
could call upon the Union of India to disclose materials based upon which the 
President had formed the requisite satisfaction in taking over the 
administration of a state by dismissing the popular ministry. The majority 
judgment said that "it does not bar the court from calling upon the Union 
Council of Minister to disclose to the court the material upon which the 
President had formed the requisite satisfaction".^* As Jeevan Reddy and 
Agrawal JJ. put it, Article 74(2) does not mean that the Government of India 
need reveal the facts to the Court. Hence, the limited provision contained in 
Article 74(2) can not override the basic provision in the Constitution 
regarding judicial review". If any act of President is challenged in a court of 
law, "they continued", it is for the Council of Ministers to justify it by 
disclosing the material which formed the basis"^' of the act/order. The 
material placed before the President does not thereby become part of advice. 
Advice is what is based upon the said material. Material is not advice. The 
position all along has been that though the Court can not compel the 
government to produce the advice tendered by the ministers to the President 
or the reasons thereof, there is nothing to prevent the court to compel 
production of material upon which the advice or its reasoning was based. The 
position is now further confirmed. The relevant portion can be quoted from 
justice Sawant's observation -
"Article 74(2) which bars enquiry into the question whether any, and 
if so, what advice was tendered by Ministers to the President doesnot bar 
judicial review of reasons which led to the issuance of the proclamation. The 
object of Article 74(2) is not to exclude any material or documents from the 
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scrutiny of the courts but to provide that an order issued by or in the name of 
the President could not be questioned on the gorund that it was either contrary 
to the advice tendered by the Ministers or was issued without obtaining any 
advice from the Ministers. Its object was only to make the question whether 
the President had followed the advice of the Ministers or acted contrary 
thereto, non justiciable".^® .... Justice K. Ramaswami observed that "... the 
records other than the advice tendered by the Minister to the President, if 
found necessary, may be required to be produced before the Constitutional 
Court".^ ' 
But in the context P.P. Rao observed differently : 
"Disclosure of cabinet papers may not be in public interest. As a 
collective expression of judicial displeasure, the judgment is justified. But as 
a proposition of enduring value, it is likely to run into difficulties".^^ 
On Dissolution of the Assembly : 
As regards the stage when the power to dissolve the Assembly should 
be exercised, the apex court directed that the Assemblies of the State coming 
under central dispensation should not be dissolved until Presidential 
proclamation is approved by both Houses of Parliament."This is to ensure," 
the Court said, "Parliamentary control of executive action in the delicate area 
of Centre-State relation". Once Parliament places its seal, the court observed, 
further steps may be found necessary to achieve the purpose of the 
proclamation i.e. dissolution of the Assembly can be ordered. As Sorabjee 
points out appreciatively: 
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"The plain language of the provision does not impose any such 
requirement. The impelling consideration for reading into the article such 
limitation was the anxiety to place a check on the executive and also to ensure 
that grant of final relief does not become difficult if not infructuous. 
Historical realism prevailed over literalism".^^ 
The ruling of the Court is sound and valuable and accords with the 
principles of Parliamentary democracy functioning in a federal set up. 
However it does not make any qualitative change. Since the party in power 
commands a majority in Parliament, more often than not, approval of 
Parliament by a simple majority is not difficult to obtain. Further, the 
government could convene the Parliament as early as possible and get its 
approval before dissolving the Assembly and order early elections or wait till 
the ground is clear for their own party to face the election, the only advantage 
is that the Parliament will get an opportunity to deliberate on the proclamation 
and the opposition could expose the government in its true colours and in this 
way it may be possible, sometimes, to make situation delicate for the central 
government. Probably it is becauseof this reason that the check created by 
clause (3) of Article 356 has not proved to be effective in practice as it ought 
to have been. 
The Commission having considered opinions on this aspect in the 
background of repeated criticism of arbitrary use of article 356 by the 
executive, is of the view that the check provided under clause 3 of article 356 
would be ineffective by an irreversible decision before Parliament has had an 
opportunity to consider it. The power of dissolution has been inferred by 
reading sub-clause (a) of clause 1 of article 356 along with article 174 which 
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empowers the Governor to dissolve Legislative Assembly. Having regard to 
the overall constitutional scheme it would be necessary to secure the exercise 
of consideration of the proclamation by the Parliament before the Assembly 
is dissolved. The Commission, therefore, recommends that article 356 should 
be amended to ensure that the State Legislative Assembly should not be 
dissolved either by the Governor or the President before the proclamation 
issued under article 356(1) has been laid before Parliament and it as had an 
opportunity to consider it.^ ^ 
Determination of the Strength of the Ministry (Floor Test) : 
Another important question which was considered in Bommai was 
the proper method of testing the strenght of the ministry and to determine 
whether it has lost or still retains the confidence of the House. The court held 
that a ministry's strength should be tested on the floor of the House which 
alone "is the constitutionally ordained forum" and not by the private opinion 
of any individual, be he the Governor or the President". This rule can be 
departed from only in an extraordinary situation where because of all 
pervasive violence a free vote is not possible in the House. Jeevan Reddy and 
Agarwal JJ. also adverted to the importance of tenth schedule to the 
Constitution the objective of which is to prevent and discourage "floor 
crossing" and defection.^^ 
Applying this principle the prosidential proclamation dissolving 
Kamataka and Nagaland Assemblies were declared unconstitutional by the 
majority. However, since fresh election had taken place in both the States and 
new legislative assemblies and governments has come into existence, no 
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further relief was granted, and which was not prayed for before the Supreme 
Court. The dissolution of the Meghalaya Assembly was held to be tainted with 
factual and legal malafides. 
The affirmation by the court is very sound and due regard to the 
principle of natural justice and democracy and prevents the dismissal of 
democraticlly elected government on the flimsy ground that the ministry has 
lost the confidence of the House. Now the court established the principle that 
the loss of majority like the proof of majority should be established on the 
floor of the House. However, we cannot under estimate the aspect of power 
politics. In the world of power politics, it is an undisputable fact that 
incubency is the key factor which decides the outcome of floor test. K. 
Ramaswamy's dissenting judgement, that "A floor test may provide impetus 
for corruption and rank force and violence by musclemen or wrongful 
confinement or vocational capacity of legislators" is worth remembering. As 
long as the rulers of mankind are unable to suggest an acceptable alternative, 
however, floor test continues to be the sole practical means of estabablishing 
majority-with an exception made for the rarest of rare cases, covering virtual 
civil war condition. 
Hence, the issue of determining the majority support of a political 
party in the House in the form of floor test has found its place in the 
Rajamannar Committee Report, Sarkaria Commission's Report and the 
Bommai judgement. Likewise the Constitution Commission has recommended 
that the question whether the Ministry in a state has lost the confidence of the 
Legislative Assembly or not, should be decided only on the floor of the 
Assembly and nowhere else.^ ^ 
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Relief in Case of Malaflde Exercise of Power : 
The court also considered the question of what consequential 
direction should be issued on the quashing of the proclamation and whether 
those directions should also cover within their ambit the reinstatement of the 
State Governments and revival of the State Legislatures. The court observed 
that if the Presidential proclamation is held invalid "then Notwithstanding the 
fact that it is approved by both Houses of Parliament, it will be open to the 
court to restore the status quo ante " and bring back to life the Legislative 
Assembly and ministry.^^ The Court also held that in appropriate cases and if 
the situation demands it, the High Court/Supreme Court have the power by an 
interim injunction to restrain the holding of fresh elections to the legislative 
Assmebly pending the final disposal of the challenge the validity of the 
proclamation but not in such a manner as to allow the Assembly to continue 
beyond its original term. This it can do to avoid a fait accompli and to prevent 
"the remedy of judicial review (from) being rendering fruitless".^* Here it 
may be pointed out that if the case is taken to the court and if the court 
disapproves (even though the Parliament approves), the Legislature should not 
be dissolved. Here one can see that the Legislature is being made subservient 
to the judiciary. 
The political significance of the decision is that it will act as a bar 
on motivated and arbitrary dismissal of State Governments by the Centre as 
had happened in a number of cases in the recent past. The unseating of a 
ministry commanding a majority in the Assembly by applying Article 356 is a 
virtual dismissal through back door. Now that the courts could go into the 
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unanimity in upholding these Presidential proclamations and the court held 
that violation of any basic feature of the Constitution by a State Government 
is a valid ground for the exercise of Article 356. Secularism being part of the 
basic structure of the Constitution, its violation will justify use of Article 
356. Thus the apex court reiterated secularism a basic and inalienable feature 
of the Constitution - a feature nobody has any right to violate. Sw a^nt and 
Kuldip Singh JJ. reasoned : 
Secularism is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The 
acts of State Governments which are calculated to subvert or sabotage 
secularism as enshrined in our Constitution can lawfully be deemed to rise to 
a situation in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the constitution. In deciding the Bommai 
case the Supreme Court has enunciated the judicial and moral principles on 
which the practice of secularism is to be assessed.^' 
After laying down this rule, the court considered the material before 
the Centre in the cases under challenges. In justification of its decision the 
court considered the following materials before its consideration. First, the 
BJP manifesto on which the elections were contested and won in the three 
Sutes which interalia declared that "the party is committed to build Shri Ram 
Mandir at Janmasthan by relocating the super imposed Babri structure" and 
similar speeches by leaders of BJP were examined. Secondly, the judges also 
took into account the fact that some of the Chief Ministers and ministers 
belonged to the R.S.S. which was a banned organisation at the relevant time 
and also their inability to implement the ban on R.S.S., V.H.P. etc. Thirdly, the 
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exhortation by the B.J.P. ministers in these three states to join the Karseva in 
Ayodhya on 6 December also formed part of the material. Fourthly, the act of 
public send off to Karsevaks and welcoming them on their return after the 
destruction of the Mosque was also considered.One B.J.P. MLA in H.P. had 
publically admitted his participation in the destruction. At least in two 
States.namely M.P. and Rajasthan there were also atrocities against the 
Muslims and loss of lives and destruction of property and this too was taken 
note of by the judges. 
After considering all these facts the court came to the reasoning 
that there was enough material that the government of the State could not be 
carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, 
The court's decision in this respect had in a way "broadened the field 
of Presidential proclamation^^ under Article 356 in as much as justification 
for such a proclamation can be based not on some concrete act of the State 
Government but upon the mere apprehension that it would not implement the 
order of the central government. This decision has given a new dimension and 
a long rope to the central government. The dictum as such has extended the 
ambit and width of the power to issue Presidential Proclamation under Article 
356. In this context the observation of Sahya is quite significant and relevant. 
He said : 
"By making secularism a basic feature of the Constitution but taking 
a rather limited view of justiciability, the Court has left the Central 
Government, though in a much more sophisticated way than it has done so far. 
Whatever material placed before the Court, in the bar of public opinion it is 
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well known that the dismissal of the three State Governments in which the 
BJP was in power was an unfair act intended to hide the Centre's own 
shortcoming in protecting the demolition of the Babri Masjid".^^ 
A critical analysis of the decision could now be attempted. The 
verdict evoked mixed reaction among politicians, journalists and 
constitutional experts. While recording his resentment against the decision 
L.K. Advani observed that "the verdict was erroneous". He said that the 
Judiciary had no right to set itself as an "ideological ombudsman". There was 
no clear rational validity for the dismissal of the three BJP governments, 
while all other instances of the use of Article 356 before the court had been 
overturned.^* The CPI-M unreservedly welcomed the judgement. Prakash 
Karat, CPM polit bureau member, described it as a "land mark verdict" which 
need to be widely published and disseminated and could serve as a weapon in 
future struggle against the politics of communalism. "There is a fundamental 
point that the judgement makes", he pointed out, "secularism can only mean 
that religion cannot intrude into politics".^^ As such the judgement could be 
"the basis for further enactment to strengthen existing provisions of law on 
the separation of religion and politics".^^ 
Constitutional experts also took widely divergent view of the 
judgement. Soli J. Sorabjee, the former Attorney General of India, welcomed 
the judgement. He observed : 
The decision in Bommai makes the high watermark of judicial 
review. It is a very salutary development and will go a long way in minimising 
Centre's frequent onslaught on the states who, as rightly pointed out, "are 
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neither satellite nor agent of the Centre" and "have as important a role to play 
in the political social educational and cultural life of the people as the Union". 
However, there is a genuine concern about misuse by the Centre of Article 
356 on the pretext that the state Government is acting in defiance of the 
essential features of the Constitution. The real safeguard will be full judicial 
review extending to an enquiry into the truth and correctness of the basic 
facts relied upon in support of the action under Article 356 as indicated by 
Sawant and Kuldip SinghJ' 
While supporting the judgement F.S. Nariman, a senior Supreme 
Court lawyer, expressed the view that the affirmation that secularism is a 
basic feature of the Constitution is a welcome development. This, he said, is 
the single most important aspect of the judgement. The definition of the 
concept is reasonable and would "serve as a good starting point" for further 
judicial refinement.'* 
However, K.K. Venugopal, the former Solicitor General of India, 
was not entirely convinced of the merit of the judgement, which he finds as 
inconsistent in parts.'^ The same view was also taken by Prashant Bhushan, a 
legal expert, who too was unimpressed by the status accorded to secularism as 
a basic feature."Socialism too is written into the Preamble to the constitution" 
he pointed out. He further posed the question "Does this mean that 
government could be dismissed on the ground that they follow policies 
inimical to socialism? How long would the Central Government itself with its 
new economic policies, survive if that were to be the case"?*° 
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With regard to the exercise of power of judicial review in cases 
challenging the abuse of power, vested in the Central Government under 
Article 356(1), the Supreme Court judgement which came in Bommai Vs. 
Union of India upheld the ruling given in State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India 
that it was competent of the courts to entertain the petition. In the earlier 
case the judgement very much circumscribed the scope of investigation which 
could be done only if the grounds taken to be the basis of calling for the 
action were made known by the government and are alleged to be malafide, 
extraneous or irrelevant. In Bommai vs. Union of India the Supreme Court 
ruled that Article 74(2) did not prohibit the court from enquiring into the 
facts which formed the basis of the advice made to the President to declare 
emergency under Article 356 unless the government took the plea of secrecy 
which was granted by the court. The court held that it was incumbent on the 
government to defend the action, on the ground of facts contained in the 
advice, and prove that the impunged action did not suffer from malafide and 
was germane to the extra-ordinary conditions existing in the state. It would be 
binding on the government to produce in the court all papers and relevant 
material forming the basis of the advice. Thus the judgement in this case with 
the cover of immunity which the government had enjoyed so far, under the 
camouflage of the conferment of power on the President was taken off 
because the President did not take action on his own and acted only on the 
advice of the government. The judgement rejected the perverse philosophy 
formulated in the State of Rajasthan vs. Union of India that the Central 
government could dissolve the state government to have a better coordination 
and effective implementation of its socio-economic policies in the 
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perspective of planned development. Another ground taken was that in a 
democracy it was quite legitimate to seek more power through the process of 
elections. In Bommai vs.. Union of India Justice Ahmadi rejected the view 
lock, stock and barrel. He said, "having noticed the nature of the federal 
structure under the Constitution, the possibility of different political parties 
ruling at the Centre and in one or mere states cannot be ruled out. The 
constitution clearly permits it. Therefore, the mere defeat of the ruling party 
at the Centre cannot by itself entitle the newly elected party which comes to 
power at the Centre to advise the President to dissolve the assemblies of 
those states where the party in power is other than one in power at the Centre. 
Merely because if a different party is elected to power at the centre, even 
with a thumping majority, is no ground to hold that, "a situation has arisen in 
which the government of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the 
provision of the Constitution" which is the requirement for the exercise of 
power under Article 356 of the constitution. To exercise power under the said 
provision and to dissolve the state Assemblies solely on the ground of a 
newly elected party having come to 'power' at the Centre with a sweeping 
majority would, to say the least, betray intolerance on the part of the Central 
Government clearly basing the exercise of power under Article 356(1) on 
consideration extraneous to the said provision and therefore legally 
malafide.*' 
Recently, in 1996 when elections were held to the Uttar Pradesh 
Legislative Assembly no party secured a majority to form the govermnent. So, 
President's Rule was imposed in the State and this proclamation was 
subbsequently approved by the Parliament. Against this imposition of 
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President's Rule five petitions were filled in the Allahabad High Court. A two 
member bench delivered a split verdict on 11 November 1996, necessiating 
the referring of the matter to a three-member bench. 
The court unanimously held that the impugned Presidential 
proclamation dated 17 October 1996 reimposing President's Rule in U.P. and 
subsequently approved by Parliament was unconstitutional, issued in 
colourable exercise of power and was based on wholly irelevant and 
extraneous grounds and therefore, could not be allowed to stand. 
Consequently the proclamation was quashed.*^ However, to avoid any crisis as 
a result to the quashing of the aforesaid proclamation, the court, by applying 
the doctrine of prospective overruling, directed that the judgement shall come 
into operation only after the pronounced date for the resumption of political 
process in the State. 
Even though the verdict quashing the Presidential proclamation was 
unanimous, the three judges cited different reasons in their respective 
judgements. B.M. Lai J. observed that the Governor of U.P. was 
constitutionally not bound to invite the single largest party to form a 
government, in case, it did not have the confidence of the House. But at the 
same time he was constitutionally bound and obliged to explore all 
possibilities.*' 
B. Brajcsh Kumar J. ruled that there is neither any convention nor 
any constitutional provision under which the leader of largest single party, not 
in majority, must be called to form the government except where the Governor 
was satisfied that it would have the support of any other party in minority and 
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would enjoy the confidence of the House. He said that the period of 
President's Rule could not be extended beyond one year except in the situation 
prevailing under Article 356(5) of the Constitution and concluded that the 
reimposition of President's Rule on 19 October 1996 was not a fresh 
proclamation but rather an extension of a proclamation that was already a year 
old. 
Quite a novel thing happened in Uttar Pradesh in 1998 when 
Governor Romesh Bhandari, being of the view that the Chief Minister Kalyan 
Singh Ministry had lost majority in the Assembly dismissed him without 
giving him opportunity to prove his majority on the floor of the House and 
appointed Shri Jagdambika Pal as Chief Minister which was challenged by 
Shri Kalyan Singh before the High Court which by an intrim order put Shri 
Kalyan again in position as Chief Minister. This order was challenged by Shri 
Jagdambika Pal before the Supreme Court which directed a "composite floor 
test" to be held between the contending parties which resulted in Shri Kalyan 
Singh securing majority. Accordingly, the impugned interim order of High 
Court was made absolute.*^ 
The Jagdambika Pal's case is a reflection of the judicial progress 
which in turn a proof of the contribution in constitutional jurisprudence. The 
theory deducted by way of construction of the constitution has been an instant 
need of Indian constitutional system. The President and the Parliament found 
short in protecting the constitutional misuse for political purposes. It is now 
expected that the judicial weapon can preclude from abusing the provisions of 
the Constitution which have colourably been interpreted with their own line 
by the politicians. 
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Chapter - 6 
ARTICLE 3 5 6 IN COALITION 
CONTEXT : To B E RETAINED OR 
A half century of constitutional existence and a century of cynically 
imposed Central rule later, it is clear that all political parties, the Congress in 
profusion, adopted gleefully the Churchill approach and dumped, even more 
gleefully, the hope and faith of the founding fathers. No. other provision 
received such grievous and repeated outraging of constitutional modesty as 
Article 356 and its colonial precursor, Section 45 of the Government of India 
Act of 1935 amply made clear why. The Article was meant ot be misused; or, 
rather, it was meant to be an enabling provision and not an exceptional, 
emergency measure. As early as in June 1951, Jawahar Lai Nehru conveyed as 
such when, to remove the then Chief Minister of Punjab-Gopichand Bhargava 
- he brought the state under emergency and imposed President's Rule. Eight 
years later, his daughter as Congress President followed the Churchillian 
advice to the dot and "arranged the breakdown" of the constitutional machinery 
to get the Namboodiripad Ministry in Kerala desmissed. 
The tradition continues. The Congress vehemently opposed the 1935 
Act but effortlessly absorbed the malevolent spirit of measure once it 
replaced the British as the ruler of the subcontinental nation. And it passed on 
the baton to the Janata Party in 1977, got it back in 1980, 1984 and 1991 to 
pursue the policy which had by now acquired the imprimature of a routine 
constitutional instrument in the hands of whoever was in the power. The 
interlopers, the Janata Dal, the BJP, and the United Front, imbibed the true 
spirit of the Article and its usefulness for those in power as shown in the 
following table 
TABLE 
IMPOSITION OF PRESIDENT'S RULE BY PRIME MINISTERS 
Regime 
Jawaharlal Nehru 
Lai Bahadur Shastri 
Indka Gandhi 
Morarji Desai & 
Charan Singh 
Rajiv Gandhi 
V.P. Singh 
Chandra Shekhar 
P.V. Narasimha Rao 
H.D. Deve Gowda 
Inder Kumar Gujral 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
Total 
1950-May '64 
June '64-Jan '66 
1966-77, 1980-84 
1970-80 
1984-89 
Dec '89-Nov '90 
Nov'90-June'91 
June '91-May '96 
June '96-April '97 
May '97-April '98 
April '98-Feb '99 
No. of times 
7 
2 
48 
16 
6 
2 
4 
11 
2 
0' 
2 
100^ 
And now everyone plays the game according to rules. When in 
opposition, ask for the abolition, amendment or abrogation of Article 356 and 
in power at the Centre abuse the power for political ends. Thus, the Congress, 
the grossest misuser of Article 356, finds nothing incongruous about 
protesting against the BJP's move on Bihar. The BJP, which piously 
proclaimed in its manifesto of 1996 that "we will explore the possibility of 
making it mandatory for the Union Government to seek Parlimant's approval 
by two-thirds majority for dismissal of State Governments," thinks nothing of 
violating its own stated position. As for the Janus-faced duplicity of the 
Communist parties, one need only in recall their mealy-mouthed defence of 
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the imposition of President's Rule in Gujarat by the UF Government of Deve 
Gowda in 1996 after the BJP Government there proved its majority on the 
floor of the House. 
The Sarkaria Commission^, which has analysed 75 cases of 
President's rule from June 1951 to May 1987, has classified them into six 
categories: 
a 18 cases of special category following the Lok Sabha eletions in 1977 
and 1980. 
b. 13 cases when Ministries commanded 'majority' 
c. 15 cases without giving a chance to claimants 
d. 3 cases where no caretaker Ministry was constituted 
e. 3 cases in the context of reorganisation of states 
The Article has been used as it had been intended to. There are only 
two choices before the country. Do away with Article 356 and let 
Governments do what they like or let the Article remain as it is and let 
Governments do what they like. There's no third option and there's no second 
way. 
Hence, misuse of Article 356 has produced a pressure on the minds 
of, not only common people but constrtutional expert also with the result a 
call for national debate on Article 356. Opinion makers seem to have 
polarised into two camps - those who want to retain the provision and those 
who insist on scrapping it. All texts are produced in particular contexts. The 
Indian Constitution too is a text formulated in a context. The Indian state 
emerged after the division of an entity (call it a nation or a civilisation) 
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believed to have an essential unity for centuries. At the time of formulating 
the Constitution the threat to further division had not yet disappeared. 
Has the context changed? One familiar with contemporary Indian 
social reality cannot answer this question in the affirmative. Anybody who is 
familiar with the trajectory of multi-national states cannot rule out the 
possibility of threats to the Indian state surfacing in future. Which is to say 
that there is a prima facie case for retaining the Constitutional provision. 
Because in the final analysis Article 356 is for and about maintaining the 
unity and integrity of India. 
I must add a caveat here. No context remains static for ever. But the 
perception regarding the quality of change varies. And this perception is a 
variant depending upon one's socio-economic location and ideological 
disposition. Not only that, even the same person's perception should change 
depending upon the role-shift. The 'problem' that we face, is largely, if not 
exclusively, the obstinacy with which the perceptions of some of the role-
incumbents persist. Most of our PresidentsA^ice-Presidents and Governors 
were/are ex-politicians and/or ex-bureaucrats. In the prevailing dispensation 
they are viewed as receivers of 'rewards' for their loyalty to their erstwhile 
parties and political leaders. But their role is drastically different in that they 
are upholders of the constitution which calls for scrupulous of the 
constitution political neutrality. The mismatch between the 'reward' for their 
past loyalty and the requirement of their present role-performance is at the 
root of much of the tension faced in the application of Article 356. 
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The Constitution refers to India as a Union of States but it does not 
provide for the right of secession to its constituents. At the apex of this 
hierarchy is the Central Government and at the bottom are the panchayats. 
Just as the State Governments cannot and will not tolerate the recalcitrance of 
local self-governments (zilla parishads) and panchayats) beyond a point, the 
Centre cannot accomodate the challenge posed by the states when it crosses 
the Laxman Rekha. The issue is who should draw and sustain the boundary. 
Admittedly, it is drawn in the constitution and should be sustained by its 
accredited agents - the President and the Governors. And that is why these 
role-incumbents - the Presidents and the Governors - should be politically 
neutral. 
Beneath the clamour for scrapping Article 356 is the refusal to 
accept the implied hierarchy in Centre-State relations. Therefore it is no 
accident that those who are most vociferous for scrapping the Article are 
leaders and supporters of either 'regional' parties or 'all-India' parties with no 
prospect of capturing power at the Centre. But it's cannot be gain said that 
even after India becomes a functioning democratic federal polity with 
adequate and appropriate autonomy for the constituent units, the role of 
coordinator and fmal arbiter would remain. And only the central authority can 
perform the function. In performing this role it may have to invoke Article 
356 sparingly and judiciously. 
Political neutrality is not simply a function of the personality 
endowment of the role incumbents. It is as much a resultant of the property of 
the situations in which they function. During the hey day of one-party 
dominance in India the Presidents and Governors largely, if not entirely. 
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belonged to the Congress system. Those days, dissent occurred and opposition 
existed within the one-party system and not oustside of it. Rebels and 
rebellions there were but they could be easily silenced as witnessed in the 
presidential election contested by Sanjeeva Reddy and V.V. Giri. That is, under 
one-party dominance political neutrality was not only, not possible it was not 
even necessary. 
The situation varied enormously with the gradual erosion and final 
demise of the Congress and emergence of coalitional politics. By coalitional 
politics I am not only referring to the politics of recent governments at the 
Centre, but also to the rupture that began by the mid-1950s with the capture 
of State Governments by opposition parties. Gradually, the disjuncture 
between the party in power at the Centre and the opposition parties in power 
in the states, widened. During the interim period - the period between one-
party dominance when both at the Centre and in the states when one party 
ruled and the current multiple party regime at the Centre when the possibility 
of several parties assuming power in turn emerged - Article 356 was invoked 
frequently and inappropriately. 
As and when the government at the Centre changed, it was believed 
to be an imperative that the State Governments too must change. The dictum 
was that the same party ought to be in power both at the Centre as well as in 
the states for the health of the polity. This assumption was reflective of the 
transitional anomie in the interim period of Indian politics - from one party 
dominance to several party regime. With the crystallisation of the current 
coalition politics, those who are charged with the responsibility of upholding 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution came to be drawn from a wide political 
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spectrum. If some of them are loyal to one party or set of parties, others are 
committed to another party or set of parties. That is why we witness the 
strange spectacles of some Governors becoming hyperactive and others 
remaining utterly passive even when the conditions of the states they preside 
over are precisely the same. 
It is hinted at the possibility of differential interpretations of a text, 
particularly when the context varies. But the real problem arises when varying 
interpretations are made about the same text even when the context remains 
constant. It is here that the political preferences and ideological dispositions 
of the role incumbents who interpret the text becomes relevant. If they are 
intimidated to feel that their positions are made rewards for their past loyalty 
and future obedience to particular political parties, the retention or scrapping 
of Article 356 will not make any difference to the quality of working of 
Indian polity. On the contrary, if they are viewed as upholders of the 
Constitution in letter and spirit, the retention of Article 356 will not in any 
way whittle down the autonomy of states and integrity of federal India. The 
problem is not with the text but with its interpreters. 
But the interpreters too are products of their time. President K.R. 
Narayanan made history by returning twice the Cabinet recommendations to 
proclaim Presidential rule to two different political establishments.. This is a 
measure not only of Constitutional appropriateness but also of moral 
conviction. He could command both because he is a consensual and not a 
partisan President, Both the political establishments which he has apparently 
not 'offended' have supported his Presidential candidacy. His political 
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neutrality is a function of political consensus about him. Can we not think in 
terms of evolving a mechanism through which consensual and not partisan 
Governors are appointed? 
On the question - should Article 356 be detected ? - the National 
Conunission to review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC)'* had issued 
a consultation paper along with a questionnaire with a view to elicit the views 
and responses of the public. Large majority of responses were against deletion 
of article 356 but favoured its being suitably amended to prevent misuse. The 
reasons traced out by the Commission for retaining the article 356 are mainly 
three :-
(i) Article 356 and related provisions were regarded as a bulwark of the 
Constitution, an ultimate assurance of maintaining or restoring representative 
government in states responsible to the people. 
(ii) In a fairly number of cases the invocation of article 356 has been 
found to have been not only warranted but inevitable. 
(iii) If this article is deleted, article 365 would lose relevance and use of 
article 355 in the absence of 356 might bring a drastic change in Union-State 
relations which may be worse from the point of view of both the states and 
union. 
A study in 2002 by this Constitution Commission (NCRWC), 
showed that out of the 111 cases of imposition of President's Rule since the 
Constitution came into force in 1950, only in a little over 20 instances it 
could be said that Article 356 had been misused to deal with political 
problems or considerations such as maladministration. The NCRWC found 
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that in many cases the exercise of this power was inevitable. However, in view 
of the fact that the Article represents a giant instrument of Constitutional 
control of one tier over the other, it causes misapprehensions. 
Recently, the Eighth Inter-State Council (ISC) held its meeting in 
Srinagar on August 27 and 28, 2003 has shown the consensus on strong 
federal pressures appear to have convinced both the Centre and states. 
However, ISC had been in favour of constitutional reforms on this issue.^ 
The coalitional turn from single party dominancy at Centre in the 
form of NDA government led by Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) has been taught 
by its own experience with multi-party coalition that its earlier obsession 
with the principle of a "strong centre vis-a-vis the states" in conformity with 
its nationalistic and patriotic platform, would yield little political ground, 
with its allies and other key constitutional functionaries suspecting the 
motives behind every improtant federal decision taken by its government. On 
the contrary the Congress (I), which has been primarily responsible for the 
rampant misuse of this power during the decades when it was in power at the 
Centre, has realised the need for Constitutonal safeguards against the misuse 
of the ARticle, as the party is in power in many states and faces the risk of 
politically motivated action by Centre. As far as the regional parties are 
concerned, many of whom would like this power to be abrograted when they 
are in power rather than in opposition in the States. 
A changing position can be seen in case of BJP government headed 
by Narendra Modi in Gujrat in 2002. The BJP led-govemment at centre 
invoked Article 365 not Article 356 invoked to answer the opposition's 
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demand to use Art. 356 against government in Gujrat in the background of its 
abject failure to contain the anti-Muslim pogrom. Thus, the ISC is not in 
favour of Art. 356 being deleted but has shown concern to ensure transparency 
in the exercise of power. The ISC has agreed with the recommendations of 
Sarkaria Commission. The ISC has also agreed to recommendation of the 
NCRWC to amend Article 356 in line with the Supreme Court's judgment in 
S.R. Bommai Vs. Union of India (1994) - to ensure that the State Legislative 
Assembly is not dissolved by the Governor or the President before the 
proclamation issued under the Article is approved by the Lok Sabha and Rajya 
Sabha. Hence, it is to be submtited that the facts are in favour of not to 
abrogate the Article 356 but to retain it with some procedural amendments in 
the whole code of President-proclamation. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
A N D 
SUGGESTIONS 
A long journey - more than a half century - of our constitutional set 
up in terms of governing the country discloses the fact that a coalition 
governing process in the system as a reality in itself.^  During June 96 - April 
97, the Government headed by H.D. Deve Gowda, was a kind of curiousity in 
the World of political History. The Prime Minister's party has got only 44 
MPs and all the parties having formed the government put together do not 
account for more than 150 MPs in the Lok Sabha having a total strength of 
545 members. So the major political challenge that India faces today is how 
to make coalitions a viable proposition of government while in states like 
Orissa, West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura, the coalition formula has worked 
reasonably well, the experience of the centre has proved to be a total fiasco. 
The experience of coalition and Minority governments has widened the 
horizone of political leaders and have enlarged the participating space for a 
large assortment of parties and regions in the process of governance. Though 
on an average coalition governments are less stable than on party system 
governments. Yet under certain conditions, they have shown more stability. 
However, it is considerable situation in which the pre-condition to extend the 
support by the party - national or regional happens to be not only 
unideological but unethical with the tone of constitutional morality^, who will 
know the fate of such government, this is not a hypothetical situation but a 
live example of our coalition era. The creditability of such alliances as could 
be seen from the attitude of ALADMK which came up with certain conditions 
including the arbitrary dismissal of the then government by opposition for 
according support to the B.J.P. 
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The small parties which have come together to form the minority 
govenmient have only their smallness in common. They have fought elections 
against each other. Any strife between two reasonal parties forming part of 
the combine or a controversy over an action or ommission of the Prime 
Minister or another Minister, or an internal calamity or disturbance, or an 
external event affecting deeply the country may bring down the government. 
What is disturbing is that in case the Government falls, the prospect 
of a strong majority emerging is dim, if elections are held without some 
reforms for that purpose. We may again get a hung Parliament! However, a 
stability is very much required for the efficiency of the Government and also 
to inspire confidence to the external financial world. For the present 
Parliamentary system to work properly two parties almost equally strong 
sharing the power alternatively, are required. But such a pattern is the result 
of historical factors in a few countries. We can not expect such a situation to 
spring up to its own in India. 
After Independence, we had the rehearsal of democracy with one 
giant party along the miniscule parties was growing to be a challenge to the 
old depository of power, the old party weakened by way of successive splits. 
The new big party developed cracks even before it could achieve majority in 
the country as a whole. Simultaneously we have been witnessing the growth of 
strong regional parties which stand in the way of the development of being 
national parties. So the historical trend in independent India is not towards the 
emergence of big and disciplined national parties, essential for stability. 
Some steps have to be taken towards that end. Of course we can not create 
artificially a two party regime, but we can certainly create conditions 
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favourably for its emergence or at least for reaching a stable majority in 
Parliament. 
The first thing to be done to make the present system work is to 
regulate the political parties. The present system is a government by parties; 
parties offer a choice for the representation of the people in parliament; the 
party is the meeting point of the majority and the government. However, the 
constitution which is quite elaborate and consists of not less than 395 articles 
does not contain any provision in respect of political parties. The 
Representation of the People Acts, 1950 and 1951 also did not embody any 
substantive provision in respect of parties, which appear only in schedules and 
nomination forms. It fell on the Election Commission to prescribe the 
particulars to be given by political parties for getting themselves registered 
which it did in the Elections Symbols (Reservation and allotment) order 1968. 
For some check on split, we had to wait for 52nd Amendment of the 
Constitution in 1985, known as the Anti-Defection Law and till 1989, for 
insertion in the Representation of the People Act 1951, of section 29A 
containing elaborate provisions for the registration of the parties. But the 
internal functioning of parties was not adverted to. 
So it is high time that the lacuna is filled up by adequate statutory 
provisions regarding the constitution and mode of functioning of parties in 
order to ensure their commitment to democracy throughout in order to create 
democracy within the parties.-' 
With the fundamental step to be taken even before parties are 
regulated is to prescribe that a party would be entitled to fight the Lok Sabha 
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elections only if it presents candidates in all the constituencies in the country. 
These provisions will have the following effect -
(A) The effect of reducing the number of parties present in the Lok Sabha, 
there will be a regrouping of a political forces. The proliferation of 
parties on account of negligible difference of opinion or on account of 
personal friction or out of unbridled ambition will curbed. 
(B) Such provisions will help the formation of parties of truely national 
character taking into acocunt problems of all the various parts of the 
country and adverting to them in a national perspective. 
(C) It will bring about a true national integration and not the artificial one 
which is being attempted by all kinds of administrative measures and 
incentives. 
(D) It will bring about a true national integration and not the artificial one 
which is attempted by all kinds of administrative measures and 
incentives. 
Since on the other side the present system may lead soon to a 
Parliament with the majority belonging to one part of the country and the 
opposition to another part. Such a geographical divide, if it takes place, would 
be a real danger to our nation marked by diversity and majority and opposition 
should be prevalent all over the country. The electoral law should be 
conducive to it. 
In addition to enacting new laws conducive to bring the healthy party 
system, the Representation of the People Act 1951, need to be amended. 
Another thing needs to be done is that the politics of defection, which has 
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drained out the whole ethos of the system, should be jettisoned lock, stock 
and barrel.'* The existing Act on the subject is defective because it gives 
premium to defection. Defection, by its very nature, is destructive of the 
principle of mandate, party system; parliamentary government and political 
stability. 
Though it is not much purposeful to compare the number of 
occasions on which the President's rule were imposed during the period of 
coalition government with that of non-coalition counterpart. Yet it is analysed 
that the demand within the government by coalition formation found inherent 
based condition of supposition. However, the rate of success remained lesser 
due to the coalition factor in opposition. In fact it was the period of single 
dominant party enjoying majority the Parliament, that laid a treck for running 
its successor in dismissing the government in the State. During whole period, 
either the government was dismissed due to the factor of opposite party ruled 
state or settle the internal differences within the party. The same political 
motivation is more or less reflected in the whole dismissal episode but it is a 
new phenomenon reflected during coalition age as a demand of allies. 
The controversy in relation to the Article, shivers the very roots of 
constitutional institutions in the system. The conferment of the power to 
exercise the provision is coupled with the constitutional duty to protect the 
constitution. The institutions which are under bounden-duty to defend the 
constitution are the President, the Parliament, the Governor and the judiciary. 
Among them a long history of misuse of the provision implicate not only 
President and Governor but Parliament also. Till the judgement was delivered 
in state of Rajasthan Vs. Union of India, holding that if the facts, forming the 
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basis of declaration of emergency, were known and malafides are alleged the 
court could entertain the petition but before this case was decided the states 
High Court had held that it was none of its concern to sit in judgement on 
action taken by the President. Interpreting the Constitution these courts had 
held that the Parliament was the only authority intended to have a decisive say 
in the matter, either by approving or rejecting the resolution and the exercise 
of judicial review was not permitted by the Constitution. The Parliament is 
though an exalted and dignified institution yet, by its nature, character and 
complexion is highly partisan and hence the Parliament, strictly controlled by 
the centre government, is thoroughly incompetent to perform judicial function 
because the overtones are highly political and the consequences to the State 
government are very serious. 
Now it is not difficult to discern an outrageous praradox, made to 
project from the powers and position, stipulated to be conferred both on the 
President and the Governor. The President being the head of the Federal State, 
has to do much of the balancing between the centre and the States to fulfil his 
sacred trust of defending and protecting the Constitution and the Govenror, on 
the other hand, had none of such function to perform yet the former was 
stripped of his powers conferred by the law of the Constitution while the later 
was made vested with unlimited discretionary powers. It did not accord with 
the system envisaged by the Constitution yet every thing came to be 
manipulated with a view to make the system subservient to the petty and paltry 
expediency of the Central Government. 
However, on the point the presidential act done by K.R. Narayanan 
consequently halted an errant government in its tracks by using his 
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Constitutional authority and influencing it with his own high moral stature in 
context with the dismissal of the Rabri Devi government in Bihar. In this case 
the Union government bypassed the Supreme Court's guidelines and ignored 
its own commitment not to misuse Article 356. Mr. Narayanan's second return 
of a government recommendation for dismissal of an elected state 
government should persuade political parties - all inveterate sinners while in 
office and convenient crusaders while in opposition to get together and agree 
on a minimum set of rules for the imposition of President's rule in any state. 
Hence, precedant set by the President ought to be respected by the subsequent 
one. 
To extricate the system from other factors of subversion it is called 
forth that the procedure and method of Governor's appointment should be 
changed and brought in line with the requirements of the federal parliamentary 
system. He should be appointed by the President on the joint recommendation 
of the Prime Minister, the leader of the opposition and the Chief Minister of 
the state where he is being appointed. In addition to it his discretionary 
powers, which arc unlimited and paradoxical to the Parliamentary system 
should be spelled out and catalogued in articulate terms lest he should have 
the freedom to act in a lackadaisical way. 
Now in relation to the Provision, since the time of its framing, 
Article 356 has generated serious controversy because the founding fathers 
apprehended that there was possibility of this Article "being abused or 
employed for political purposes" or being resorted to for "unneccessary or 
intolerant action through political prejudice." Also they apprehended that the 
Centre might "intervene in petty provincial matters" on the "slightest pretext" 
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"on the pretext of resolving ministerial crisis or on the pretext of purifying or 
reforming maladministration obtaining in a particular State" or on the ground 
of "mismanagement or inefficiency or corruption in a province," or for 
resolving "a mere crisis or a vote of no-confidence in the Ministry by the 
Legislature," or for ensuring "good government" thus "reducing the autonomy 
of the States to a farce. In fact Dr. Ambedkar echoed the sentiments of the 
framers when he said : "The proper thing we ought to expect is that such 
articles will never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead 
latter." 
The main reason for the incorporation of this Article was that the 
founding father recognised the fact that in a country of sub-continental 
dimensions, immense dimensions, immense diversities, socio-economic 
disparities and multitudinous people, with possible divided loyalties, security 
of nation and stability of its polity could not be taken for granted. External 
aggression in Jammu and Kashmir, the emergence of disruptive forces and 
widespread violent disturbances in the wake of partition made them feel the 
imperative need for bestowing the Union with overriding powers to control 
and direct all aspects of administration and legislation throughout the country 
during an emergency arising out of external aggression, internal disturbance 
or the dreakdown of the constitutional machinery in a State. The Constitution 
gives plenary authority to the States to make laws and administer them in the 
field assigned to them. That being so, pointed out Dr. Ambedkar in the 
Constituent Assembly, the Centre's interference in the administration of 
provincial affairs must be 'by and under' some constitutional obligations, so 
that the 'invasion' by the Centre in the provincial field "must not be an invasion 
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which is wanton, arbitrary and unauthorised by law".^ This constitutional 
obligation and authority, as stated by Article 356, was considered essential in 
order to contain the activities of desintegrating and divisive forces. 
The provisions relating to the imposition of President's Rule 
constitute an important exception and limitation to the principle of 
constitution and limitation to the principle of constitutional Governments in 
the States. President's Rule brings to an end, for the time being, a duly elected 
Government, A responsible Government in the State, during the period of 
proclamation, is replaced by a responsible government at the Centre in respect 
to matters falling normally in the State's sphere. It may be argued that a larger 
democracy temporarily takes control of a smaller democracy. This because 
the Constitution does not suspend the constitutional machinery in the State 
concerned. 
There is however, a shift in the power structure. And this shift in the 
power structure does constitute federal coercion. This is a very tricky power. 
Exercised correctly, it may operate as a safety mechanism for the system. 
Abused or misused, it can destroy the Union and the States. A wide literal 
constitutional distribution of powers between the Union and the States. A 
wide literal construction of Article 356 (1) will reduce the constitutional 
distribution of powers between the Union and the States to a licence 
dependent on the pleasure of the 'Union Executive. Further, it will enable the 
Union Excutive to cut at the root of the parliamentary form of government in 
the State and will act against the idea of federation. 
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It may be recalled that Dr. Ambedkar also told the Constituent 
Assembly "when we say that the Constitution must be maintained in 
accordance with the provisions contained in this constitution we practically 
mean what the American Constitution means, namely that the form of the 
Constitution prescribed in this constitution must be maintained.^ In view of 
the different interpretations given by Dr. Ambedkar, it appears that he himself 
was not quite clear about the true meaning of the term, "failure of the 
constitutional machinery." This led the study team of the Administrative 
Reforms Commission to comment that what constitutes a failure of the 
constitutional machinery and calls for the use of this Article has not been and 
will not be authoritatively defined. As a result, the Governors in various States 
interpreted and applied Article 356 in different ways under analogous 
situations. 
Although it was expected that these extraordinary provisions would 
not be invoked for any extraneous purposes other than in the case of a 
breakdown of the constitutional machinary, in practice it has been the other 
way round. Since the Constitution came into vogue, this Article has been 
invoked on 111 occasions (upto March 2002). The very fact that Article 356 
was resorted to even during the Nehru period to thwart the formation of non-
Congress Ministries or to resolve an internal crisis in the ruling party became 
a trend-setter for the post-Nehruvion period as well. 
Different Committtees and Commissions, such as the Administrative 
Reforms Commission, the Governors' Committee, the Sarkaria Commission 
did not suggest deletion of this Article. The Sarkaria Commission felt that the 
Article should remain as an ultimate constitutional weapon to cope with 
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situations having a bearing on the preservation of unity and integrity of the 
country and upholding the Constitution. Article 356, has, indeed, solved many 
seemingly intractable problems. Given the right political conditions, it might 
be possible for any Governor to avoid turning to this Article. Actually, the 
problem lies not in the constitutional provision but in its application. What is 
required is delineating proper safeguards against its arbitrary, partisan and 
malafide use. 
The Sarkaria Conmiission has made comprehensive and wideranging 
recommendations to guard against the abuse and misuse of this Article by the 
party in power at the Centre: 
1. Article 356 should be used sparingly, in extreme cases, as a measure of 
last resort, when all available alternatives fail to prevent or rectify a 
break-down of constitutional machinery in the State. 
2. A warning should be issued to the errant State, in specific terms that it is 
carrying on the Government of the State in accordance with the 
Constitution. Before taking action under Article 356, any explanation 
received from the State should be taken into account. 
3. When an 'external aggression' or 'internal disturbance' paralyses the State 
administration creating a situation that drifts towards a political 
breakdown of the constitutional machnery of the State, all alternative 
courses available to the Union for discharging its paramount 
responsibility under Article 356 should be exhausted to contain the 
situation. 
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4(a) In a situation of political breakdown, the Governor should explore all 
possibilities of having a Government enjoying majority support in the 
Assembly. If it is not possible for such a Government to be installed and 
if fresh elections can be held without avoidable delay, he should ask the 
outgoing Ministry, if there is one, to continue as a caretaker Government 
and then dissolve the Legislative Assembly. 
(b) If the important ingredients described above are absent, the Governor 
should recommend the proclamation of President's rule without 
dissolving the Assembly. 
5. Every Proclamation should be placed before each House of Parliament 
at the earliest, in any case before the expiry of the two-month period, 
contemplated in clause (3) of Article 356. 
6. The State Legislative Assembly should not be dissolved either by the 
Governor or the President before the Proclamation has been laid before 
Parliament and its has had an opportunity to consider it. Article 356 
should be amended to ensure this. 
7. Safeguards corresponding, in principle, to clauses (7) and (8) of Article 
352 should be incorporated in Article 356 to enable Parliament to 
review continuance in force of a Proclamation. 
8. To make the remedy of Judicial review on the ground of mala fides a 
little more meaningful, it should be provided, through an approptiate 
amendment, that the material facts and grounds on which Article 356(1) 
is invoked should be made an integral part of the Proclamation issued 
under the Article. 
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9. The report of the Governor should be a "speaking document" containing 
a precise and clear statement of all material facts and grounds on the 
basis of which the President may satisfy himself as to the existence or 
otherwise of the situation contemplated in Article 356. 
10. The Governor's report should be given wide publicity in the media and in 
full. 
11. Normally, President's Rule in a State should be proclaimed on the basis 
of the Governor's report under Article 356(1). 
12. In clause (5) of Article 356, the word 'and' occurring between sub-
clause(a) and (b) should be substituted by 'or', so that if either condition 
is satisfied, the Proclamation can be continued even beyond one year 
with the approval of Parliament and repeated amendments of the 
Constitution avoided. 
13. President's Rule should not be imposed on the grounds of 
'maladministration,' 'corruption,' 'stringent financial exigencies of the 
State' or to sort out internal difference or intra-party problems of the 
ruling party or on the ground that in the General Elections to the Lok 
Sabha, the ruling party in the State has suffered a massive defeat. 
14. In choosing a Chief Minister, the Governor should be guided by these 
principles: 
(i) The party or combination of parties which commands the widest support 
in the Legislative Assembly should be called upon to form the 
Government. 
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(ii) The Governor's task is to see that a Government is formed and not to try 
to form a Government which will pursue policies that he approves. 
15. The Governor should not risk determining the issue of majority support, 
on his own, outside the Assembly. The prudest course for him would be 
to cause the rival claims to be tested on the floor of the House. 
These recommendations, submitted more than fourteen years earlier, 
are yet to be accepted. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, in the S.R. Bommai 
case has decreed that the Assembly should not be dissolved before 
parliamentary approval and that the floor of the House is the constitutionally 
ordained forum of testing a Ministry's strength. Even this dictum of the 
Supreme Court is not being honoured. Political parties of all hues and of all 
shades of opinion had tasted power at the Centre and all of them had most 
unabashedly used this Article as a panacea for all evils. Having realised the 
immense potential of this Article, it is really doubtful whether the political 
parties are at all serious about their poll promises regarding this Article. 
In view of the growth of sub-nationalism which has tended to 
strengthen the divisive and secessionist forces and weaken the unity and 
integrity of the country, it will not be prudent to scrap this Article. Instead, 
the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission with some modiflcations in 
the light of the Supreme Court judgments and experience, may be accepted. 
With the introduction of necessary amendments to this provision 
and the formulation of a "Code of Conduct" for the President and the 
Governors under Articles 356 and 357, much of the sting of criticism against 
this provision could be blunted. The political climate will be much better and 
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the people, in general, and the political parties, in particular, will be well 
aware of the exact circumstances which would lead to the promulgation of 
President's Rule in the State, Parliament will then be able to play a meaningful 
role in overseeing the functions of the Executive Government and act as a 
watchdog in defence of democracy and federalism. 
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